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        Princelings, as a proxy for rent-seeking bureaucrats, help firms to gain many types of 
privileges including access to bank loans and insider information. This enables princeling-
backed firms to be more competitive in the Chinese market.  Similarly, business groups 
enable firms to finance from internal capital markets, which ensures their subsidiaries are 
free of financial constraints. In China’s emerging economy with its unique institutional 
background, when business groups establish princeling connections, each party contributes 
characteristics that improve their functioning. In this thesis, we investigate the impacts of 
princeling connections and the features of business groups separately and then collectively, 
to thoroughly explore their roles and relationships.  
        The first part of this thesis investigates the role of princelings in Chinese listed firms. 
Our findings suggest that princelings ensure better access to bank loans for non-SOEs but 
bring no significant benefits to SOEs. Our empirical results further indicate that bank lending 
decisions are distorted for princeling-backed firms due to the privileges and protections they 
can obtain from the higher levels of government through princelings’ family ties. Moreover, 
we find that, due to excess long-term bank loans, princeling-backed non-SOEs tend to over-
invest, which ultimately results in lower investment efficiency. Most importantly, we 
demonstrate that the anti-corruption campaign launched by the Chinese government in 2012 
effectively weakened the power of princeling connections, contributing to a fairer and more 
balanced economic environment. Overall, our study suggests that by distorting bank lending 
decisions and encouraging over-investment, the involvement of princelings in firms causes 
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resource misallocation which favours princeling-backed firms and discourages investment in 
non-princeling-backed firms. 
        The second part focuses on business groups and internal capital market. The business 
group has always been considered to be a powerful organisational form because it combines 
the strength of individual subsidiaries to serve a common goal. Such power mainly arises 
from the group’s internal capital market, which enables spare capital to be transferred to 
where it is most needed within the group. This part sheds light on the role of internal capital 
in the Chinese market. The empirical results demonstrate that internal capital markets exist 
in Chinese business groups and have diverse impacts on groups of different sizes. The 
findings show that large business groups tend to maintain inefficient internal capital markets 
for their expansion purposes, while smaller business groups usually operate efficient internal 
capital markets to achieve profit maximisation. More importantly, when faced with 
systematic threats like financial crises, the role of internal capital markets changes from 
promoting development to supporting groups’ survival regardless of the size of business 
groups. Taking the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment, we find that Chinese 
business groups preferred to have efficient internal capital markets during and immediately 
after the crisis in order to get themselves through difficult times. The results are robust while 
using alternative measures of key variables. 
        Last but not least, the third part of the thesis investigates the impact of princeling 
connections on the internal capital market efficiency of business groups by classifying the 
whole business groups into two types: vertically structured and horizontally structured 
groups. Empirical test results suggest that the incentive of profit maximisation stimulates 
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business groups to expand their businesses in the same industry, because entering an entirely 
strange industry could be risky and costly. Nevertheless, princeling connections are 
considered to be a solution to information asymmetry, industry barriers and other obstacles 
to diversification, and so they can enable business groups to enter new industries. Moreover, 
methods to transfer internal capital are different in the two types of business groups. 
Vertically structured business groups carry out internal capital transfers through trade credits, 
while horizontally structured groups do so through equity transactions. Furthermore, since 
the aim of profit maximisation stimulates vertically structured business groups to expand 
their businesses in the same industry, they often operate efficient ICMs. In comparison, 
horizontally structured business groups’ aim of “empire building” encourages them to 
establish subsidiaries in new industries, and therefore they usually have inefficient ICMs 
which usually have inefficient ICMs. Consequently, vertically structured business groups 
generally perform better than their horizontally structured counterparts. In addition, 
princeling connections help to improve ICM efficiency and corporate performance in 





Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation for the research 
        The performance and operation of a firm can be affected by many factors. These factors 
can come from inside the firm (e.g. financing and investing decisions), or outside, for 
instance the institutional environment, the firm’s network of connections, or changes to the 
economy as a whole. In the literature there are many studies on the influence of these factors 
on individual firms, but most of them focus on developed economies. However, emerging 
economies should not be neglected for they are also an important component of the 
international market. As the largest emerging economy, the Chinese market is growing and 
developing rapidly. With its unique institutional background, which will be further discussed 
in Section 1.2, the Chinese market itself presents an interesting setting to study as a 
representative of many other emerging economies.  
        The motivation of exploring the topic of princeling connections in business groups in 
the Chinese market is that both elements are quite common and representative in China, 
which provides plenty of sample and data to investigate this topic.  This thesis focuses mainly 
on princeling connections and business groups. On the one hand, princeling connections, 
thoroughly introduced and investigated in Chapter Two, are a unique form of political 
connections in emerging economies. The uniqueness of princeling connections lies in the 
institutional features of the economies. The Chinese market is the largest and the most 
representative economy among the few economies that are experiencing the influence of 
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princelings connections, which makes it an ideal research object for this topic. On the other 
hand, in regard to business groups and their internal capital markets, massive literature has 
investigated various aspects of foreign business groups, especially in the developed countries. 
In particular, business groups are formed in diverse patterns in different economies, for 
instance conglomerates in the United States, consortiums in Japan and chaebols in Korea 
(Almeida et al., 2011; Joe and Oh, 2018). Nevertheless, Chinese business groups have their 
unique settings for internal capital markets. In most Chinese business groups, especially 
state-owned business groups, there is a specific subsidiary in charge of the internal capital 
markets. Such structure differentiates Chinese business groups from those of other 
economies, and somehow forms an interaction relationship between Chinese business groups 
and princeling connections. Therefore, this study focuses on the Chinese market, and 
investigates several influencing factors and their impacts on firms, including political 
connections, the internal capital markets (ICMs) of business groups, and princeling-backed 
business groups. 
        Chapter Two describes the first study of this thesis. It is on “princeling connections”. 
The concept of princeling connections is derived from political connections in view of the 
unique institutional background of the Chinese market. Political connections are always a 
hot topic in the field of corporate finance. These connections have been demonstrated to have 
diverse influences on individual firms. The term political connection refers to a firm 
establishing a close tie with the government by either employing executives or having 
shareholders with working experience in the government. Hence, “princeling connection” 
refers to a firm establishing a close tie to the government by either employing executives or 
having shareholders who are “princelings”. Princelings are descendants of former senior 
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bureaucrats of the Chinese Communist Party. In the unique institutional and political context 
of the Chinese market, princelings work as agents of former senior officials who have an 
incentive to take advantage of their political power under strict regulations, the details of 
which will be further discussed in Section 2.1. Princeling connections, which are a 
complement to normal political connections, have been long neglected in academic studies. 
This study explores the role of princeling connections and their impacts on princeling-backed 
firms, in addition to normal political connections. 
        To explore the impact of princeling connections, it was necessary to review the literature 
on political connections, since they are closely related. When it comes to answering the 
question of whether political connections are a “helping hand” or a “grabbing hand” for a 
connected firm, the literature provides inconclusive evidence (Cheung et al., 2010). Some 
studies have found that political connections bring benefits to government-backed firms, 
including favourable conditions when borrowing from state-owned banks, better chances of 
winning government contracts, assistance and protection in licensing and taxation, and even 
bailouts during economic crises (Faccio et al., 2006; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009; Berkman 
et al., 2010). However, other researchers believe that political connections harm firm 
performance and operations due to expropriation from the government, for example due to 
tunneling or the corrupt activities of government officials (Timothy and Shleifer, 1997; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Cheung et al., 2010). In Chapter Two, the fundamental role of 
princeling connections, in addition to political connections, and its various impacts on 
princeling-backed firms, are investigated. Moreover, this study explores the reasons for the 
conflicting findings of prior studies. In the light of agency theory, princeling connections will 
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be divided into two types: shareholder princelings and executive princelings. This may help 
to solve the puzzle. 
        It is true that princeling connections are, to some extent, similar to normal political 
connections that they both utilize their connections to the government in exchange for 
personal benefits and help firms to take an advantageous position in the market. Nevertheless, 
princeling connections are distinguished from normal political connection in the mechanism 
through which they have impacts on corporate operations. On the one hand, normal political 
connections refer to executives who have previous working experience in the government. 
Upon its definition, it is obvious that “experience” of normal political connections is what 
valued most by firms. Based on their experience, executives of normal political connections 
are familiar with how government works, for instance the operation of government 
departments or the approval procedure of license or projects (Ferris et al., 2019; Hung et al., 
2015). Such experience helps executives to better cooperate with the government in order to 
achieve their firms’ aim. In other words, executives with normal political connections know 
how to do things in the government’s way to win a favourable place. On the other hand, 
princelings handle this in another way. The reason they are called princelings is their “family 
ties”, and that is their biggest difference from normal political connections. Counting on their 
fathers or mothers who used to be senior or even top bureaucrats, princelings utilize their 
family ties to reach out to the incumbent bureaucrats who were their fathers’ or mothers’ 
former colleagues or subordinate officials (Chen and Kung, 2019). With their inherited 
political power, princelings know how to get things done through their ties. Moreover, their 
networks that cover the government enable them to obtain insider information, which is a 
real advantage compared to non-princeling-backed firms. To sum up, impacts of princeling 
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connections are released in a way that is more direct and powerful. Since princeling 
connections are superior to normal political connections, we would expect their significant 
impacts in addition to normal political connections when they co-exist in firms. In addition, 
to the best of our knowledge, princeling connections have rarely been studied in previous 
literature and are initially proposed in this thesis, which is a significant different between 
princeling connections and normal political connections in the literature.  
        Forming princeling connections is one way for individual firms to create a favourable 
operating environment for themselves, as princeling connected firms have access to help 
from the government.  Alternatively, firms can seek help from other affiliated firms. 
Becoming affiliated with another firm, or establishing a new subsidiary firm, in other words 
forming a “business group”, is another way to make a firm more competitive. Compared to 
conglomerates in the United States, consortiums in Japan and chaebols in Korea, which are 
all privately owned, Chinese business groups have their unique characteristics. Due to state 
capitalism, Chinese business groups can be state-owned or privately owned (Chen et al., 
2011). State-owned business groups are usually larger, since they have strong support from 
the government.   
        Chapter Three is about Chinese business groups, and more importantly, their internal 
capital markets (ICMs). Forming a business group is a common choice for firms who are 
ambitious, while ICMs enable firms that are affiliated to act in concert. Business groups 
gather their strength through ICMs to realize their goal, whether it is profit maximisation or 
business expansion. According to the theory on ICM efficiency, within a business group, if 
internal capital is transferred to subsidiaries that have better investment opportunities, 
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(represented by higher Tobin’s Q), the ICM is considered to be efficient (Stein, 1997; Cline 
et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2011). In other words, the internal capital of a business group is 
efficiently utilised in optimal investment opportunities. Similarly, if internal capital is 
transferred from high-Tobin’s Q subsidiaries to low-Tobin’s Q subsidiaries, the ICM of the 
business group is considered to be inefficient. Even though it would seem logical for business 
groups to have efficient ICMs, both efficient and inefficient ICMs exist. Business groups 
create inefficient ICM for some purposes, for instance to facilitate “empire building” 
business expansion or to support government policy as state-owned business groups. The 
literature shows that ICMs act as alternatives to finance from the external financing market, 
such as bank loans, firm bonds and stocks (Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002; Hovakimian, 2011). 
However, findings on whether ICM adds to or diminishes business group value are not 
consistent. Thus, Chapter Three focuses on the fundamental role of ICMs in Chinese business 
groups and tries to explain how the efficiency of ICMs is determined and the impacts of 
ICMs on corporate investment decisions. 
        Since princeling connections and business groups are both considered and discussed as 
features that help firms to realise their goals, we are curious about how princeling-backed 
business groups behave. Is there a sort of synergy between princeling connections and ICMs? 
Therefore, Chapter Four shows the impacts of princeling connections on business groups, 
and furthermore, their impacts on ICM efficiency. Zhu and Chung (2014) show that, under a 
multi-party system in Taiwan, portfolios of political ties are essential to business group 
strategy. Affiliation with the ruling party facilitates business groups to enter a new industry, 
while affiliation with the rival (or competing) party is considered to be a barrier to entering 
a new industry. However, things are different in China. Since the establishment of the nation, 
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the Chinese Communist Party has been the only ruling party. Thus, there are no portfolios of 
political ties. Nevertheless, political ties to the government, as well as princeling ties, may 
still have impacts on business groups’ ability to enter a new industry. Chapter Four divides 
Chinese business groups into two types according to their level of industry diversification. 
The two types are horizontally structured and vertically structured groups. Chapter Four 
further investigates the relationship between princeling connections and the two types of 
business groups regarding ICM efficiency. 
1.2 Institutional background 
        Emerging economies, like developed economies, are important components of the 
overall international market. Among them, the Chinese market is the biggest and also one of 
the leading markets in the development process, which makes it quite representative.  
However, although the Chinese market has a lot in common with other emerging economies, 
it has its unique institutional background. When focusing on the “emerging” nature of the 
Chinese market, there are several key characteristics that stand out, including government 
intervention, state ownership, its underdeveloped external financing market and its relatively 
weak legal system. 
        First of all, there is a high level of government intervention in the Chinese market. Even 
though the market is developing rapidly and is transitioning from a centrally planned 
structure to a market-oriented structure, the government still holds a controlling power over 
the entire economy. The intervention of the government manifests in many ways, including 
the formulation of economic policy and policies for particular industries, controlling essential 
resources (water, gas, electricity, land and most importantly capital), and limitations on 
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licensing (which can be a barrier to entering an industry). Therefore, establishing a 
connection to the government can benefit a firm in many ways, including advance 
information about changes to industry policy, acquiring valuable resources, winning 
government contracts, being favoured in external financing markets, obtaining exemptions 
from taxes, protection from punishment, and obtaining licenses to enter particular industries. 
Clearly, for both standalone firms and business groups, princeling connections are highly 
valued due to the high level of government intervention. 
        The second distinguishing feature of the Chinese market is that, for historical reasons, 
there are two types of firms in terms of ownership structure. They are normally referred to 
as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). SOEs, 
which are a reflection of state capitalism (Chen et al., 2019), are obviously controlled and 
supported by the government. With their natural ties to the government, SOEs are born with 
privileges in many aspects, including advantages in the external financing market. As 
mentioned above, capital from the external financing market, especially bank loans, is 
controlled by the government (Chen et al., 2011). The big five state-owned banks account 
for more than 75% of total deposits (Liu et al., 2016). Therefore, there is no difficulty in 
understanding that why SOEs are favoured by most banks and consequently receive a 
disproportionately large share of bank loans (Cull and Xu, 2005). On the other hand, due to 
a long history of discrimination, extra capital is always welcomed by non-SOEs.   
        Thirdly, the relatively weak legal system is also a drawback of the Chinese market, and 
it breeds corruption. According to the official records of the Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China, by the end of 2011, 4.2 million party 
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members had been punished over the past three decades (Pan and Tian, 2017). By taking 
advantage of loopholes in laws and regulations, princelings are able to work as a bridge 
between connected firms and corrupt bureaucrats in exchange for personal benefits. This is 
further discussed in Section 2.1. Corruption encourages firms to establish princeling 
connections to obtain privileges. Firms without connections are at a disadvantage, and this 
creates an unfair market environment. Fortunately, the Chinese government was aware of the 
issue of corruption and decided to take action. At the end of 2012, right after the 18th 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the most serious ever anti-corruption 
campaign was launched under the leadership of President Xi. More than 182,000 bureaucrats 
had been investigated or arrested by the end of 2013, including 43 at the vice-minister-level 
or higher (Pan and Tian, 2017). Since corruption helps to create a hotbed for the tradeoff 
activities of princelings, after the anti-corruption campaign, the influence of princeling 
connections is supposed to decrease significantly.  
1.3 Theory and methodology 
1.3.1 Theory 
        Agency theory is one of the most important theories in the field of corporate finance. 
The theory points out that there is a conflict between principals and agents in the same firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Principals are the owners of a firm – for example shareholders, 
while agents are the members of the managerial team who should represent principals, for 
instance firm executives and board members. Agents are supposed to act or make operational 
decisions in the principals’ best interests. When agents fail to do so, since miscommunication 
and disagreement can always come between the two interested parties, the situation is 
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referred to as an agency problem. Agency problem usually leads to inefficiency and financial 
losses. 
        In this study, agency theory is introduced to discuss the heterogeneity of princeling 
connections. When the term “princeling connection” (the concept and definition of this term 
are further discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.3) is proposed in this study, it includes not only 
princeling executives, but also princeling shareholders. In the literature, the term ‘political 
connection’ normally refers to executives or board members with working experience in 
government, which limits its application to agents only. However, this definition does not 
accord to reality, as people with political backgrounds can be shareholders and even founding 
partners. Therefore, we are interested in the difference between principal and agent 
princelings.  
        Rent-seeking theory is another commonly recognised theory that is applied in this study. 
According to this theory, “rent-seeking” is an attempt of individuals or entities to gain 
economic benefit by manipulating social or political resources, without creating any wealth 
in return (Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 2001). Clearly, rent-seeking behaviour leads to the 
misallocation of resources and wealth. Rent-seeking activities are quite common. Some of 
them are legal like lobbying in the United States, and some are illegal for instance bribery 
and corruption. As regards the content of this study, rent-seeking theory is applied to explain 
the motivation and influence of princeling connections.  
        Rent-seeking incentive among bureaucrats motivates them to seek personal benefit from 
firms. In return for their support, they ask for personal benefits. Firms would like to take 
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advantage of bureaucrats’ political power to obtain privileges so that they can create 
favourable operating environments. Therefore, firms are inclined to establish connections to 
the government. However, in China, laws as well as the regulations of the Chinese 
Communist Party forbid bureaucrats from participating in business activities under their 
jurisdiction, even after their retirement. Unfortunately, there are loopholes which enable 
princelings to build a bridge between bribery firms and corrupt bureaucrats (further discussed 
in Chapter Two). As a result, princeling-backed firms enjoy privileges while unconnected 
firms suffer losses for any privileges they would otherwise be entitled to are transferred to 
others, which is surely a misallocation of social wealth as a consequence of rent-seeking 
behaviour. In other words, the progress of princeling-backed firms is achieved at the cost of 
unconnected firms, which results in an unhealthy and unfair competitive environment.  
 
1.3.2 Methodology 
        Empirical tests are an essential part of this study. Data regarding princeling connections 
and business groups were obtained from two frequently used databases, The China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and the Financial Research Database 
(RESSET). Information on princeling connections was manually collected from annual 
reports that provide “Background of Incumbent Executives”, as well as IPO prospectuses 
which contain sections of “Profiles of directors and senior managers”, “Background of large 
shareholders”, and “Background of founding investors”. The identification of business 
groups and their affiliated member firms is based on the “Affiliated Relationship Sub-
database” sections in CSMAR and RESSET. My dataset covers qualified listed firms (with 
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proper financial information disclosure) on Chinese stock markets from 2004 to 2014, 
including data on corporate financing, investment, performance and governance.  
        Chapter Two focuses on princeling connections and their impacts on corporate 
financing and investment. To test the effects of princeling connections on financing 
capability in SOEs and non-SOEs, an original regression model is built with a dummy 
variable of princeling connection as the independent variable. Moreover, in order to examine 
how princeling connections affect bank lending decisions, an interaction term between 
princeling connection and corporate profitability is introduced, for profitability is a vital 
criterion in loan approval processes. Furthermore, following Chen et al. (2011), the influence 
of extra bank loans on investment efficiency is tested by employing Tobin’s Q as a proxy for 
investment opportunity. Thus, the change in sensitivity of investment expenditure to 
investment opportunity, as a measure of investment efficiency reflects the impact of 
princeling connections on investment decisions. In addition, the heterogeneity of princeling 
connections is illustrated by distinguishing principal princelings (princeling shareholders) 
from agent princelings (princeling executives). Last but not least, the influence of the 
government’s current anti-corruption campaign on princeling connections is examined using 
a difference in difference method.  
        Chapter Three investigates the function and mechanism of ICMs in business groups. 
We firstly use a simultaneous model to look into the balance between external financing 
levels and investment levels in business group member firms in order to address the 
fundamental function of ICMs as an alternative to external financing markets. Secondly, 
concerning the mixed results in the literature on ICM efficiency, the sample of business 
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groups is divided into “large” and “small” sub-samples according to group size, based on the 
possibility that the development stages and sizes of business groups could affect the operation 
of their ICMs. Thirdly, by applying the method proposed by Cline (2014) to calculate 
“inefficient investment” in ICMs, we test to see if there is a difference in ICM efficiency 
between large and small business groups. To be specific, inefficient investment is measured 
as a sum of “value-destroying” and “cross-subsidiary” investment, and the models used are 
described in Section 3.3.2. Finally, as a nature experiment, the influence of the 2008 financial 
crisis on ICM efficiency is examined using a difference in difference method.  
        Chapter Four reveals the impacts of princeling connections on business groups. Using 
a measure of business group industry diversification as the dependent variable, which is a 
natural logarithm of the number of industries in one business group, the causality between 
princeling connection and business group diversification is modelled. Subsequently, a basic 
model reporting the influence of industry structure on ICM efficiency in business groups is 
developed. To further illustrate the impact of princeling connections on this relationship, an 
interaction term between princeling connection and industry structure is generated to show 
the results. Similarly, depending on the basic model that describes the influence of industry 
structure on corporate performance represented by ROA, an interaction term between 
princeling connection and industry structure is added to simulate the impact of princeling 
connections.  
1.4 Key findings and contributions 
1.4.1 Princeling connection and corporate operation 
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        High levels of government intervention over the entire economy, along with a relatively 
weak legal system, enables princelings to utilise the political networks of their fathers’ 
generation in exchange for personal benefits. The rent-seeking motivations of corrupted 
bureaucrats and the privilege-seeking motives of firms facilitate the establishment of 
princeling connections. The point of this part of the study is to examine what privileges 
princeling connections could bring and how they are achieved. Moreover, what are the 
impacts of these privileges? 
        To answer these questions, princeling-backed firms are identified in order to compare 
them with firms without princeling connections, while normal political connections are 
controlled for to eliminate their influence. The empirical results show that the relationship 
between princeling connection and the level of access to bank loans of a firm is significantly 
positive, indicating that princeling connections help connected firms to improve their 
chances of getting more bank loans. This phenomenon is not difficult to explain since the 
external financing market is controlled by the government. Notably, the loan-winning effect 
of princeling connections is more significant in non-SOEs. As discussed in Section 1.2 which 
discusses the institutional background of the Chinese market, there is a long history of 
discrimination against non-SOEs for the reason that they are less competitive compared to 
SOEs, especially in the external financing market since most big banks are owned by the 
government. Without the support of the government, non-SOEs experience strong incentives 
to establish princeling connections. In comparison to SOEs who are always adequately 
financed by banks, the loan-winning effect is stronger in princeling-backed non-SOEs. After 
further investigation, which involved introducing corporate profitability into the model, the 
findings show that banks no longer value profitability as much when a firm is princeling 
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connected. Since corporate profitability is an essential criterion in bank lending decisions, to 
some extent, the presence of princeling connections weakens its importance, which improves 
the access to bank loans in connected firms. Consequently, according to the results of 
investment efficiency model, the coefficient of the interaction term between princeling 
connection and Tobin’s Q indicates that investment expenditure becomes less responsive to 
investment opportunity in princeling-backed non-SOEs. With the extra bank loans obtained 
through princeling connections, non-SOEs tend to over-invest, which leads to a decrease in 
investment efficiency.  
        The findings on the impacts of princeling connections on corporate financing and 
investment demonstrate that such connections do help firms to gain privileges, and this is a 
finding which contributes to our understanding of the influence of political connections. As 
a complement to political connection, princeling connections share some characteristics with 
normal political connections. There seems to be a synergy between princeling connections 
and political connections regarding their loan-winning effects (further discussed in Section 
2.4.5). However, these benefits are at the cost of unconnected firms. Firms without princeling 
connections, especially non-SOEs, suffer from discrimination that makes their business 
environments even harsher. Establishing princeling connections is not a healthy way to 
strengthen firms’ competence, and it only adds to the unfairness of the market. The findings 
of this study show that the actual privileges of princeling-backed firms are obtained at the 
expense of unconnected firms, and this study therefore provides evidence that may help with 
government policy-making in regard to building a healthy and fair market. Finally, 
princelings are divided into two types, shareholder princelings and executive princelings, 
according to their roles in connected firms. The findings of this study show that there is a 
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difference between the impacts of the two types of princelings, and this is another 
contribution to the literature on agency theory (further discussed in Section 2.4.5).  
1.4.2 Business groups and internal capital markets 
        ICM is one of the key elements that help a business group to plan and develop as a 
whole. Compared to external financing markets, ICMs provide subsidiaries with internal 
capital at lower interest rates, with simpler procedures and less outside monitoring. This has 
been demonstrated to be the fundamental function of ICMs. While banks and outside 
investors can be very cautious about investing in newly established firms or firms without 
outstanding performance, ICMs meet the capital needs of these kinds of subsidiaries based 
on a long-term strategy and a concern for sustainable development.  
        Particularly, there is a significant difference between Chinese business groups and 
business groups in other markets, which motivates this research to be conducted under the 
background of the Chinese market. In a Chinese business group, ICM is usually operated by 
a specific “business group finance company” which is also a subsidiary of the group (Yiu et 
al., 2005; Keister, 1998). According to the “Measures for the Administration of Enterprise 
Group Finance Companies” issued by the People’s Bank of China in 2004, business group 
finance company refers to a non-bank financial institution that provides financial 
management services to members of a business group for the purpose of strengthening the 
centralized management of internal capital and improving the efficiency of the use of internal 
capital by business groups. Since the establishment of the first Chinese business group 
finance company in 1987, there are now 248 business group finance companies with their 
total capital scale reached more than $758 billion (Yearbook of Chinese Enterprise Group 
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Finance Companies, 2018). In this case, ICMs in Chinese business groups operate in different 
ways to ICMs in developed economies, which raises the question that whether they perform 
differently as a result.  In the literature there is a debate about the role of ICMs and whether 
they circulate internal capital efficiently or it just adds to managerial inefficiency. Can this 
study shed some light on this issue? 
        The empirical results of this study show that, thanks to ICMs, Chinese business groups 
tend to borrow less from banks while they invest indifferently compared to standalone firms. 
In other words, even though subsidiaries receive less external capital, they are able to invest 
beyond their cash flow level with the support of ICMs. To be specific, my findings show that 
affiliation with business groups weakens the relationship between cash flow level and 
investment expenditure, which is considered to be a financial constraint on a firm. ICMs help 
to ease financial constraints on subsidiaries and, interestingly, this effect is even stronger in 
smaller business groups. To figure out why the functioning of ICMs varies with group size, 
the whole sample was divided into large and small business group subsamples for further 
tests. Both subsamples were tested for ICM efficiency, and the results suggest that the 
majority of large business groups have inefficient ICMs while small business groups 
normally maintain efficient ICMs. This finding helps to explain why conclusions in the 
literature about the role of ICMs are mixed. In emerging economies like China, the market 
itself is still growing, providing spacious expansion room for business groups. Business 
groups that are eager to take over market-share, mostly large business groups, are more likely 
to be engaged in continuous expansion. Therefore, to support newly established subsidiaries 
and to serve their goals of “empire building”, large business groups circumstantially allocate 
internal capital to subsidiaries that are not currently performing well. When the stream of 
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internal capital towards relatively “weak” subsidiaries exceeds the capital stream to “strong” 
subsidiaries, an ICM is operating inefficiently. By contrast, small business groups, which are 
not engaged in aggressive expansion, focus on their goal of profit maximisation, which 
motivates them to allocate internal capital to subsidiaries with the best investment 
opportunities. Consequently, small business groups maintain efficient ICMs.  
        These findings contribute to the literature on ICMs in business groups by providing 
evidence from the Chinese market. Even though ICMs in Chinese business groups are unique 
in form, they still play a role that is identical to business groups in other countries. Key 
findings of Chapter Three regarding group size also contribute to the literature on the 
efficiency of ICMs. Different group sizes, to a certain extent, indicate different stages of 
development. By pointing out the influence of group size on the efficiency of ICMs, this 
study helps to explain the mixed results in the literature.  
1.4.3 Princeling connections and business groups 
        Given the above discussion on the function of princeling connections and business 
groups, which indicates that they both help affiliated firms to create a favourable business 
environment, it is fascinating to explore the behaviour of princeling-backed business groups. 
Since princeling connections have been demonstrated to have various impacts on individual 
firms, how do they affect business groups? More importantly, what are the impacts of 
princeling connections on ICMs and other aspects of corporate operations in business groups? 
        The findings of Chapter Four firstly suggest that Chinese business groups with 
princeling connections are more likely to be involved in more than one industry. Specifically, 
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princeling connections facilitates business groups to enter new industries due to the 
privileges they bring, including getting licenses and obtaining resources more easily, and 
better access to insider information on industry policy. As a result, business groups can be 
divided into two types based on their industry structures. Horizontally structured business 
groups refer to groups involved in multiple industries, while vertically structured business 
groups refer to those that concentrate on one industry. Empirical results indicate that 
horizontally structured business groups are more likely to be involved in “inefficient 
investment”, which is composed of “cross-subsidiary” and “value-destroying” investments. 
If a business group makes inefficient investments, its ICM is considered to be inefficient 
(Cline et al., 2014). Thus, the findings show that horizontally structured business groups 
perform inefficient ICM to serve their “empire building” purpose. If a group is a cross-
industry business group, this clearly reveals its intention of business expansion, while 
vertically structured business groups perform efficient ICM to realise profit maximisation, 
and they utilise their accumulated professional and practical experience in one industry.  
        Furthermore, my findings show that princeling connections improve ICM efficiency in 
horizontally structured business groups. Compared to non-connected horizontally structured 
business groups, princeling-backed horizontally structured groups have a better chance of 
gaining promising and profitable investment opportunities, and they are better placed to be 
aware of potential policy changes in new industries due to insider information. For the same 
reason, princeling connections improve the corporate performance of connected business 
groups, especially horizontally structured ones, because they generally perform worse than 
their vertically structured peers. All in all, princeling connections not only facilitate business 
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groups to enter more industries, but also help them to overcome some of the drawbacks of 
horizontally structured business groups. 
        The findings on the relationship between princeling connections and business groups, 
and their connections to industry structure and ICM efficiency contribute to the literature on 
both political connections and business groups. Prior studies on political connections have 
mainly focused on their influence on individual firms, and this study provides another 
perspective by looking at the question from the perspective of business groups. In addition, 
this study explores the effect of princeling connections on business group industry structure, 
which provides another reasonable explanation for business group diversification.   
1.5 Structure of this thesis 
        This thesis has five chapters. Chapter One gives an overview of the thesis, briefly stating 
the motivation and key findings of the research, and describing the institutional background 
of the Chinese market. The following three chapters are the main content of the thesis. 
Chapter Two focuses on princeling connections and their various impacts on individual firms 
in regard to corporate operations, including financing and investing decisions. The chapter 
thus reveals the privileges brought by princeling connections and the corresponding losses 
experienced by non-connected firms. Chapter Three investigates ICMs in Chinese business 
groups from several perspectives, including: their fundamental role as alternatives to external 
financing market, the transfer of internal capital, and the influence of group size on ICM 
efficiency. Chapter Four explores princeling-backed business groups, especially in regard to 
the effects of princeling connections on ICM efficiency and the performance of horizontally 
structured business groups. The last chapter provides a summary of the results of the 
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empirical study, and highlights the key conclusions drawn from the analysis and discussion 
in the preceding chapters.   
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   Social networks have always been an essential component of human societies. When it 
comes to the field of corporate finance, we are interested in the influence of such relationships 
on corporate operations. The objective of Chapter Two is to investigate the role of princeling 
connections in the Chinese market, since they are really a powerful and influential network 
due to the specific institutional background of the economy. The impacts of princeling 
connections are examined from four perspectives: (1) impacts on the level of access to bank 
loans in individual firms; (2) impacts on bank lending decisions; (3) impacts on corporate 
investment decisions; (4) the influence of the anti-corruption campaign on the role of 
princeling connections. Firstly, since many studies have shown that normal political 
connections do have great positive impacts on corporate financing, we hypothesise that 
princeling connections have unique effects in addition to normal political connections. This 
hypothesis can be inferred from the institutional background mentioned above. Secondly, we 
hypothesise that princeling connections have significant impacts on bank lending decisions 
because firms with government support are always considered to be better debtors by banks. 
Thirdly, if princeling-backed firms are supposed to get more loans, it is reasonable to assume 
that the excess capital is transferred into investment expenditure, and that this affects 
investment efficiency. Finally, to justify the fundamental fact that the benefits brought by 
princeling connections depend on bribery and corruption, a comparison between the 
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empirical results before and after the anti-corruption campaign is made. 
    The extant literature has identified several other types of networks that have impacts on 
individual firms, including alumni connections, professional connections, social connections 
(local ties), legal and business connections, and political connections in diverse forms 
(Maciel and Camargo, 2016; Mogiliansky, 2002). For instance, alumni connections affect 
stock holding decisions and returns of fund portfolio managers (Cohen and Malloy, 2010), 
while professional connections help firms to get more trading credit (Liu et al., 2016). Among 
others, political connections play a non-negligible role in firms in both developed and 
developing economies (Gary et al., 2014). In developed economies like the United States, 
lobbying activities are a typical form of political connection at the firm level (Bennedsen and 
Feldmann, 2006; Drazen el al., 2007). In emerging countries like China, political connections 
usually exist through executives having prior experience working for government. The latter 
form of political connections, which are referred to as normal political connections in this 
study, has been thoroughly investigated in the literature. 
In addition to the aforementioned normal political connections, there is another similar 
connection that is even more popular in the Chinese market. This ‘princeling connection’ is 
proposed as a new form of political connection in this chapter. A firm with princeling 
shareholders or executives is considered to possess princeling connections. The term 
princeling refers to descendants of former senior bureaucrats of the Chinese Communist 
Party. They have aroused a heated discussion due to their significant influence on the 
economy in China, but their impacts have rarely been investigated in an academic manner. 
As a result of the continuous rule of Chinese Communist Party since the establishment of the 
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nation, successive senior bureaucrats possess great political power, even long after their 
retirement, and that power is inherited by princelings to some extent. The New York Times 
published an article in May 2012, entitled “‘Princelings’ in China Use Family Ties to Gain 
Riches”. The article declared that princelings were almost routinely included in commercial 
ventures in today’s China. According to the article, “this is how the Communist Party shares 
the spoils, allowing the relatives of senior leaders to cash in”. For instance, Li Xiaolin 
(daughter of Li Peng, a former prime minister) is the chairwoman and chief executive of 
China Power International, one of the five biggest power generating companies in China. 
Her brother, Li Xiaopeng, was formerly the head of another top electricity company and is 
now a provincial governor. Over the past two decades, business and politics have become so 
tightly intertwined that the Communist Party has effectively institutionalised an entire 
ecosystem of crony capitalism (Barboza and Franiere, 2012). 
Princelings do play a big part in the crony system. They are extremely popular in China 
because even though laws and regulations prevent senior bureaucrats from misusing their 
authority, there are still loopholes for their families to take advantage of. To be more specific, 
incumbent bureaucrats are legally barred from taking any positions in firms and their spouses 
and children are not allowed to be engaged in any business under the bureaucrats’ jurisdiction 
while they are in power. If incumbent bureaucrats or their family members are caught 
obtaining personal benefits, they suffer harsh punishments according to the law. In 
consideration of possible future political careers, and more importantly to be free from 
having criminal records, incumbent bureaucrats are normally very cautious when they are in 
power. Therefore, if they intend to obtain personal benefits from their positions, their only 
choice is to cooperate with their former colleagues and, more commonly, with subordinate 
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officials after their retirement. However, there are strict regulations which prevent former 
bureaucrats from participating in business activities connected to their former jurisdictions 
even after their retirement. This means that it is not possible for them to gain benefits directly 
for themselves. As a result, the descendants of former senior bureaucrats, princelings, are 
found to be perfect proxies for the elder generation.  
Princelings act as representatives of their political families and obtain benefits by 
utilising the political networks previously constructed by older family members. Due to their 
family connections they are able to bribe corrupt bureaucrats in their networks in exchange 
of privileges and protections for their firms (Fan et al., 2008). This motivates princelings to 
take managerial positions in firms, or simply to establish their own firms. Participating in 
business activities enables princelings to use their political influence into obtain actual 
benefits for their firms, as well as for themselves if going a step further, juris et de jure. The 
other way around, against the institutional background of severe government intervention 
and relatively weak legal protection for property rights, Chinese firms, especially private 
enterprises, are subject to strong incentives to establish princeling connections so that they 
can enjoy privileges and protections from the government (Burkart et al., 2003; Chen et al., 
2017; Faccio et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2012; Morck et al., 2005; Yeh et al., 2013; Yang, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the benefits gained by princeling-backed firms are at the cost of non-
princeling-backed firms. As discussed above, since China is an emerging economy in 
transformation, its financing market is not entirely market-oriented. The government still 
possesses great controlling power over banks, especially state-owned banks. Therefore, state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) are in a favourable position for obtaining loans from banks due to 
their inherited connections to the government. This means fewer loans are available for non-
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SOEs. Thus, princeling connections are highly sought after by non-SOEs. Since SOEs and 
princeling-backed non-SOEs are able to claim larger shares of the limited capital resources, 
non-princeling-backed non-SOEs are faced with as even harsher financing environment, and 
this creates an unbalanced and unhealthy economic environment. Fortunately, the Chinese 
government is fully aware of the situation, and it launched a major anti-corruption campaign 
at the end of 2012. The effects of the campaign will be discussed in detail in later sections. 
To sum up, princeling connections are of great practical influence in the Chinese market 
and are a typical phenomenon that worth studying. However, its role has been long neglected 
by literature. More importantly, as a complement to normal political connections, 
unrecognition of princeling connections data could result in type 1 error during analysis of 
normal political connections. In order to fill in this gap and to achieve a more comprehensive 
understanding of the role of political connections, this chapter focuses on the investigation 
of political connections in the Chinese market.   
Princeling connections, as a complement to normal political connections, are the key 
study subject. The two types of political connections co-exist. On the one hand, the 
widespread normal political connections are usually identified when firms employ executives 
with governmental working experience. On the other hand, princeling connections are 
welcomed by firms as well. The extant literature contains mixed, even conflicting, views on 
the influence of political connections (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2010; Fan et al., 2007). The 
reason for this may be the hidden role of princeling connections. As normal political 
connections have been relatively broadly established in firms, princeling connections appear 
to have more influence on competition for resources and loans. 
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The results of our regression models, consistent with our hypotheses, suggest that 
princeling connections do have major impacts on multiple aspects of corporate operations. 
First of all, princeling connections generally improve princeling-backed firms’ access to 
bank loans, especially for non-SOEs, which is at the cost of non-princeling-backed firms. 
Secondly, according to the test results on bank lending decisions, banks prefer princeling-
backed firms regardless of their profitability. Thirdly, princeling-backed firms, holding better 
access to long-term bank loans which are afterwards converted into investment capital, tend 
to over-invest.  As a result, weakened relationship between investment growth and 
investment opportunity impairs investment efficiency in princeling-backed firms. Fourthly, 
the anti-corruption campaign effectively weakened the impacts of princeling connections, 
creating a fairer and more balanced economic environment. This result further demonstrates 
that princelings grab personal profits by means of bribery and corruption. Moreover, 
princeling executives are found to be more powerful than princeling shareholders, due to 
their responsibility in corporate management and operations. Last but not least, princeling 
connections were found be more powerful than normal political connections.  
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, to the best of our 
knowledge, the impacts of princeling connections on corporate financing and investment are 
academically investigated for the first time in this study. The role and impacts of princeling 
connections, as phenomena distinct from normal political connections, have long been 
neglected. With their inherited political power through family ties which are surely 
exogenous, princeling connections help to eliminate potential endogeneity issues.  The 
analysis of princeling connections gives us an insight into the typical rent-seeking behaviour 
of corrupted government bureaucrats. Furthermore, based on agency theory, princelings are 
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divided into two groups in regard to their different roles in corporate operations. The 
empirical results and discussion on princeling shareholders as principals and princeling 
executives as agents contribute to agency theory from a unique perspective. More 
importantly, the co-existence of princeling connections and normal political connections is 
explored by examining and comparing their individual impacts on financing and investing 
activities. This chapter facilitates a comprehensive understanding of the role of political 
connections by viewing them as a complement to normal political connections.  
2.2 Hypothesis development 
2.2.1 Princeling connections and bank loans 
        As the world’s largest emerging economy, China is making every effort to improve its 
economic environment. However, despite decades of progressive achievements in economic 
reform, China is still a transforming economy with a high level of government intervention 
over various dimensions including the allocation of key resources. Studies found that 
connections with the government provide firms with preferential access to government 
subsidies, financing opportunities, investment opportunities, and protection from 
expropriation by the government (Chen, 2011; Cheung et al., 2010; De Soto, 1989; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993, 1994). Therefore, on the one hand, firms experience strong incentives to 
establish connections with the government to obtain privileges and protection. They also 
expect additional benefits from the connections, for instance favourable conditions when 
borrowing loans, exemption from taxes, and winning government contracts (Ferris et al., 
2019; Goldman et al., 2013). For these tempting terms, firms are willing to sacrifice a small 
part of their earnings. On the other hand, government bureaucrats are stimulated to take 
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advantage of their political power for personal benefit. They are able to provide convenience 
to firms under their jurisdiction due to their power over resource allocation and project 
approvals. Even though both sides are eager to ‘cooperate’, laws always act as a barrier 
between them to prevent the trade-off between money and power, and to protect the rights of 
other law-abiding firms. Consequently, acting as a proxy of former senior bureaucrats, 
princelings function as the bridge between the two interested parties, under the cover of 
loopholes in laws. The motives of both sides facilitate rent-seeking behaviours that take place 
through bribery and corruption. As a result, equipped with guaranteed government 
connections, princeling-backed firms are able to enjoy many direct and indirect advantages, 
which surely contributes to better corporate performance. Given this situation, it is not 
surprising that princeling-backed firms are considered to be favourable debtors by banks, 
especially state-owned banks, and that this directly results in more loans (Claessens et al., 
2008). 
        To a further extent, according Chen (2011), firms with different ownership structures 
may have diverse experiences in regard to political connections. On the one hand, due to 
weak property right protection accompanied by a long history of discrimination against 
entrepreneur enterprises in China, non-SOEs are always in a disadvantageous position in the 
external financing market, and they experience stronger incentives to obtain princeling 
connections to turn the table (Boubakri et al., 2011). Once connected, non-SOEs are likely 
to receive considerable benefits. In non-SOEs, princeling connections help to remedy their 
inferiority (compared with naturally government-connected SOEs) and even to gain 
superiority (compared with non-princeling-backed non-SOEs). Banks, mainly state-owned 
banks, may find it hard to reject loan applications from princeling-backed non-SOEs due to 
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their political backgrounds. On the other hand, since SOEs are naturally connected to the 
government, they have already had a taste of every possible privilege (Li et al., 2009). Thus, 
SOEs may not experience a significant improvement in their situation as a result of princeling 
connections. Furthermore, corruption in SOEs creates the potential for collusion between 
government bureaucrats and SOE managers to provide personal benefits for both (Pan and 
Tian, 2017). The tunnelling issue in SOEs may even be aggravated by princelings, since their 
political backgrounds protect them from possible punishment, which totally offsets any 
benefits brought by princelings. Overall, banks prefer princeling-backed non-SOEs to non-
princeling-backed non-SOEs, while princeling-backed SOEs do not share the exactly same 
experience. The above discussion gives rise to the following hypothesis: 
        H1a: Princeling connections help firms to gain more bank loans, and these positive 
impacts on corporate financing are much stronger in non-SOEs than that in SOEs. 
        H1a deals with the impact of princeling connections on access to bank loans in 
individual firms. Nevertheless, we are more interested in how princeling connections affect 
bank lending decisions. It is reasonable to expect that firm profitability is one of the most 
essential criteria for assessing bank loan applications. Usually, firms with better profitability 
are more likely to receive relatively more bank loans. Based on the argument above, 
princeling-backed firms gain more bank loans because they are considered to be better and 
safer debtors by banks. Findings of Cheng and Wu (2019) show that the mechanism for better 
access to bank loan might be political connections are considered by banks as a signal of 
creditworthiness. Therefore, it can be further assumed that banks tend to award more loans 
to princeling-backed firms, due to the privileges and protections they can get from the 
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government, without worrying too much about their profitability (Chen et al., 2010). The 
situation is different from what normally happens. In other words, if firms establish 
princeling connections, even if their profitability is poorer, they are able to obtain more loans 
which were previously unavailable. To some extent, the privileges brought by princeling 
connections offset the deficiency of poor firm profitability. Therefore, a sub-hypothesis is 
developed:  
        H1b: Bank lending to princeling-backed firms is less responsive to firm profitability 
than bank lending to firms that do not have princeling connections.  
2.2.2 Princeling connections and corporate investment 
    As princeling connections are supposed to bring more bank loans, we are curious about 
their further influence on other aspects of corporate operations. Since external financing is 
one of the most common methods of raising investment capital, especially in China where 
other financing markets are relatively underdeveloped, it is worth investigating the 
relationship between additional bank loans and investment growth in princeling-backed firms. 
Chen et al. (2011) documented that normal political connections weaken the sensibility of 
investment expenditure to investment opportunities in SOEs, but have no significant 
influence in non-SOEs. In line with the research of Chen et al., this study explores the impacts 
of princeling connections on investment efficiency, expecting to reveal more details. We 
predict that the situations in SOEs and non-SOEs will be different for the same reason 
proposed earlier regarding bank loans. 
    On the one hand, it is relatively easier for SOEs to access bank loans due to their 
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inherent state-owned nature. Therefore, princeling connections do not dramatically increase 
their access to bank loans. To a further extend, no obvious changes are expected in their 
investment decisions. On the other hand, in princeling-backed non-SOEs, it is reasonable to 
assume that the majority of additional bank loans, especially long-term bank loans, are 
transferred into investment expenditure. With excess financial capital, princeling-backed 
non-SOEs tend to invest more than they used to. Thus, investment growth should be 
increased by the presence of princeling connections as well. However, since princeling-
backed non-SOEs are receiving more bank loans than they used to, regardless of their firm 
profitability, they are eagerly searching for more investment opportunities in addition to the 
optimal ones, resulting in their being less cautious when making investment decisions. 
Consequently, we predict that princeling-backed non-SOEs tend to over-invest as a result of 
their soft budgetary constraints, leading to lower investment efficiency: 
        H2: Princeling connections give rise to investment growth, but make it less responsive 
to investment opportunities in non-SOEs, but in SOEs, princeling connections do not make 
investment growth less responsive to investment opportunities. 
2.2.3 Princeling connections and the anti-corruption campaign 
        H1 and H2 are proposed based on the argument that princeling connections work by 
means of bribery and corruption. More specifically, in this tripartite transaction, individual 
firms play the role of briber, and bureaucrats play the role of 49ehav, while princelings act 
as agents between the two interested parties. Equipped with the political network built by 
their fathers’ generation, princelings have easy access to incumbent bureaucrats who are their 
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fathers’ former colleagues and subordinate officials. Utilising such networks, princelings 
enable the trade-off between personal benefits for corrupted bureaucrats and privileges for 
bribing firms. Undoubtedly, the intermediary princelings gain their own benefits during the 
process. As a result, bureaucrats’ willingness to exert political power and engage in corrupt 
activities, along with the actions of firms, facilitate the establishment of princeling 
connections in the first place (Ramalho, 2007). In summary, the improvement of corporate 
financing in princeling-backed firms actually depends on corruption activities. Recently, the 
Chinese government decided to stop the chaos, and promoted a nationwide anti-corruption 
campaign, and this provides us with a suitable context for examining the impact of princeling 
connections in a nature. At the end of 2012, the National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party launched an ‘eight-point’ Anti-bureaucracy and Formalism Regulation, and declared 
the commencement of an anti-corruption campaign. This was followed by very detailed 
implementations, and the severest-ever anti-corruption campaign has had significant 
influence in many respects, even at the firm level (Ke et al., 2016). During the progress of 
the campaign, a large number of corruption cases have been exposed, and corrupt bureaucrats 
were arrested in 2013 and 2014. Based on this anti-corruption activity, the impacts of 
princeling connections before and after the anti-corruption campaign will be compared to 
detect any changes. Basically, if the impacts of princeling connections do depend on corrupt 
activities, a sharp change is expected to be observed, given the success of the campaign. To 
illustrate the authenticity of this fact statistically, the influence of the anti-corruption 
campaign on the power of princeling connections is examined with the following hypothesis: 




2.3 Research design 
2.3.1 Sample 
2.3.1.1 Definition of key variables 
The most important variable in the models is Princelings. As mentioned in Section 2.1, 
‘princelings’ refers to direct descendants of former senior government bureaucrats who were 
in provincial or higher-level positions. The Princelings variable is initially proposed in this 
study as a measure of this typical kind of political connection, which is differentiated from 
normal political connections, for its impacts have not yet been academically investigated. To 
avoid ambiguity, a firm is defined as princeling-backed if it satisfies both the following 
criteria: (1) one of its top 10 shareholders or CEO or board members (including chairman) is 
a direct descendant of a former senior bureaucrat; (2) the former bureaucrat was in a 
provincial or higher-level position. The first criterion ensures that the sample of princeling-
backed firms comprises firms with princeling shareholders and firms with princeling 
executives. The second criterion ensures the study accords with the reality that only senior 
bureaucrats are considered to remain influential after their government tenure. Ultimately, a 
dummy variable Princelings is generated, which equals 1 if a listed firm is defined as 
princeling-backed and it equals 0 otherwise. 
Other than Princelings, normal political connections are also included as a control 
variable, and to enable a further comparison between the two types of political connections. 
In light of extant literature, normal political connections are said to occur when firms employ 
executives with governmental working experience. Precisely, a firm is considered to be 
politically connected if any of its CEO or board members (including chairman) is a former 
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government official, or (current or former) deputy of the People’s Congress or the People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (Chen et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2013). Hence, the dummy 
variable Normal PC is generated, which equals 1 if the listed firm employs executives with 
working experience in the government and it equals 0 otherwise. Dependent variables include 
Bank loan (Total bank loan, Long-term bank loan and Short-term bank loan) and Investment 
growth. A set of selected variables were employed as control variables for other aspects of 
firm characteristics, including ROS, Tobin’s Q, Size, Tangibility and so on. Detailed 
definitions and calculations of the dependent and control variables are reported in Table 2.1. 
In avoiding abnormal observations, all the variables are trimmed at the 1% level in each tail. 
2.3.1.2 Data collection 
To identify the sample of princeling-backed firms, the information about princelings is 
manually collected in mainly two ways. On the one hand, we manually searched all potential 
(anecdotal) princelings for their education, career, and life experience, and then compare 
their profiles to backgrounds of shareholders and executives in the database. If there is an 
exact match between a princeling’s profile and a shareholder/executive’s background, the 
firm that has the princeling is identified as a princeling-backed firm. Since princelings are a 
group that has attracted so much attention to themselves, brief introduction of essential 
princelings can be easily accessed through the internet. Meanwhile, CSMAR includes sub-
databases briefly reporting key information of executives/shareholders in listed firms, 
including their year of birth, educational background, and career life. Depending on the 
publicly accessible information, we firstly search in the database for executives/shareholders 
who share the same name with the princelings, and then compare resumes of the 
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Table 2.1 Definition and calculation of variables 
 
Name of variables Definition 
Panel A. Dependent variables  
Bank loan  Includes total bank loan, long-term bank loan and short-term bank 
loan 
Total bank loan  Total bank loans scaled by total assets 
Long-term bank loan  Long-term bank loans scaled by total assets 
Short-term bank loan  Short-term bank loans scaled by total assets 
Investment growth Logarithm of investment expenditure divided by its one period lag 
∆ total bank loan  Total bank loans less its one period lag scaled by total assets  
∆ long-term bank loan Long-term bank loans less its one period lag scaled by total assets  
∆ short-term bank loan  Short-term bank loans less its one period lag scaled by total assets  
∆ investment expenditure Investment expenditure less its one period lag scaled by total assets 
Panel B. Independent variables  
Princelings A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a princeling 
shareholder or executive and equals 0 otherwise 
SOE A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a SOE, and equals 0 if 
the firm is a non-SOE 
Normal PC A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has an executive with 
governmental working experience and equals 0 otherwise 
Campaign A dummy variable that equals 1 if referring to the period after the 
anti-corruption campaign and equals 0 otherwise 
ROS Total pre-tax profits to total sales 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets divided by the replacement cost of assets 
Panel C. Control variables  
Size  Natural logarithm of total assets 
Tangibility  Total fixed assets to total assets 
Leverage Total liabilities to total assets 
Board  Number of directors on the board to total assets 
Independence Number of independent directors on the board to total number of 




executives/shareholders to profiles of the princelings. An exact match between one 
executive’s/shareholder’s resume and a princeling’s profile implies that they are the same 
person. In other words, we can confirm that this firm is princeling-backed. By repeating this 
process, we went through the long list of princelings manually. On the other hand, we search 
through the official website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the 
Communist Party of China for exposed corruption cases that involved descendants of former 
senior bureaucrats. Afterwards, related information is collected by utilising the searching 
engines of Google and Baidu, as well as reports in the state media Xinhua News Agency and 
other mainstream media if applicable. Additionally, if any of the aforementioned information 
resources indicates that a firm is related to princelings, we go through its IPO prospectus and 
annual reports to verify this.  
In particular, according to the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China and the 
disclosure rules of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), IPO prospectuses 
must contain sections on “Profile of Directors and Senior Managers”, “Background of Large 
Shareholders”, and “Background of Founding Investors”. Similarly, annual reports must 
provide background information on incumbent executives. Thus, if a top-10 shareholder or 
an executive is recognised as a princeling by either of the above two ways, the firm he/she is 
serving is considered to be princeling-backed. To clarify, only top 10 shareholders are 
considered, for small shareholders do not have sufficient influence on corporate operations.  
With respect to the process of basic data collection, we firstly include all the qualified 
firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) from 2004 to 
2014, excluding the Small and Medium Sized Enterprise board (SEM) and Growth Enterprise 
55 
 
Market board (GEM). In order to eliminate abnormal observations, listed firms in the 
financial sector are excluded due to their unique accounting standard and special capital 
structures, as well as firms with Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) status 
according to usual data processing methods. Most of the data is collected from multiple sub-
databases in the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). All the 
financial information and indexes are collected from the Chinese Listed Firm Annual Report 
Database and Chinese Listed Firm Financial Variables Analysis Database. In addition, the 
Chinese Listed Firm Corporate Governance Database and the Chinese Listed Firm 
Shareholder Analysis Database are used to collect background information about firm 
shareholders and executives. In total, we have 19440 firm year observations. 
2.3.1.3 Sample distribution and summary statistics 
Table 2.2 reports the sample distribution of princeling-backed firms. Panel A shows the 
distribution by year and ownership structure. On average, 7.63% SOEs and 7.90% non-SOEs 
were princeling-backed. There was an obvious turning point in the percentage of princeling-
backed firms after the anti-corruption campaign at the end of 2012. The percentage of 
princeling-backed SOEs decreased from 7.44% to 6.36%, while the percentage of princeling 
backed non-SOEs decreased from 7.03% to 6.75%. According to Panel B, the sample 
distribution by industry, princeling-backed firms were apparently concentrated in several 
industries. The highest densities of princeling-backed firms were spotted in the mining, 
transportation and business service industries, followed by the resources, real estate and 
utilities industries. This distribution supports our argument that princeling connections exert 
an influence by participating in the sectors with high levels of government intervention, for 
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Table 2.2 Sample distribution  
Panel A: Distribution by year and ownership structure 
Year SOEs Non-SOEs 
 No. of 
sample 
No. of  
connected  




No. of  
connected  
% of  
connected 
2004 957 79  8.25 296 36   12.1 
2005 963 92  9.55 382 42   10.9 
2006 947 86  9.08 395 37   9.36 
2007 943 79  8.37 476 49   10.2 
2008 950 82  8.63 571 47   8.23 
2009 959 63  6.56 616 52   8.44 
2010 975 71  7.28 747 59   7.89 
2011 1012 70  6.91 1059 80   7.55 
2012 1007 75  7.44 1294 91   7.03 
2013 1022 65  6.36 1407 95   6.75 
2014 1017 59  5.80 1445 99   6.85 
Total 10752 821  7.63 8688 687   7.90 
Panel B: Distribution by industry 
This table shows sample distribution by year and ownership structure, as well as by industry.  
instance the real estate and utilities industries. In addition, princeling-backed firms in the 
Industry No. of sample No. of connected  % of connected 
Agriculture 216 6 2.77 
Mining 666 118 17.7 
Manufacturing 12161 744 6.11 
Electricity, gas and water 873 116 13.2 
Construction 513 6 1.16 
Wholesale and retail 1198 48 4.00 
Transportation 918 144 15.6 
Information technology 695 55 7.91 
Real estate 1134 152 13.4 
Leasing and business services 261 50 19.1 
Utilities 207 30 14.4 
Service 146 11 7.53 
Conglomerate 452 28 6.19 
Total 19440 1508 7.75 
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business services and utilities industries provide circumstantial evidence that princelings 
have shortcuts to insider information and privileges in winning government contracts. 
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics of all variables included in regression models and 
univariate test results of dependent variables between princeling-backed and non-princeling-
backed firms. According to Panel B, princeling-backed firms received significantly more 
bank loans compared to non-princeling-backed firms, including long-term and short-term 
bank loans. Simultaneously, princeling-backed firms experienced higher growth rates in 
investment. All the univariate tests results are preliminarily consistent with our hypotheses. 
2.3.2 Regression models 
        As proposed in Section 2.2 regarding the hypotheses, this chapter mainly explores the 
impacts of princeling connections on corporate external financing, bank lending decisions, 
and corporate investment decisions, as well as the influence of the anti-corruption campaign 
on princeling connections. Hence, a set of regression models is developed as follows. In order 
to investigate the primary hypothesis regarding corporate bank loans, the first regression 
model is established in the light of Liu et al. (2016).  
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 × 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐶  
                                      +𝛽 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐶 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠 𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒   
                                      +𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + ɛ (2.1a) 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 × 𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑂𝐸  
                                    +𝛽 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐶 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠 𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒                                 
                                    +𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + ɛ  (2.1b)  
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Table 2.3 Summary statistics and univariate test of key variables  
Panel A: Summary statistics 




StD Min Max 
Total bank loan 
(%) 
19440 15.60 12.8 5.06 29.53 17.34 3.75 38.24 
Long-term 
bank loan (%) 
19440 6.11 3.89 0.00 9.16 7.21 0.00 25.56 
Short-term 
bank loan (%) 
19440 7.28 2.02 0.00 11.01 1.93 0.00 20.38 
Investment 
growth 
19440 0.08 0.13 -0.59 0.72 1.18 -0.82 1.39 
Tobin’s Q 19440 1.72 1.39 0.61 2.91 1.79 0.08 7.21 
ROS (%) 19440 3.03 3.07 0.01 9.74 1.26 -0.49 19.69 
Leverage (%) 19440 0.45 0.46 0.23 0.67 0.24 0.05 2.07 
Ln(Size) 19440 21.62 21.26 20.58 22.11 1.27 16.73 30.64 
Tangibility (%) 19440 24.60 21.86 11.63 35.96 7.45 3.16 43.01 
Board 19440 9.03 9.00 8.00 9.00 1.88 6.00 18.00 
Independence 
(%) 
19440 35.55 33.33 33.33 33.33 6.55 33.33 39.98 
Princelings 19440 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Normal PC 19440 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Panel B: Univariate tests comparing princeling-backed and non-princeling-backed firms 
Variables With princelings Without princelings t-value Wilcoxon 
Total bank loan 0.18 0.13 3.46*** 3.45*** 
Long-term bank loan 0.08 0.06 2.95*** 2.95*** 
Short-term bank loan 0.08 0.07 2.16** 2.14** 
Investment growth 0.15 0.07 2.26** 2.26** 
This table shows summary statistics and univariate test of key variables. Detailed definitions of all 
the variables are reported in Table 2.1. 
 
    where the dependent variable Bank loan is the level of access to bank loans, including 
total bank loans, long-term bank loans and short-term bank loans. The variable Princelings 
is an essential dummy, which equals 1 if a firm is recognised as princeling-backed and equals 
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0 otherwise. Normal PC is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a firm is politically 
connected by executives with government working experience and it equals 0 otherwise. 
SOE is a dummy that equals 1 for SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs. The interaction term between 
Princelings and SOE shows the diverse impacts of princeling connections on firms with 
different ownership structures. ROS (return on sales) stands for firm profitability, and Tobin’s 
Q represents investment opportunity. Two groups of indicators that control for the financial 
and corporate governance characteristics of different firms are included. The former includes 
Size (natural logarithm of total assets) and Tangibility. The latter includes Board (natural 
logarithm of board size) and Independence (percentage of board independence), please see 
Table 2.1. Year and Industry dummy variables are also included to control for year and 
industry fixed effects. 
The coefficient of Princelings, β1, is expected to be significantly positive, supporting the 
hypothesis that princelings generally improve the access to bank loans in firms. According 
to H1a, the coefficient of the interaction term in equation (2.1b), β2, is expected to be 
significantly negative, suggesting princeling connections bring relatively more bank loans to 
non-SOEs compared to SOEs. In regards to the coefficient of the interaction term in equation 
(2.1a), a significantly positive coefficient suggests a complementary effect between 
princeling connections and normal political connections, and a significantly negative 
coefficient suggests a substitute effect between the two types of connections. In addition, the 
coefficient of SOE, β3, is expected to be significantly positive, reflecting the fact that SOEs 




    In order to test H1b regarding bank lending decisions, regression (2.2) is constructed on 
the basis of regression (2.1). ROS is a measurement of firm profitability, which is considered 
to be a common criterion adopted by banks when making lending decisions. In most cases, a 
firm with high profitability is likely to get more bank loans because of its better debt 
repayment ability. Therefore, the interaction term between Princelings and ROS reveals 
whether princeling connections distort this decision-making rule. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 × 𝑅𝑂𝑆  
                                              +𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐶 +  𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠 𝑄                              
                                              +𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  
                                              +𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + ɛ                                               (2.2) 
        where all the variables are defined in the same way as in regression (2.1). The coefficient 
of ROS, β3, is expected to be significantly positive which indicates the fact that firm 
profitability is usually positively correlated with access to bank loans in individual firms. 
More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term between Princelings and ROS, β2, 
is expected to be significantly negative to provide evidence to support H1b that princeling 
connections distort the profitability criterion of bank lending decisions. 
        Furthermore, regression (2.3) is structured to examine H2. Following Chen (2011), the 
dependent variable is investment growth, while Tobin’s Q represents investment opportunity. 
Similar to regression (2.2), normally, investment growth is positively responsive to 
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investment opportunities, reflecting healthy investment efficiency. Thus, the interaction term 
between Princelings and Tobin’s Q indicates whether princeling connections have any 




= 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 × 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠 𝑄  
                                 +𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠 𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐶 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  
                                 +𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ                                              (2.3) 
        The coefficient of Tobin’s Q, β3, is expected to be significantly positive, showing the 
normal relationship between investment opportunities and growth. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient of Princelings, β1, is expected to be significantly positive as well, which indicates 
princeling connections promote investment growth due to the extra bank loans brought by 
them. However, the coefficient of the interaction term between Princelings and Tobin’s Q is 
expected to be significantly negative to show that princeling connections indirectly do harm 
to investment efficiency. 
        Finally, to test H3 on the influence of the anti-corruption campaign, regression (2.4) and 
(2.5) are developed as follows to give separate results on bank lending decisions and 
corporate investment decisions. The control variables are also different for different tests. 
The whole sample is firstly divided in to two subsamples for SOEs and non-SOEs, and each 
subsample is further divided into two parts to indicate princeling-backed and non-princeling-
backed firms respectively.  
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   𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛 + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛 × 𝑅𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝑆       
                                      +𝛽 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐶 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠 𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  
                                      +𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + ɛ  (2.4) 
  𝐿𝑛 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛 + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛 × 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄  
                   +𝛽 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐶 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ  (2.5) 
        In regression (2.4), the coefficient of the interaction term between Campaign and ROS 
is expected to be significantly positive in princeling-backed firms, suggesting the importance 
of firm profitability has been reinforced and bank lending decisions have returned to normal 
due to the anti-corruption campaign. Similarly, in regression (2.5), the coefficient of the 
interaction term between Campaign and Tobin’s Q is expected to be significantly positive in 
princeling-backed firms as well, reflecting that the prediction that the campaign has restored 
the healthy relationship between investment opportunities and growth, and that the campaign 
has eliminated the crowding out effect previously caused by princeling connections. 
2.4 Empirical results and analysis 
2.4.1 Impact of princeling connections on firms’ ability to access bank loans 
        To test the primary hypothesis regarding the relationship between princeling 
connections and level of access to corporate bank loans, regression (2.1) was run for 




Table 2.4 The impact of princeling connections on bank loans  
VARIABLES Total bank loan 
1                   2 
Long-term bank loan 
3                   4 
Short-term bank loan 
5                  6 
Princelings 0.084*** 0.057*** 0.039*** 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 
 (9.24) (4.45) (7.65) (2.59) (7.72) (5.73) 
Princelings*SOE  -0.066***  -0.047***  -0.004 
  (-3.55)  (-4.18)  (-0.49) 
SOE  0.030***  0.018***  0.010*** 
  (5.95)  (6.18)  (4.03) 
Princeling 0.016*  0.018  0.017  
*Normal PC (1.88)  (1.36)  (1.39)  
Normal PC 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 
 (5.22) (5.65) (5.81) (6.25) (3.81) (4.21) 
ROSt-1 0.184*** 0.187*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 
 (3.96) (4.98) (7.73) (7.29) (6.77) (6.87) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (5.40) (5.02) (4.78) (3.19) (5.29) (4.25) 
Size 0.215*** 0.218*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 
 (3.50) (2.99) (3.26) (3.85) (4.16) (4.06) 
Tangibility 0.223*** 0.225*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 
 (3.52) (3.79) (5.30) (5.88) (9.22) (9.56) 
Board 0.014** 0.010* 0.005* 0.002 0.001 0.000* 
 (2.23) (1.71) (1.87) (1.35) (1.06) (1.92) 
Independence 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.007 
 (0.45) (0.24) (0.74) (0.25) (1.27) (0.74) 
Constant -2.583*** -2.648*** -1.568*** -1.625*** -1.457*** -1.256*** 
 (-5.35) (-7.46) (-4.85) (-9.47) (-6.46) (-7.36) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.458 0.463 0.485 0.463 0.485 0.452 
Observations 16,976 16,976 16,976 16,976 17,034 17,034 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on the level of access to total bank loans in 
columns 1 and 2, on the level of access to long-term loans in columns 3 and 4, and on the level of 
access to short-term loans in columns 5 and 6. Princelings is a dummy that measures the princeling 
connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; SOE is a dummy which 
equals 1 for SOEs; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of listed 
firms; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in 
brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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bank loans, long-term bank loans and short-term bank loans respectively. The results of a 
basic regression without the dummy variable SOE are shown in columns 1, 3 and 5. The 
coefficients of Princelings are all positively significant at the 1% level, which indicates 
princeling connections generally increase the access to all types of bank loans.  
        Based on the reasoning described above, the dummy variable SOE was introduced to 
examine the individual impact of princeling connections in firms with different ownership 
structures. The detailed empirical results are shown in columns 2, 4 and 6. Again, the 
coefficients of Princelings are positive and significant at the 1% level, providing extra 
evidence that princeling connections ensure better access to bank loans. Given the 
circumstance that the largest banks in China are all controlled by the government, there have 
always been privileges for princeling-backed firms which have enabled them to obtain more 
bank loans than other firms. Furthermore, the coefficients of the dummy variable SOE are all 
positively significant at the 1% level, suggesting that SOEs normally receive significantly 
more bank loans than non-SOEs due to their inherited connections to the government. More 
importantly, the coefficients of the interaction term between Princelings and SOE are 
significantly negative at the 1% level in column 2 and 4, indicating that princeling 
connections help non-SOEs to gain significantly more bank loans than SOEs, especially 
long-term bank loans, which is consistent with H1a. It is not surprising that the impact of 
princelings is obscured in SOEs, because their nature governmental connections have 
basically the same effects as princeling connections, and are even stronger in many cases. In 
other words, it is to be expected that princeling connections will not bring many extra bank 
loans to SOEs. On the contrary, the situation in non-SOEs is just the opposite. Due to the 
institutional background of poor property rights protection and a long history of 
65 
 
discrimination against privately-owned enterprises, princeling-backed non-SOEs experience 
dramatic boosts in their access to bank loans. Due to their governmental connections and 
protections, princeling-backed non-SOEs allay the concerns of banks, and are therefore at 
the same level as SOEs when competing for loans.  
Another important variable, Normal PC, is included in the regression as a comparable 
term, as well as a control variable for Princelings. The impact of normal political connections 
on access to bank loans has already been demonstrated in the literature (Berkmanet et al., 
2010; Blau et al., 2013; Yeh et al., 2013). The coefficients of Normal PC in every column 
are all positively significant, illustrating the bank-loan-winning nature of normal political 
connections. Nevertheless, at the same 1% significance level, the coefficients of Princelings 
are always much larger than those of Normal PC, indicating that the power of princeling 
connections are much greater than the power of normal political connections. The two types 
of political connections work towards the same outcome which may even have a synergistic 
effect. Since the coefficients of Princeling and Normal PC are both significantly positive, 
and the coefficients of the interaction term between Princeling and Normal PC are also 
significantly positive at the 10% level, the results indicate that there is a complementary 
effect between the two types of connections. With the reinforced benefits and protection from 
the government, princeling connections and normal political connections in firms work in 
the same direction to achieve better result. The relationship between princeling connections 
and normal political connections will be further discussed in Section 2.4.5.2. The inclusion 
of Normal PC and the interaction term further proves that, after controlling for the positive 
effect of normal political connections, princeling connections still have additional power 
over access to bank loans. In addition to Normal PC, other control variables all take the 
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expected signs. In particular, as one of the most essential criteria of bank lending decisions, 
ROS is included for further analysis. The coefficients of ROS are significantly positive at the 
1% level, demonstrating the positive relationship between bank lending and firm profitability.  
In summary, non-SOEs have the incentive to establish princeling connections since 
princeling connections could improve their financing performance. Such incentives are 
stimulated by the plights of non-SOEs when they are competing with SOEs. Princeling 
connections strengthen the competitive power of non-SOEs, which promotes the 
development of a more balanced market. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the superior 
performance of princeling-backed non-SOEs comes at the cost of an even harsher situation 
for non-princeling-backed non-SOEs. The allocation of limited external financial resources 
for overall non-SOEs favour princeling-backed non-SOEs, and this gradually crowds out the 
living space for non-princeling-backed non-SOEs and finally does harm to the general 
economy. Fortunately, the Chinese government has noticed the inequity, and is now taking 
action. The severest ever anti-corruption campaign has been a great success, and has 
effectively cut off corruption by princeling connections. Detailed empirical results will be 
discussed in Section 2.4.4. 
2.4.2 Impact of princeling connections on bank lending decisions 
        In Section 2.4.1, it is demonstrated that princeling connections do provide firms with 
better access to bank loans. Therefore, since banks always have a set of criteria to follow 
while making lending decisions, how do princeling connections change bank loan approval 
standards? Based on the discussion in Section 2.2.1, we suggest that this change is related to 
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firm profitability. Firm profitability is considered to be a solid indicator for bank loan 
repayment. If a firm does not show satisfactory profitability, it is rational to assume that it 
would not have enough capital to repay its debts. This confirms the importance of firm 
profitability in bank lending decisions. According to Zheng and Zhu (2013), when loans are 
awarded to firms with high profitability, this is a good bank lending decision. Therefore, in 
normal cases, bank lending should be highly responsive to firm profitability, represented by 
the relationship between Total bank loan and ROS in regression (2.2). To find out the answer 
to the question of how princeling connections affect bank lending decisions, regression (2.2) 
was run to test H1b which predicts that princeling connections weaken the role of 
profitability in determining the outcomes of loan applications. Table 2.5 reports on the impact 
of princeling connections on bank lending decisions.  
        In Table 2.5, the coefficients of Princelings are significantly positive at the 1% level, 
regardless of different firm ownership structures, confirming the result in Section 4.1 that 
princeling-backed firms do receive more bank loans. The coefficients of ROS are also 
significantly positive, suggesting that bank lending is normally highly responsive to firm 
profitability. However, the coefficient of the interaction term between Princelings and ROS 
is significantly negative at the 5% level in column 1 for the whole sample, which indicates 
princeling connections severely weaken the positive relationship between bank lending and 
firm profitability, and further distort bank lending decisions. In other words, princeling-
backed firms are provided with more bank loans, even when their profitability is relatively 
poor. In columns 2 and 3, the coefficients of the interaction term are significantly negative 
at the 1% and 5% levels, leading to the same conclusion that princeling connections make 
bank lending decisions less responsive to firm profitability. More specifically, the coefficient 
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Table 2.5 The impact of princeling connections on bank lending decisions 
VARIABLES Total bank loan 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.085*** 0.122*** 0.029*** 
 (8.92) (6.95) (4.87) 
Princelings -0.084** -0.234*** -0.025** 
*ROS t-1 (-2.07) (-2.79) (-1.98) 
ROS t-1 0.192*** 0.359*** 0.059*** 
 (6.12) (4.86) (8.66) 
Normal PC 0.025*** 0.021** 0.004 
 (5.23) (2.39) (1.37) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.007*** 
 (6.44) (9.53) (6.94) 
Size 0.216*** 0.288*** 0.101*** 
 (4.83) (4.57) (9.66) 
Tangibility 0.220*** 0.323*** 0.066*** 
 (5.15) (3.37) (6.56) 
Board 0.018*** 0.021** 0.003** 
 (9.14) (2.17) (2.07) 
Independence 0.058* 0.055 0.015 
 (1.65) (0.88) (0.98) 
Constant -4.641*** -6.133*** -2.130*** 
 (-9.85) (-7.05) (-5.29) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.473 0.530 0.397 
Observations 16,976 8,263 8,713 
 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on bank lending decisions in all listed firms, 
as well as in SOEs and non-SOEs separately. The dependent variable is Total bank loan. The key 
independent variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the princeling connections of listed firms, 
which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; ROS is return on sales that represent firm profitability; 
Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of listed firms; detailed 
definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below 




In column 2 for SOEs is larger in magnitude than in column 3 for non-SOEs (-0.234 vs. -
0.025). This result reflects the difference between the two ownership structures. Princeling 
connections in SOEs reinforce the power of their natural governmental connections, which 
makes princeling-backed SOEs the most reliable debtors regardless of their profitability. 
Overall, the empirical results are consistent with H1b.  
2.4.3 Impact of princeling connections on corporate investment decisions 
        According to the analysis in Sections 2.4.1 on Table 2.4, princeling connections help 
both SOEs and non-SOEs to gain more bank loans. Moreover, princeling-backed non-SOEs 
receive significantly more long-term bank loans than princeling-backed SOEs. To a further 
extent, since external financing capital is the main source of investment expenditure, we are 
interested in how the increase in long-term bank loans affects corporate investment decisions.  
        Table 2.6 reports the impact of princeling connections on investment activity in the 
whole sample, as well as in SOEs and non-SOEs separately. The results can be analysed 
from two perspectives, investment expenditure and investment efficiency. First of all, it is 
clear that the coefficients of Princelings are significantly positively at the 5% level in 
columns 1 and 3, indicating princeling connections promote investment growth mainly in 
non-SOEs. This result is consistent with the discussion in Section 2.4.1. The dramatic 
increase in access to long-term bank loans consequently boosts investment growth in 
princeling-backed non-SOEs. Secondly, with respect to investment efficiency, the 
relationship between investment growth and Tobin’s Q is considered to be a proxy. In details, 
the significantly positive coefficients of Tobin’s Q, representing investment opportunities, 
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Table 2.6 The impact of princeling connections on investment decisions 
VARIABLES Investment growth 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.137** 0.006 0.253** 
 (2.09) (0.06) (2.48) 
Princelings -0.094*** -0.025 -0.145*** 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (-3.33) (-0.52) (-3.89) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.028*** 0.027** 0.029*** 
 (3.59) (2.07) (2.84) 
Normal PC -0.012 -0.018 -0.022 
 (-0.57) (-0.58) (-0.73) 
Leverage t-1 -0.193*** -0.109 -0.209*** 
 (-3.87) (-1.46) (-2.95) 
Size 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 
 (5.17) (4.08) (3.90) 
Tangibility 0.761*** 0.640*** 0.892*** 
 (11.67) (7.69) (8.45) 
Constant -0.797*** -0.934*** -1.164*** 
 (-3.66) (-3.28) (-3.11) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.324 0.236 0.456 
Observations 13,019 6,354 6,665 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on investment growth in all listed firms, as 
well as in SOEs and non-SOEs separately. The dependent variable is investment growth measured 
by Ln(It/It-1). The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the princeling 
connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; Tobin’s Q is the ratio of 
the market assets value divided by the replacement cost of assets, representing investment 
opportunities; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of listed firms; 
detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets 
below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Suggest that investment growth is normally highly responsive to investment opportunities. 
Investment decisions are rational if increased investment growth is backed up by more 
investment opportunities. Nevertheless, in columns 1 and 3, the coefficients of the interaction 
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term between Princelings and Tobin’s Q are negative and significant at the 1% level, 
revealing that princeling connections severely weaken the positive relationship between 
investment growth and investment opportunities. In princeling-backed non-SOEs, 
investment growth becomes less responsive to investment opportunities, resulting in lower 
investment efficiency. Comparatively, the results in column 2 show that the impacts of 
princeling connections on investment decisions in SOEs is not significant. That is because 
SOEs do not experience a dramatic increase in long-term bank loans, as explained above. 
The results are consistent with H2.  
2.4.4 The influence of the anti-corruption campaign on princeling connections  
    As discussed in previous sections, the benefits brought by princeling connections are at 
the cost of non-princeling-backed firms. In a financing market with limited capital resources, 
princeling-backed firms are crowding out non-princeling-backed firms, which is harmful to 
the sustainable development of the Chinese economy. Being aware of the severity of this 
corruption-related issue, the Chinese government has taken actions to make up for the 
loopholes in laws, among which the anti-corruption campaign is the most representative 
activity. Table 2.7 shows the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on princeling 
connections regarding bank lending decisions. Campaign is a time dummy variable adopting 
a breakpoint at the end of year 2012, because the anti-corruption campaign began at this time. 
In order to investigate the influence of the campaign, an interaction term between Campaign 
and ROS is generated. Consistent with the method employed in former tests, the whole 
sample is divided into two subsamples – SOEs and non-SOEs. Furthermore, to avoid cubic 
terms, Princelings is taken out of the original regression and used to divide the subsamples  
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Table 2.7 The influence of the anti-corruption campaign on the impact of princeling 
connections on bank lending decisions 
VARIABLES Total bank loan 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
 Princelings         Non-princelings Princelings           Non-princelings 
Campaign 0.127 0.089*** 0.022 0.034*** 
 (1.16) (4.58) (0.73) (4.06) 
Campaign  0.125** 0.012 0.085*** 0.016 
*ROSit-1 (2.30) (0.20) (3.07) (0.96) 
ROS it-1 0.364*** 0.336*** 0.081*** 0.054*** 
 (3.77) (12.94) (3.44) (7.21) 
Normal PC -0.000 0.023*** 0.001 0.005* 
 (-0.00) (2.64) (0.08) (1.69) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.087*** 0.030*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 
 (5.09) (8.34) (3.45) (6.57) 
Size 0.419*** 0.278*** 0.130*** 0.099*** 
 (22.74) (70.68) (17.99) (56.93) 
Tangibility 0.173 0.332*** 0.085** 0.065*** 
 (1.54) (13.51) (2.10) (6.28) 
Board -0.016 0.023*** 0.001 0.002* 
 (-0.88) (6.61) (0.21) (1.67) 
Independence 0.022 0.060*** -0.002 0.013*** 
 (0.45) (6.41) (-0.10) (3.47) 
Constant -8.707*** -5.915*** -2.725*** -2.086*** 
 (-3.02) (-6.26) (-8.01) (-5.47) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.713 0.519 0.583 0.389 
Observations 441 7,822 494 8,219 
This table shows the influence of the anti-corruption campaign on the impact of princeling 
connections on bank lending decisions in SOEs and non-SOEs. Columns 1 and 3 report the results in 
princeling-backed firms, while columns 2 and 4 report the results in non-princeling-backed firms. 
The dependent variable is total bank loan. The key independent variable Campaign is a dummy that 
equals 1 when it refers to years later than 2012; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported 
in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Into smaller groups. More specifically, both SOEs and non-SOEs are further divided into 
princeling-backed and non-princeling-backed firms.  
        Based on the discussion in Section 2.4.2, princeling connections have a major impact 
by weakening the relationship between level of access to bank loans and firm profitability. 
Therefore, according to Table 2.7, the significantly positive coefficients of the interaction 
term in columns 1 and 3 suggest that the relationship between Total bank loan and ROS has 
been reinforced in princeling-backed non-SOEs by the campaign. Since various corruption 
activities, including collusion between business owners and government bureaucrats have 
been curtailed by the campaign, princeling-backed firms are no longer able to earn extra bank 
loans utilising such connections. Consequently, bank loans are reallocated, leading to a 
recovery in the level of access to loans in non-princeling-backed firms, which is 
demonstrated by the significantly positive coefficients of Campaign in columns 2 and 4. The 
results are consistent with H3.  
    At the meantime, Table 2.8 reports the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on the 
relationship between princeling connections and investment decisions. Similarly, the key 
interaction term between Campaign and Tobin’s Q is included, and the whole sample is 
divided into four subsamples. The significantly positive coefficients of the interaction term 
in columns 1 and 3 show that in princeling-backed firms the positive relationship between 
investment growth and Tobin’s Q was restored after the campaign. It can be concluded that 
the impact of princeling connections on investment decisions has been weakened by the 
campaign, providing additional empirical evidence for H3. 
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Table 2.8 The influence of the anti-corruption campaign on the impact of princeling 
connections on corporate investment decisions 
VARIABLES Investment Growth 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
 Princelings         Non-princelings Princelings           Non-princelings 
Campaign 0.093 0.197*** 0.384 0.043 
 (0.28) (2.66) (0.88) (0.46) 
Campaign  0.137* 0.030 0.002** 0.015 
* Tobin’s Qt-1 (1.84) (1.16) (2.02) (0.90) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.006 0.033** 0.247*** 0.034*** 
 (0.10) (2.33) (4.21) (2.69) 
Normal PC -0.037 -0.015 0.013 -0.022 
 (-0.26) (-0.50) (0.09) (-0.71) 
Leverage t-1 -0.155 -0.113 -0.282 -0.206*** 
 (-0.42) (-1.47) (-0.91) (-2.82) 
Size 0.043 0.049*** 0.201** 0.061*** 
 (0.77) (3.81) (2.49) (3.53) 
Tangibility 1.361*** 0.607*** 0.274 0.954*** 
 (3.66) (7.07) (0.56) (8.80) 
Constant -0.014 -0.935*** -5.031*** -1.022*** 
 (-0.01) (-3.18) (-2.90) (-2.66) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1875 0.2324 0. 2910 0.4308 
Observations 441 7,822 494 8,219 
 
This table shows the influence of the anti-corruption campaign on the impact of princeling 
connections on corporate investment decisions in SOEs and non-SOEs. Columns 1 and 3 report the 
results in princeling-backed firms, while columns 2 and 4 report the results in non-princeling-backed 
firms. The dependent variable is investment growth. The key independent variable Campaign is a 
dummy that equals 1 when it refers to years later than 2012; Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market assets 
value divided by the replacement cost of assets, representing investment opportunities; Normal PC is 
a dummy that measures the normal political connections of listed firms; detailed definitions of all the 
variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** 




2.4.5 Additional analysis 
2.4.5.1 Heterogeneity of princeling connections 
The literature on normal political connections focuses mainly on executives, including 
CEOs and chairmen of the board with governmental working experience. However, this 
study aims to gain an insight into the heterogeneity of princelings regarding their different 
roles in firms. To be more specific, in the light of agency theory, we intend to further 
investigate the impacts of princeling connections from the perspective of conflicts between 
principals and agents. Hence, princeling executives are placed in an ‘agent’ subsample, and 
princelings who are controlling shareholders are placed in a ‘principal’ subsample. 
Princelings who are controlling shareholders were initially included in this study for their 
undoubtedly important role in corporate operations. According to the Company Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, general meetings of shareholders are in charge of decision-
making, including investment plans and management policy. Necessarily, based on the one-
share-one-vote rule, the impact of princelings who are controlling shareholders should also 
be examined to provide a comprehensive analysis of the heterogeneity of princeling 
connections. 
Table 2.9 shows a comparison between princeling shareholders and princeling 
executives regarding the impact of princeling connections on access to bank loans. The 
whole sample is firstly divided into two sub-samples based on different ownership structures, 
and each sub-sample is further divided into two smaller sub-samples representing princeling 
shareholders and princeling executives. According to Princelings in the first row, the 
coefficients of princeling executives (in columns 2, 4 and 6) are much larger than those of  
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Table 2.9 The comparison between princeling shareholders and princeling executives 
regarding the impact of princeling connections on total bank loan 
VARIABLES  Total bank loan   






Princelings 0.040*** 0.354*** 0.053*** 0.326*** 0.021*** 0.201*** 
 (4.04) (14.48) (2.68) (9.84) (3.57) (6.72) 
Normal PC 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.020** 0.005* 0.003 
 (5.34) (5.14) (2.79) (2.21) (1.86) (1.13) 
ROSt-1 0.177*** 0.188*** 0.327*** 0.351*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 
 (15.92) (15.62) (14.33) (14.39) (9.18) (8.53) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (15.59) (15.30) (8.89) (8.63) (7.02) (6.39) 
Size 0.208*** 0.215*** 0.276*** 0.286*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 
 (92.60) (90.82) (72.09) (71.64) (59.42) (56.94) 
Tangibility 0.222*** 0.227*** 0.323*** 0.336*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 
 (15.66) (15.02) (13.65) (13.39) (6.89) (5.88) 
Board 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.002 0.003** 
 (9.54) (9.47) (6.71) (6.32) (1.59) (2.26) 
Independence 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 
 (10.73) (10.77) (6.39) (6.10) (3.12) (4.28) 
Constant -4.444*** -4.607*** -5.877*** -6.089*** -2.103*** -2.099*** 
 (-9.55) (-8.82) (-6.61) (-6.19) (-5.92) (-5.50) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.463 0.479 0.518 0.534 0.394 0.395 
Observations 16,836 16,178 8,141 7,941 8,695 8,237 
 
This table shows the impact of different types of princeling connections on level of access to total 
bank loans. The results of princeling shareholders are reported in columns 1, 3 and 5. The results of 
princeling executives are reported in columns 2, 4 and 6. The key independent variable Princelings 
is a dummy that measures the princeling connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is 
princelings connected; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of 
listed firms; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported 




princeling shareholders (in columns 1, 3 and 5). The results suggest that princeling executives 
have much stronger loan-earning capacities compared to princeling shareholders, even 
though they both significantly improve access to total bank loans.  
        Similarly, Tables 2.10 and 2.11 show the comparison between princeling shareholders 
and princeling executives regarding their impacts on bank lending decisions and corporate 
investment decisions.  Referring to the coefficients of Princelings in Table 2.10, the results 
are consistent with those in Table 2.9. Furthermore, it is quite clear that the significantly 
negative coefficients of the interaction term in columns 2, 4 and 6 reveal that princeling 
executives significantly distort the relationship between bank lending and ROS. However, 
princeling shareholders do not share the same effect, while none of the coefficients in 
columns 1, 3 and 5 are significant. Therefore, the conclusion is that princeling executives 
have a stronger impact on bank lending decisions. Table 2.11 shows a similar situation where 
princeling executives have much stronger impacts on reducing investment efficiency. The 
comparison between the two types of princelings gives us a deeper insight into their 
characteristics.  It is clear that princeling executives play a much more important role. The 
reason may be traced to agency theory. As principals, if princeling shareholders decide to 
pursue certain goal utilising their political power, they are more likely to suffer from conflict 
between principals and agents due to their different roles. However, princeling executives 
are normally free of such troubles for they are directly responsible for corporate management 
and operations. Additionally, it is possible that princeling shareholders tend to keep their 




Table 2.10 The comparison between princeling shareholders and princeling executives 
regarding the impact of princeling connections on bank lending decisions 
VARIABLES  Total bank loan   






Princelings 0.038*** 0.343*** 0.049** 0.302*** 0.022*** 0.440*** 
 (3.78) (11.99) (2.48) (7.85) (3.69) (9.88) 
Princelings -0.049 -0.139* -0.142 -0.296** -0.022 -3.330*** 
*ROSt-1 (-1.22) (-1.75) (-1.63) (-2.24) (-0.96) (-7.22) 
ROSt-1 0.181*** 0.189*** 0.336*** 0.354*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 (5.67) (5.64) (4.29) (4.44) (8.56) (8.42) 
Normal PC 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.020** 0.005* 0.004 
 (5.33) (5.15) (2.79) (2.23) (1.85) (1.37) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (15.62) (15.28) (8.94) (8.58) (6.99) (6.45) 
Size 0.208*** 0.215*** 0.277*** 0.286*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 
 (92.61) (90.81) (72.12) (71.62) (59.38) (56.93) 
Tangibility 0.221*** 0.227*** 0.323*** 0.335*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 
 (15.63) (15.00) (13.64) (13.38) (6.91) (6.05) 
Board 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.002 0.003** 
 (9.55) (9.48) (6.67) (6.32) (1.56) (1.96) 
Independence 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 
 (10.74) (10.77) (6.36) (6.09) (3.09) (4.05) 
Constant -4.445*** -4.607*** -5.880*** -6.087*** -2.103*** -2.094*** 
 (-9.56) (-8.80) (-6.63) (-6.15) (-5.89) (-5.54) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.463 0.479 0.518 0.534 0.394 0.399 
Observations 16,836 16,178 8,141 7,941 8,695 8,237 
This table shows the impact of the two different types of princeling connections on bank lending 
decisions. The results for princeling shareholders are reported in columns 1, 3 and 5. The results for 
princeling executives are reported in columns 2, 4 and 6. The key independent variable Princelings 
is a dummy that measures the princeling connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is 
princelings connected; ROS is return on sales that represent firm profitability; detailed definitions of 
all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. 




Table 2.11 The comparison between princeling shareholders and princeling executives 
regarding their impacts on investment decisions 
VARIABLES  Investment growth  






Princelings 0.099 0.134* -0.058 0.032 0.452 0.241** 
 (0.67) (1.79) (-0.38) (0.30) (0.93) (2.25) 
Princelings -0.043 -0.094*** 0.007 -0.038 -0.367 -0.139*** 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (-0.46) (-3.05) (0.07) (-0.66) (-1.15) (-3.54) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027** 0.026** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (3.61) (3.45) (2.09) (2.04) (2.86) (2.68) 
Normal PC -0.012 -0.010 -0.019 -0.014 -0.022 -0.022 
 (-0.59) (-0.48) (-0.61) (-0.45) (-0.75) (-0.71) 
Leverage t-1 -0.190*** -0.195*** -0.105 -0.116 -0.207*** -0.205*** 
 (-3.80) (-3.83) (-1.39) (-1.53) (-2.92) (-2.82) 
Size 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 0.061*** 
 (5.10) (4.81) (3.99) (4.01) (3.90) (3.52) 
Tangibility 0.756*** 0.765*** 0.632*** 0.614*** 0.895*** 0.953*** 
 (-11.51) (11.48) (7.52) (7.23) (8.46) (8.80) 
Constant -0.808*** -0.738*** -0.949*** -0.956*** -1.168*** -1.012*** 
 (-3.66) (-3.33) (-3.26) (-3.31) (-3.11) (-2.63) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.3210 0.3132 0.2316 0.2334 0.4528 0.4307 
Observations 12,903 12,486 6,253 6,140 6,650 6,346 
 
This table shows the impact of the two different types of princeling connections on bank lending 
decisions. The results for princeling shareholders are reported in columns 1, 3 and 5. The results for 
princeling executives are reported in columns 2, 4 and 6. The key independent variable Princelings 
is a dummy that measures the princeling connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is 
princelings connected; Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market assets value divided by the replacement 
cost of assets, representing investment opportunities; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the 
normal political connections of listed firms; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in 
Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent 





2.4.5.2 Princeling connections and normal political connections 
    Princeling connections are introduced in this chapter as a new perspective on political 
connections. Therefore, normal political connections should be included in the analysis as 
well to enable a comprehensive conclusion. In particular, the interacting relationship between 
the two types of political connections is worth exploring. Tables 2.12 and 2.13 give a 
comparison between the impacts of princeling connections in firms with and without normal 
political connections. Specifically, columns 1 and 3 show the situation when princelings and 
normal political connections co-exist, while columns 2 and 4 include firms with princeling 
connections only.  
    The extant literature demonstrates that normal political connections do improve access 
to bank loans. Given that, the significantly positive coefficients of Princelings in Table 2.12, 
especially in columns1 and 3, suggest that princeling connections help to gain more bank 
loans over and above the impact of normal political connections. In other words, even though 
the two political connections have the same impact on access to bank loans, they both make 
their individual contributions. The impact of princeling connections is not obscured by the 
impact of normal political connections, and there may even be a synergistic effect between 
them. However, the coefficients of the interaction term are statistically significant and 
negative in columns 2 and 4, indicating that the distortion of bank lending decisions by 
princeling connections is only observed in firms without normal political connections. In 
Table 2.13, the impact of princeling connections on investment decisions is observed in non-
SOEs only, which is consistent with the discussion in Section 2.4.3. The coefficients of the 
interaction term between Princelings and Tobin’s Q are statistically significant and  
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Table 2.12 The impact of princeling connections on bank lending decisions in firms with and 
without normal political connections (NPC)  
VARIABLES Total bank loan  
  SOEs Non-SOEs 
   With PC              Without PC With PC              Without PC 
Princelings 0.162*** 0.111*** 0.040*** 0.025*** 
 (4.40) (5.53) (2.96) (4.33) 
Princelings 0.044 -0.268*** -0.069 -0.015* 
*ROS t-1 (0.27) (-2.72) (-1.07) (-1.72) 
ROS t-1 0.330*** 0.357*** 0.054** 0.053*** 
 (7.60) (12.27) (2.56) (8.66) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.019*** 0.037*** 0.002 0.006*** 
 (2.83) (9.03) (0.72) (6.40) 
Size 0.275*** 0.291*** 0.125*** 0.084*** 
 (3.38) (3.71) (3.39) (4.86) 
Tangibility 0.206*** 0.365** 0.091*** 0.051*** 
 (4.79) (2.41) (3.88) (5.19) 
Board 0.027*** 0.017** 0.006** 0.007** 
 (4.63) (2.21) (2.27) (2.32) 
Independence 0.057 0.053* 0.003 0.020 
 (0.51) (1.82) (0.44) (1.17) 
Constant -5.777*** -6.229*** -2.695*** -1.751*** 
 (-3.78) (-6.79) (-3.94) (-4.82) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.527 0.535 0.441 0.371 
Observations 2,271 5,992 2,756 5,957 
 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on bank lending decisions in SOEs and non-
SOEs. Columns 1 and 3 report the results in firms with normal political connections, while columns 
2 and 4 report the results in firms without normal political connections. The dependent variable is 
total bank loan. The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the princeling 
connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; ROS is return on sales 
that represent firm profitability; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 





Table 2.13 The impact of princeling connections on corporate investment decisions in firms 
with and without normal political connections (PC) 
VARIABLES Investment growth 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
  With PC              Without PC With PC               Without PC 
Princelings 0.021 -0.005 -0.208 0.303** 
 (0.12) (-0.05) (-1.09) (2.42) 
Princelings -0.077 -0.006 -0.141* -0.152*** 
* Tobin’s Q t-1 (-0.75) (-0.11) (-1.71) (-3.56) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.033 0.024 0.041** 0.025** 
 (1.21) (1.59) (2.37) (1.96) 
Leverage t-1 -0.031 -0.134 -0.194 -0.208** 
 (-0.18) (-1.60) (-1.41) (-2.47) 
Size 0.057** 0.046*** 0.065** 0.071*** 
 (2.25) (3.23) (2.49) (3.14) 
Tangibility 0.662*** 0.635*** 1.107*** 0.791*** 
 (4.06) (6.44) (6.30) (5.93) 
Constant -1.210** -0.802** -1.124* -1.277** 
 (-2.14) (-2.38) (-1.96) (-2.55) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.233 0.566 0.411 
Observations 1,712 4,642 2,210 4,455 
 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on corporate investment decisions in SOEs and 
non-SOEs. Columns 1 and 3 report the results in firms with normal political connections, while 
columns 2 and 4 report the results in firms without normal political connections. The dependent 
variable is investment growth measured by Ln(It/It-1). The key independent variable Princelings is a 
dummy that measures the princeling connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is 
princeling-backed; Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market assets value divided by the replacement cost 
of assets, representing investment opportunities; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported 
in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent 




Negative in columns 3 and 4 at the 10% and 1% levels respectively (-0.141 vs. -0.152), 
indicating that the impact of princeling connections on investment decisions is much stronger 
in non-SOEs without normal political connections. 
2.4.6 Robustness results 
2.4.6.1 Potential endogeneity issue 
    In this section, the potential endogeneity issue in our regression models is addressed. 
The most possible cause of the issue is that princeling connections are not entirely exogenous 
in the regression models. More specifically, since the regression models adopt many indexes 
that represent different aspects of corporate operations, it is difficult to tell if princeling 
connections have no correlation whatsoever with any of them. For instance, regarding 
profitability, one could argue that some firms are princeling-backed because they are 
generous employers due to their good corporate performance. Otherwise, it could be argued 
that princelings are willing to take positions in a firm due to its excellent corporate 
performance and operation. As a result, princeling connections could be endogenous if 
correlated with profitability, which gives rise to a potential endogeneity problem. 
    In order to solve the potential endogeneity of princelings connections, difference in 
difference (DiD) method is adopted. As mentioned in section 2.2.3, the anti-corruption 
campaign can be considered as an appropriate even for a natural experiment to be used in the 
DiD method. In section 2.4.4, the influence of the anti-corruption campaign on the impacts 
of princeling connections is briefly analysed in pooled regressions. In this section, random 
effect model is applied to test the robustness of the results of the impacts of princeling 
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connections on access to bank loans and investment growth by utilizing the influence of the 
campaign. Fixed effect model is not a proper way to solve the endogeneity issue in this study, 
because the value of the dummy variable Princelings changes in different firms so that the 
term Princelings will be omitted in fixed effect regression results. Following the DiD method, 
princeling-backed firms are considered as the treated group, while others as the control group. 
The anti-corruption campaign is the shock that naturally divides the whole sample period 
into two parts. Based on the empirical results that a princeling-backed firm have better access 
to bank loans and have higher investment growth if compared with non-princeling-backed 
firms, and the campaign weakens the impacts of princeling connections, such difference 
between the two types of firms is supposed to reduce after the campaign.  
Table 14 reports the DiD regression results of the random effect models. In this model, 
the robustness of the results that princeling-backed firms have better access to bank loans 
and increase investment growth is examined. According to Panel A in Table 14, the 
coefficients of Princelings are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which is 
consistent with the previous results that princeling connections help to improve the level of 
access to bank loans. We are more concerned about the coefficients of the interaction term 
between Princelings and Campaign. The coefficient in column 1 is significantly negative at 
the 5% level. Considered together with the coefficient of Princelings, the interaction term 
coefficient in column 1 indicates that the positive impact of princeling connections on access 
to bank loans is changed to negative impact after the anti-corruption campaign. This result 
reflects the fact that princeling-backed firms, especially non-SOEs, experienced a hard time 
after the campaign due to the stringent regulations on princelings and incumbent bureaucrats. 
The sharp reduction of corrupt activities broke the channel through which princeling 
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Table 2.14 Difference in difference regression results on princeling connections and 
corporate financing and investing  
Panel A. Difference in difference regression results of the impacts of princelings connections 
on the level of access to bank loans 
VARIABLES Total bank loans 
 All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.042*** 0.058*** 0.031*** 
 (6.43) (2.66) (3.54) 
Princelings -0.201** -0.120* -0.157*** 
*Campaign (-2.23) (-1.96) (-3.14) 
Campaign -0.060* -0.149*** -0.042*** 
 (-1.81) (-6.49) (-4.03) 
Normal PC -0.011 0.024** 0.007* 
 (-0.74) (2.18) (1.73) 
Tobin’s Q 0.004 0.070*** 0.015*** 
 (0.77) (3.70) (9.51) 
Size 0.258*** 0.305*** 0.109*** 
 (4.54) (6.53) (4.56) 
Tangibility 0.263*** 0.393*** 0.096*** 
 (6.40) (3.30) (7.37) 
Board 0.010* 0.019* 0.003* 
 (1.71) (1.68) (1.67) 
Independence 0.010 0.064 0.011** 
 (0.63) (1.63) (2.20) 
Constant -5.453*** -6.568*** -2.297*** 
 (-3.92) (-6.52) (-3.55) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Chow test  4.01**  
Adjusted R2 0.487 0.571 0.427 
Observations 16,976 8,263 8,713 
This table shows DiD random effect model results of the impacts of princelings connections 
on access to bank loans. The dependent variable is total bank loans. The  independent variable 
Princelings is a dummy which equals 1 if the firm is princelings connected; Campaign is a 
dummy that equals 1 when it refers to years later than 2012; detailed definitions of all the 
variables are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the 
coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Panel B. Difference in difference regression results of the impacts of princelings connections 
on investment growth 
VARIABLES Investment growth 
 All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings -0.086 -0.031 -0.028 
 (-0.48) (-0.43) (-0.29) 
Princelings -0.167** -0.061* -0.119** 
*Campaign (-2.28) (-1.68) (-2.36) 
Campaign -0.252 0.065 -0.189*** 
 (-0.85) (0.69) (-2.94) 
Normal PC 0.040 -0.024 -0.043 
 (0.56) (-0.73) (-1.14) 
Leverage -0.044 -0.004 -0.168* 
 (-0.31) (-0.05) (-1.69) 
Size 0.066** 0.037*** 0.054** 
 (2.23) (2.81) (2.50) 
Tangibility 0.491** 0.717*** 0.893*** 
 (2.36) (7.96) (6.81) 
Constant -1.223* -0.698** -0.904** 
 (-1.67) (-2.36) (-1.96) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Chow test  3.90**  
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.221 0.354 
Observations 13,019 6,354 6,665 
 
This table shows the difference in difference random effect model regression results of the 
impacts of princelings connections on investment growth in SOEs and non-SOEs 
respectively. Column 1 report the results in all sample firms, while columns 2 and 3 report 
the results in SOEs and non-SOEs. The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy 
that measures the princelings connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is 
princelings connected; Campaign is a dummy that equals 1 when it refers to years later than 
2012; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of listed firms; 
detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported 




 Connections work. The coefficients of the interaction term in columns 2 and 3 are both 
negative. Moreover, the coefficient in column 3 for non-SOE s is more significant (the 1% 
level compared to the 10% level) and is larger in magnitude than the coefficient in column 2 
for SOEs. We also conduct the Chow test to examine the difference between the interaction 
term coefficients for SOEs and non-SOEs. Considered together with the coefficients of 
Princelings, the interaction term coefficients in columns 2 and 3 suggest that, after the 
campaign, the negative impact of princelings connections on access to bank loans is more 
severe in non-SOEs. Since princeling-backed non-SOEs benefited more than princeling-
backed SOEs, they are more affected by the anti-corruption campaign.  
Panel B in Table 14 shows the difference in difference random effect model regression 
results of the impacts of princelings connections on investment growth. Similarly, we are 
most interest in the coefficients of the interaction term between Princelings and Campaign. 
The coefficients are all negative in three columns. Most importantly, the coefficient in 
column 3 for non-SOE s is more significant (the 5% level compared to the 10% level) and is 
larger in magnitude than the coefficient in column 2 for SOEs, which is consistent with the 
Chow test result. Considered together with the coefficients of Princelings, the interaction 
term coefficients suggest that, after the campaign, the previously positive impact of 
princelings connections on investment growth is changed to negative impact, and the 
negative impact is more severe in non-SOEs.  The reason is that princeling connections are 
no longer helpful and princelings are under stringent regulations after the campaign, which 




2.4.6.2 Other robustness tests 
        Other than employing the DiD method, alternative measurements of dependent 
variables are adopted to give more evidence on the robustness of the fundamental models. 
Panel A in Table 2.15 shows the impact of princeling connections on change in total 
accessible bank loans, change in accessible long-term bank loans and change in accessible 
short-term bank loans, as a replacement for the originally used level of access to bank loans. 
The significantly positive coefficients of Princelings suggest that the conclusion about its 
positive impacts on access to bank loans is robust. Nevertheless, the positive impact is 
stronger for changes in short-term bank loans, while it is not significant for changes in long-
term bank loans. Meanwhile, the significantly negative coefficients of the interaction term 
indicate that princeling connections guarantee more bank loans in non-SOEs, which is 
consistent with the discussion in Section 2.4.1. More specifically, the impact is also stronger 
on changes in short-term bank loans compared to changes in long-term bank loans.  
        We further test robustness of regression (2.2) regarding bank lending decisions, using 
change in accessible total bank loans to replace the access to total bank loans. According to 
Panel B in Table 2.15, the coefficients of Princelings are significant and take the same sign 
as their corresponding coefficients in Table 2.5, while the coefficients of the interactions 
term in columns 1 and 3 are significantly negative, indicating the robustness of the conclusion 
that princeling connections help to gain more bank loans by distorting bank lending decisions 
in non-SOEs.  
        Finally, Panel C in Table 2.15 shows the impact of princeling connections on changes 
in investment expenditure as a replacement for investment growth. The most important term  
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Table 2.15 Robustness tests with different dependent variables 
Panel A. The impact of princeling connections on changes in level of access to bank loans  
VARIABLES ∆ total bank loan  ∆ long-term bank loan  ∆ short-term bank loan  
Princelings 0.710*** 1.354*** 0.000 0.004 0.706*** 1.352*** 
 (3.23) (4.44) (0.18) (1.41) (3.24) (4.46) 
Princelings  -1.337***  -0.008*  -1.338*** 
*SOE  (-3.05)  (-1.84)  (-3.07) 
SOE  0.101  0.004***  0.105 
  (0.88)  (3.28)  (0.92) 
Normal PC 0.020 0.021 0.002* 0.002** 0.022 0.023 
 (0.19) (0.20) (1.77) (2.05) (0.20) (0.22) 
ROS t-1 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (3.06) (3.07) (2.30) (2.33) (3.07) (3.08) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.000 0.000 0.195*** 0.195*** 
 (105.41) (105.47) (0.64) (0.74) (105.72) (105.78) 
Size 0.093** 0.095** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.097** 0.101** 
 (2.12) (2.09) (11.89) (12.24) (2.24) (2.23) 
Tangibility 0.054 0.058 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.073 0.078 
 (0.16) (0.18) (6.28) (6.07) (0.22) (0.24) 
Board -0.059 -0.058 -0.000 -0.000 -0.058 -0.058 
 (-1.33) (-1.31) (-0.22) (-0.44) (-1.33) (-1.31) 
Independence 0.039 0.032 0.001 0.001 0.040 0.032 
 (0.32) (0.26) (0.61) (0.58) (0.33) (0.27) 
Constant 2.454** 2.475** 0.100*** 0.106*** 2.548*** 2.577*** 
 (2.57) (2.52) (10.60) (10.97) (2.68) (2.64) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.437 0.437 0.365 0.372 0.437 0.437 
Observations 14,451 14,451 14,451 14,451 14,534 14,534 
 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on changes in level of access to total bank 
loans in columns 1 and 2, on changes in level of access to long-term bank loans in columns 3 and 4, 
and on changes in level of access to short-term bank loans in columns 5 and 6. The key independent 
variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the princeling connections of listed firms, which 
equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for SOEs and 0 for non-
SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in 




Panel B. The impact of princeling connections on bank lending decisions, with change in 
total bank loan as the dependent variable 
VARIABLES ∆ total bank loan  
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.649*** 0.001 1.239*** 
 (2.95) (0.16) (2.90) 
Princelings -0.686*** 0.037 -0.678*** 
*ROS t-1 (-7.07) (1.61) (-4.99) 
ROS t-1 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 (4.07) (3.29) (5.65) 
Normal PC 0.023 -0.000 0.024 
 (0.21) (-0.12) (0.12) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.195*** 0.005*** 0.196*** 
 (105.82) (5.39) (75.37) 
Size 0.087** 0.011*** -0.075 
 (2.00) (9.33) (-0.74) 
Tangibility 0.086 0.030*** 0.510 
 (0.26) (3.95) (0.72) 
Board -0.058 0.003*** -0.128 
 (-1.31) (2.67) (-1.40) 
Independence 0.028 -0.005 -0.023 
 (0.23) (-1.62) (-0.09) 
Constant 2.351** -0.208*** 2.602 
 (2.46) (-8.29) (1.17) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.439 0.425 0.440 
Observations 14,451 7,031 7,420 
 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on the bank lending decisions in all listed firms, 
and on the lending decisions of SOEs and non-SOEs separately. The dependent variable is change in 
total bank loan. The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the princeling 
connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; ROS is return on sales 
that represent firm profitability; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 




Panel C. The impact of princeling connections on investment decisions, with change in 
investment expenditure as the dependent variable 
VARIABLES ∆ investment expenditure 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.001 0.007 0.001 
 (0.08) (0.49) (0.04) 
Princelings -0.001** -0.005 -0.001** 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (-2.17) (-1.06) (-2.36) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.001*** 0.010*** 0.001* 
 (2.86) (5.25) (1.76) 
Normal PC -0.001 -0.001 0.004 
 (-0.11) (-0.13) (0.36) 
Leverage t-1 -0.027*** -0.002 -0.026*** 
 (-32.52) (-0.23) (-25.39) 
Size 0.004* 0.006** 0.015*** 
 (1.77) (2.54) (2.95) 
Tangibility 0.044** -0.021 0.074** 
 (2.34) (-1.35) (2.00) 
Constant 0.113** -0.123** 0.345*** 
 (2.09) (-2.41) (3.04) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.423 0.362 0.645 
Observations 13,019 6,354 6,665 
 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on change in investment expenditures in all 
listed firms, as well as SOEs and non-SOEs separately. The dependent variable is change in 
investment expenditure. The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the 
princeling connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; Tobin’s Q is 
the ratio of the market assets value divided by the replacement cost of assets, representing investment 
opportunities; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of listed firms; 
detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets 




is the interaction between Princelings and Tobin’s Q. The coefficients are significantly 
negative at the 5% level in columns 1 and 3, demonstrating that princeling connections make 
change in investment expenditure less responsive to investment opportunities, especially in 
non-SOEs. The results provide evidence of the robustness of the discussion in Section 4.3. 
2.5. Conclusions 
    This chapter investigates another type of political connection in addition to normal 
political connections. Specifically, princeling connections are proposed as a new, separate 
form of political connection in the Chinese market due to their significant influence. We are 
interested in the role of princeling connections as a complement to normal political 
connections in corporate operations. Based on the hypotheses in Section 2.2, four regression 
models are developed and run, using the data of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2015. The 
impacts of princeling connections on different dimensions, including corporate financing, 
investment activities and bank lending decisions are analysed to generate a report on the 
situation of princeling-backed firms. 
    Empirical results suggest that princeling connections generally ensure firms, especially 
non-SOEs, are given better access to all types of bank loans. Banks prefer princeling-backed 
non-SOEs due to the privileges and protections they can obtain from the government, which 
makes them safer debtors compared to non-princeling-backed non-SOEs. Correspondingly, 
bank lending becomes less responsive to firm profitability in princeling-backed firms 
because banks are considering the favourable connections of a firm rather than just its 
profitability when lending decisions are made. Furthermore, a liberal supply of bank loans, 
especially long-term bank loans, ultimately results in over-investing by princeling-backed 
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non-SOEs. In details, over-investing makes investment expenditure and growth less 
responsive to investment opportunities, which results in lower investment efficiency. 
However, any privileges enjoyed by princeling-backed firms are at the cost of non-
princeling-backed firms, so that they are faced with an even hasher financing environment. 
Fortunately, the Chinese government took immediate actions, of which its anti-corruption 
campaign was the most representative, to create a fairer and healthier economic environment. 
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that the power of princeling connections has been 
significantly weakened by the anti-corruption campaign. In addition, tests on the 
heterogeneity of princelings show that princeling executives play a more important role in 
firms than princeling shareholders. When it comes to the co-existence of the two different 
types of political connections, it is documented that princeling connections are able to further 
improve the access to bank loans of firms with normal political connections, which means 
the two types of connections may have a synergistic effect on corporate financing.  
    In conclusion, princeling connections are a double-edged sword, and princeling-backed 
firms have their gains and losses. Nevertheless, princeling connections are closely related 
with corruption, or in other words trade-offs between money and power. Therefore, the 
collapse of princeling connections after the anti-corruption campaign has had a positive 








        Groups of firms under common ownership are prevalent around the world. These 
business groups account for a large proportion of the economic activity of many countries. 
This chapter focus on explaining the role of internal capital market in Chinese business 
groups. The research questions addressed in this chapter are: (1) How to detect the existence 
of ICM in the Chinese market? To provide concrete evidence, the fundamental role of ICMs 
is demonstrated from two perspectives, external financing and investment expenditure 
respectively. (2) What are the functions of ICM in the Chinese market? With ICMs, member 
firms affiliated with business groups should be able to access more capital when making 
investment decisions. The impact of the affiliation on investment decision-making will be 
examined. (3) Are the functions of ICMs affected by the institutional characteristics of the 
Chinese market? The effects of business group affiliation are tested utilising diverse 
subsamples to give comprehensive results. (4) Will the function of ICMs ever change, given 
any unexpected incident, for instance a financial crisis? The 2008 financial crisis is 
introduced as a natural experiment to illustrate any influence on the functions of ICM. 
        A vast theoretical and empirical literature has emphasised that the availability of 
internally generated liquidity enhances firms’ investment capacities in environments where 
access to external funds is limited (Khanna and Tice, 2001). Cline et al. (2014) show that 
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internal capital markets (ICMs) provide firms an alternative to costly external financing, as 
well as an avenue to avoid the monitoring that is associated with obtaining external capital, 
especially when firms operate inefficient internal capital transfers. Cline et al. (2014) further 
indicate that if firms engage in value-destroying investment issue bonds, they are punished 
by investors through higher yield spreads. Cline’s findings demonstrate the necessity and 
rationality of ICM. Gugler et al. (2013) study the functioning of ICM in business groups 
across 90 counties over the period 1995–2006 and suggest that firm and country institutional 
structures do matter. In the light of Gugler et al.’s paper, this chapter aims to provide more 
evidence on the influence of firm ownership structure and national institutional background 
on the functioning of ICMs. Studies by authors on ICM also inspired the idea behind this 
study. On the one hand, especially in emerging countries, ICMs may provide a substitute for 
under-developed external capital markets (Desai et al., 2004; Gopalan et al., 2007; Gopalan 
and Xie, 2011; Inderst and Mueller, 2003; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Stein, 2003). On the 
other hand, the redistribution of capital between subsidiaries or segments may weaken 
managerial incentives and result in wasteful business activities (Meyer et al., 1992; Rajan et 
al., 2000; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010; Sautner and Villalonga, 2010). Based on an overall 
view of the extant literature, this chapter mainly investigates the function of ICMs in business 
groups and their effect on investment activities under the specific institutional circumstances 
of China’s emerging economy. 
        Many studies have explored the internal capital markets in a range of countries, mostly 
developed counties. However, few of them mention the Chinese market. As the largest 
emerging economy in the world, the Chinese market has its particular institutional 
background, which makes it quite different from other economies. Finance companies in 
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Chinese business groups, as subsidiaries, make Chinese business groups different from those 
in other markets. Finance companies provide financial management services to strengthen 
the centralized management and to improve the efficiency of the use of internal capital by 
Chinese business groups. He et al. (2013) investigated whether business groups in China 
operate internal capital markets, in an environment that is characterised by an 
underdeveloped financial market, a weak legal system, and a high level of government 
intervention. They find that business groups help member firms to overcome constraints on 
raising external capital, and this effect is stronger in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than in 
non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). Moreover, their paper provides evidence of the 
risk-sharing role of business groups who support their member firms, but the affiliation has 
no actual influence on their accounting performance. Following He et al.’s (2013) research, 
this chapter undertakes a fundamental study of the role of ICMs in the Chinese market, as 
well as further research on ICMs’ functions and functional mechanisms.  
        Based on the empirical regression results, this chapter provides evidence for proposed 
hypotheses with the following findings. First of all, in the literature, ICM is identified by 
internal capital flow which is measured using diverse methods. Buchuk et al. (2014) define 
internal capital by net intra-group capital, which is calculated as the difference between notes 
and accounts receivable from, and payable to, related companies. Almeida et al. (2015) 
define internal capital using cross-firm equity investments. These measures are based on a 
sufficient disclosure of relevant financial data, which is not satisfactorily available in China. 
Therefore, to identify the role of ICMs in the Chinese market, a simultaneous model that 
contains two regressions is constructed, from the perspective of external financing and the 
perspective of investment expenditure. By assessing the gap between received bank loans 
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and investment expenditure, the role of ICMs as an alternative to the external financing 
market is revealed. To be more specific, the regression results of the simultaneous model 
show that member firms who are affiliated with business groups borrow significantly fewer 
long-term loans from banks. Since long-term bank loans are considered to be closely related 
with investment, relatively low investment levels were expected to be observed in member 
firms. Nevertheless, the empirical results show that the investment levels of member firms 
are no different to those of non-member firm or independent firms. Combining the two 
findings, the role of ICM is revealed. ICMs gather the spare capital of subsidiary firms and 
reallocate it to member firms who are in need. Thanks to ICMs, member firms are able to 
maintain their investment levels while requiring fewer external loans. 
        Secondly, since ICMs work as an internal capital sources that support the investment 
expenditure of member firms who would otherwise be expected to be constrained by their 
limited self-owned capital, it is reasonable to assume that business group affiliation weakens 
the sensitivity of investment expenditure to cash flow level of member firms. Alternatively 
speaking, the affiliation reduces the financial constraints of member firms. Thus, a model is 
generated to test the relationship between business group affiliation and financial constraint. 
The results suggest that member firms do experience less financial constraint. To a further 
extend, with respect to the particular institutional characteristics of the Chinese market, the 
whole sample is divided into two subsamples according to the ownership structures of firms. 
The subsamples are: state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned-enterprises (non-
SOEs). Our findings show that the anti-financial-constraint effect of business group 
affiliation is significantly stronger in member SOEs compared with member non-SOEs.  
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        More importantly, the previous literature gives diverse conclusions on the efficiency of 
ICMs. Some academics claim that ICMs help gather spare internal capital and reallocate it 
to member firms in need, which leads to profit maximisation, while others argue that ICMs 
enable member firms to be involved in ‘value-destroying’ investments which are not efficient 
(Cline et al., 2014). This divergence may be due to treating all business groups as the same, 
without acknowledging any differences among them. Hence, to explore the nature of the 
divergence, business groups in this chapter are divided into two subgroups depending on 
their size. In the light of Cline et al.’s (2014) findings, the level of ‘inefficient investment’ 
can be calculated and used as a criterion to determine whether the ICM of one business group 
is efficient. By running a correlation test, it is demonstrated that large business groups often 
maintain an inefficient ICM in which internal capital is transferred to member firms with 
lower Tobin’s Q in order to further the aim of ‘empire building’. On the contrary, small 
business groups prefer to operate efficient ICMs in order to pursue profit maximisation. 
These detailed findings explain the divergence in the extant literature. 
        Furthermore, if business groups’ affiliations can soften financial constraints in member 
firms, this should have an impact on investment activities, especially investment efficiency. 
To test this possibility, the impacts of business group affiliation on the relationship between 
investment expenditure and investment opportunities, represented by Tobin’s Q, were 
examined. The results indicate that the affiliation reduces the investment efficiency of large 
member SOEs while it improves the investment efficiency of small member non-SOEs. On 
the one hand, member SOEs naturally enjoy privileges in external financing markets which 
make sure that there is no lack of capital for investment. Therefore, their affiliation with large 
business groups provides more excess internal capital which is consequently invested in sub-
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optimal opportunities, let alone the effect of inefficient ICM in large business groups. The 
end result of this process is over-investment and low investment efficiency. On the other 
hand, member non-SOEs who are affiliated with small business groups are always in need 
of external and internal capital to seize the best investment opportunities. Their unfavourable 
position in the competition for external financing impels them to take the best possible 
advantage of efficient ICMs in small business groups to achieve better investment efficiency.  
        Last but not least, since both efficient and inefficient ICM co-exist in the Chinese market, 
it would be interesting to know if anything could change the status of ICMs other than their 
own process of development, for instance an unexpected financial crisis. To address this 
question, the 2008 financial crisis provided the context for an appropriate natural experiment. 
For ICMs in both large and small business groups, we compared their status after the crisis 
to those in normal times. We found that survival is the supreme goal of all business groups. 
During wo years immediately after the crisis, large business groups had put ‘empire building’ 
on hold and had changed the status of their ICM from inefficient to efficient.  
          This chapter contributes to the literature in the following ways: (1) In previous 
literature, ICM is identified by internal capital flow which is measured using diverse methods, 
including net intra-group capital and cross-firm equity investment (Buchuk et al., 2014; 
Almeida et al., 2015) However, it is not realistic to continue to employ such methods in the 
Chinese market due to the lack of proper disclosure of relative financial data. Therefore, this 
chapter constructs a simultaneous model to identify the role of ICMs in China from the 
perspective of external financing and investment expenditure. (2) This chapter presents 
evidence of one essential function of ICM: softening financial constraints, by empirically 
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testing the data collected from a typical developing market from 2004 to 2014. To further 
explore the influence of ownership structure on ICM, sub-samples were created according to 
whether companies were SOEs or non-SOEs. Each of these types of enterprises comes from 
the unique historical and institutional background of the Chinese market. (3) The literature 
contains diverse conclusions on the efficiency of ICMs. For example, Lamont (1997) and 
Rajan et al. (2000) conclude that ICMs allocate too many resources to firms with bad 
investment opportunities and too few to firms with good investment opportunities, which 
promotes inefficiency. On the contrary, Stein (2002) concludes that parent firms reallocate 
funds to subsidiaries or segments with investment proposals with higher positive net present 
value, which promotes efficiency. In order to figure out the reason for these contradictory 
findings, this chapter divides the whole sample of business groups into sub-samples 
according to their size. Eventually, we conclude that large business groups tend to operate 
inefficient ICMs while small business groups prefer to maintain efficient ICMs. 
        The contents of this chapter are structured as follows. Section 3.1 gives an introduction 
and literature review on the topic of ICM, as well as an overview of the content of the chapter. 
Section 3.2 shows how the hypotheses proposed in this chapter were developed. Section 3.3 
discusses the characteristics of the data and the models constructed to test the hypotheses. 
Section 3.4 analyses the collected data and interprets the results of empirical tests. The last 
section draws conclusions about the overall role of ICMs in the Chinese market. 
3.2 Hypothesis development 
3.2.1 ICMs and the external financing market 
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        The existence of ICMs is considered to be a given in business groups. The literature has 
demonstrated that ICM plays an important role in business groups in developed. However, 
there is no concrete evidence showing that business groups in China operate their capital in 
the same way. Since ICM is a fundamental way to organise capital inside one business group, 
especially among subsidiaries, it is reasonable to assume that ICM exists in the Chinese 
market as well. Therefore, the first hypothesis is developed to prove that ICM works in the 
same way in Chinese business groups as it does in business groups in developed countries – 
that is, as an alternative to the external financing market. Moreover, it is difficult to capture 
direct evidence on ICMs because, as the term ‘internal’ suggests, the movement of internal 
capital within a business group is almost impossible for an outsider to monitor. Even though 
a few studies have used either intra-group loans or equity transfers to measure internal capital, 
these methods are not very generally recognised, and the relevant data are rarely provided in 
the Chinese market. Thus, an indirect but effective measure which combines two evidence 
together will be introduced to reveal the existence of ICM in Chinese business groups.  
        On the one hand, from the perspective of investment, Almeida et al. (2015) found no 
difference in investment activities between business group member firms and non-member 
firms. In other words, investment expenditure should be indifferent between member firms 
and non-member firms. On the other hand, from the perspective of the external financing 
market, Cline et al. (2014) demonstrate that member firms that engaged in inefficient 
investment activities issued fewer debts than non-member firms, and that they preferred 
ICMs because they enabled them to avoid external monitoring. Based on this finding, 
member firms are supposed to borrow less from banks as well. By combining these two 
perspectives, it could be argued that business group member firms do not invest less, even 
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though they borrow less from the external financing market, due to their access to ICMs.  
        H1: Business group member firms generally take advantage of internal capital market 
as an alternative to the external financing market. 
3.2.2 ICM and financial constraints 
        If the first hypothesis is proven to be true, the next appealing question would be ‘what 
is the effect of ICM as an alternative to the external financing market?’ Since member firms 
invest indifferently compared to non-member firms, though they do require fewer loans from 
banks, ICMs must be the internal source of their investment capital. So, we need to know 
how this capital market works between the parent firm and subsidiary firms. Apparently, 
when a member firm is in a need of investment but is constrained by having limited capital, 
the parent firm or other subsidiaries who possess spare capital will give it a helping hand 
(Hajivassiliou and Savignac, 2008). This mechanism solves the awkward predicament that 
bothers member firms, so their hands are no longer tied by financial constraints. According 
to He et al. (2013), member firms are less likely to be faced with financial constraints because 
they have access to ICMs. The second hypothesis is developed to examine the effect of ICMs 
on financial constraints.  
        Further investigation was conducted to examine whether this effect has different levels 
of power on different business groups. Specifically, there are diverse conclusions in the 
literature regarding the role of ICM in business groups. ICM sometimes seems to be a helping 
hand that gathers spare capital in order to invest in better opportunities which leads to profit 
maximisation, and at other times it seems like an obstacle to this purpose because spare 
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capital is directed to ‘value-destroying investments’. This phenomenon gave rise to the 
theory of efficient ICM. According to this theory, the efficiency of ICM depends on the 
direction of internal capital. If the internal capital is directed to member firms with a higher 
Tobin’s Q, compared to either peer firms in the same industry or other subsidiaries in the 
same business group, it is considered to be an efficient ICM. An efficient ICM is supposed 
to transfer internal capital to a member firm where better investment opportunities are present, 
so that the profit maximisation of the business group can be achieved. On the contrary, if the 
internal capital is directed to member firms with lower Tobin’s Qs, it is considered to be an 
inefficient ICM. An inefficient ICM seems to be unreasonable unless for good reasons. Cline 
et al. (2014) demonstrate that business groups could be involved in ‘value-destroying 
investment’, or inefficient ICM, because of its ‘empire building’ purpose. Expanding 
territory, rather than profit maximisation, is the priority of these business groups. Assisting 
with the establishment or development of new-born or weak subsidiaries is important. 
However, transferring capital to a member firm to invest in sub-optimal opportunities may 
not be wise according to investors, which is the reason why these business groups prefer ICM 
to external loans because ICM enables them to avoid external monitoring (Cline et al., 2014).  
        In this chapter, Chinese business groups are divided into two subsamples depending on 
their size. Large business groups are taken to be those that are bigger than median group size, 
which is represented by Fuson Group, Tsinghua Group and so on. The idea is that large 
business groups are surely in the process of ‘empire building’, which means their highest 
priority may be expansion, and this could result in inefficient ICMs. On the other hand, small 
business groups may care more about profit maximisation due to their stronger desire to 
survive and thrive, and hence they will have efficient ICMs. Because transferring internal 
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capital to member firms with better investment opportunities (higher Tobin’s Q) releases 
them from financial constraints, this is exactly how an efficient ICM will act. Hence, we 
could predict that small business groups who have efficient ICMs will experience even softer 
financial constraints than large business groups. 
        H2a: Business group member firms are less likely to be faced with financial constraints 
due to ICM, and this effect is stronger in small business groups. 
        H2b: Large business groups tend to maintain inefficient ICMs, while small business 
groups are more likely to operate efficient ICMs. 
3.2.3 ICM and investment efficiency 
        Since business groups are faced with less financial constraints when investing due to 
ICM, it is necessary to further investigate their investment decisions, especially investment 
efficiency. Generally speaking, softer financial constraint means more capital to invest, but 
there is never a simple answer to whether this is a good situation, especially in the Chinese 
market which is always affected by its particular institutional characteristics. According to 
Keister (1998), Chinese business group finance companies enabled the member firms to 
better manage investments both within the group and outside the group. However, Keister 
did not investigate further. Since there should be a relationship between Chinese ICMs and 
corporate investment due to the unique background of Chinese business group finance 
companies, investigation on this topic could contribute to a more comprehensive 
understanding on the nature and mechanism of ICMs.  
105 
 
        Furthermore, according to Gugler (2013), company and county institutional structures 
affect the role of ICMs. In details, ownership participation of the parent firm in the subsidiary 
plays a crucial role in the proper functioning of ICMs. Hence, it is worth exploring the 
differences between business groups with different ownership structures, especially in the 
unique institutional context of the Chinese market. To be specific, due to ownership structure 
of one firm, SOEs and non-SOEs have different experiences when it comes to financing and 
investment. SOEs are commonly favoured by banks because of their nature ties to the 
government. SOEs are often considered to be safer debtors because they have the government 
standing behind them. In addition, due to historical reasons, they are usually bigger and have 
superior resources compared with non-SOEs. Therefore, SOEs are more able to repay their 
debts, even without the help of a business group. Taking these factors into consideration, it 
is understandable that banks prefer SOEs as their debtors. That is to say, even if they did not 
have access to extra internal capital, member SOEs could still gain enough capital from the 
external financing market to invest in whatever opportunity which is best for the firm. Now 
with internal capital, there is a high level of possibility that they will invest in sub-optimal 
opportunities. In this situation, soft financial constraints are not beneficial for member SOEs, 
for they could end up with low investment efficiency. Meanwhile, things are totally different 
for member non-SOEs. There is a long history of discrimination against non-SOEs in 
external financing markets. They are not favoured by banks in any way when competing with 
SOEs for bank loans. That is why non-SOEs are always looking for capital to satisfy their 
investment needs. With the help of internal capital, member non-SOEs can seize their best 
investment opportunities and achieve higher investment efficiency.  
        H3a: Generally speaking, SOE business group member firms have lower levels of 
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investment efficiency compared to non-member firms, while non-SOE member firms have 
higher levels of investment efficiency. 
        Once again, the difference between large and small business groups regarding 
investment efficiency is a concern. As discussed previously, large business groups maintain 
inefficient ICM, thus transferring internal capital towards member firms with lower Tobin’s 
Qs. As a result, member firms with better investment opportunities (higher Tobin’s Qs) end 
up with insufficient capital while member firms with sub-optimal investment opportunities 
(lower Tobin’s Qs) receive more capital than they truly need. It is obvious in this case that 
member firms affiliated with large business groups would have their investment efficiency 
compromised by inefficient ICMs. Vice versa, member firms affiliated with small business 
groups will enjoy higher investment efficiency thanks to their efficient ICMs. 
        H3b: Affiliation with large business groups does harm to investment efficiency in 
member firms, while affiliation with small business groups improves investment efficiency in 
member firms. 
3.2.4 ICM, investment efficiency and the 2008 financial crisis 
        In the last three hypotheses, which relate to ICMs and investment efficiency, the 
fundamental functions and diverse roles of ICMs are thoroughly explored. As regards the 
risk-sharing ability of ICMs that is mentioned by He et al. (2013), more investigation is 
required. He et al. (2013) propose that business group affiliated firms in China experience 
lower levels of operating profit volatility and are less exposed to the risk of bankruptcy or 
financial distress than independent firms. He et al. (2013) find that affiliation with a business 
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group has a negative effect on the standard deviation of operating profitability, and this effect 
is more pronounced among non-SOE member firms. Furthermore, they suggest that group 
affiliation reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy or financial distress significantly after 
controlling for other financial measures and time and industry effects. Coincidentally, 
Almeida et al. (2015) investigated the efficiency of ICMs which play a similar risk-sharing 
role in financial crises. They demonstrate that after the 1997 Asian financial crisis (i.e. 1998 
to 1999), business group member firms with the highest growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q) 
sold equity to other member firms in exchange for cash (equity transfer/investment). Almeida 
et al. (2015) suggest this form of internal capital reallocation is consistent with efficient ICM. 
Using the difference in difference method, the authors further show that investment decline 
in member firms was much lower than in non-member firms after the crisis. Therefore, the 
risk sharing role of ICM works not only under normal conditions, but also during financial 
crises, although it does so in different ways. The operating mechanisms of ICMs immediately 
after financial crises are of greater interest to me. 
        Following Almeida (2015), the 2008 financial crisis could be considered as a natural 
experiment. Specifically, according to H3b, large business groups tend to operate inefficient 
ICMs due to their ‘empire building’ aspirations, while small business groups prefer to 
maintain efficient ICMs to achieve profit maximisation. If the results are consistent with 
Almeida’s (2015) findings, it could be concluded that all business groups need efficient ICMs 
to survive or to minimise the impacts of financial crises (or to maintain sustainable 
development) when they are under threat. Generally speaking, large business groups that 
previously ran inefficient ICMs remove empire building from their investment priorities, and 
small business groups do not experience any motivation to make changes to their ICMs.  
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        H4: During the 2008 financial crisis, business groups necessarily turned to efficient 
ICMs, regardless of their size, resulting in an overall improvement of investment efficiency 
in business groups. 
3.3 Research design 
3.3.1 Sample 
3.3.1.1 Definition of key variables 
        The most important variable is Business group, which is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if a firm is affiliated with one business group and 0 otherwise. To avoid ambiguity, a firm 
is defined as affiliated with business group if it is identified as either a parent firm or a 
subsidiary firm. As regards the dataset of business groups, we combine information from two 
related transaction databases from CSMAR and RESSET, both of which are very reliable 
databases for the Chinese market. The related transaction databases provide information on 
the relationships between affiliated firms, as well as details of their related transactions. 
Specifically, the affiliation relationships are organised into different types, including parent 
firm, subsidiary, controlling shareholder, brother subsidiaries (when the related transaction 
happens between two firms who are both subsidiaries of one parent firm) and so on.  
        Another important dummy variable Crisis is used to divide the whole sample period 
into two parts. Crisis equals 1 if referring to the sample period after 2008 and 0 otherwise. 
Dependent variables include total size of bank loans (long-term and short-term) and 
investment growth. A set of selected variables is employed as control variables for firm 
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characteristics, including ROS, Tobin’s Q, Firm size, Tangibility and so on. Detailed 
definitions and calculations of the dependent and control variables are reported in Table 3.1. 
To avoid abnormal observations, all the variables are trimmed at the 1% level in each tail. 
Table 3.1 Definition and calculation of variables 
 
Name of variables Definition 
Panel A. Dependent variables  
Long-term bank loan  Long-term bank loans scaled by total assets 
Short-term bank loan  Short-term bank loans scaled by total assets 
Inefficient investment  Calculated from equation (3.5) and (3.6) 
Investment expenditure Investment expenditure divided by total assets 
∆ total bank loan  Total bank loans less its one period lag scaled by total assets  
∆ long-term bank loan Long-term bank loans less its one period lag scaled by total assets  
∆ short-term bank loan  Short-term bank loans less its one period lag scaled by total assets  
∆ investment expenditure Investment expenditure less its one period lag scaled by total assets 
Panel B. Independent variables  
Business group A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is identified to be affiliated 
with a business group and equals 0 otherwise 
Crisis A dummy variable that equals 1 if referring to the period after the 
2008 financial crisis and equals 0 otherwise 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets divided by the replacement cost of assets 
Panel C. Control variables  
ROS Total pre-tax profits to total sales 
Size  Natural logarithm of total assets 
Tangibility  Total fixed assets to total assets 
Leverage Total liabilities to total assets 
Board  Number of directors on the board to total assets 
Independence Number of independent directors on the board to total number of 
directors to total assets 
110 
 
3.3.1.2 Data collection 
          Regarding the collection of the business group data, to the best of our knowledge, we 
are in need of an appropriate method that would serve the Chinese market properly, instead 
of copying methods that have been proposed in the extant literature for other countries. Cline 
et al. (2014) utilise multi-segment firms listed in the COMPUSTAT industrial annual and 
business segment databases from 1977 to 2011 to identify conglomerates in the United States. 
Gugler et al. (2013) construct a unique dataset containing data from three databases, 
Amadeus, Osiris and Worldscope, to obtain cross-country evidence on the internal workings 
of ICMs. Buchuk et al. (2014) take intra-group lending to define ICMs in Chile. However, 
this measure is of no use if the balance sheets of member firms are consolidated. Papers on 
chaebols in Korea consider firms to be affiliated if one of them is holds more than 30% of 
the total shares in each of the other firms (Ferris et al., 2003). Therefore, with reference to 
the extant literature, two commonly used measures are combined to construct a method that 
is appropriate for identifying affiliations with business groups. First of all, in two commonly 
used databases on the Chinese market, CSMAR and RESSET, there is one sub-database that 
records affiliated relationships between firms. For instance, in RESSET, this sub-database is 
called the Affiliated Relationship Database. This sub-database provides datasets on firms that 
are found to be related, mostly by means of shareholdings. Details including relationship 
type, equity ratio, investment summary and share number are also available. To be specific, 
relationship type is very precisely classified. There are 27 different types, including parent 
firm, subsidiary, and brother firm. Brother firms refer to two subsidiaries that are affiliated 
with the same parent firm and the parent firm is not listed in the stock market. This measure 
is adopted as one criterion for identifying affiliated member firms. A second criterion is 
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taking controlling-shareholder-firm into consideration. In details, if firm A possesses more 
than 20% of the total shares of firm B, firm A is defined as a controlling shareholder of firm 
B. Thus, firm A is identified as a parent and firm B a subsidiary. Moreover, if one person or 
one firm (even if not listed) is the controlling shareholder of more than one firm, those firms 
are all identified as being affiliated with the same business group. By combining the above 
two measures, the business group dataset is generated to serve the models in this chapter. 
        With respect to the process of basic data collection, we firstly include all the firms listed 
on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to 2015, excluding the Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprise board (SEM) and Growth Enterprise Market board (GEM). In 
order to get rid of abnormal observations, listed firms in the financial sector are excluded due 
to their unique accounting standards and special capital structures. Firms with Special 
Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) are also excluded according to usual data 
processing methods. Most of the data is collected from multiple sub-databases in the China 
Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). All the financial information 
and indexes are collected from the Chinese Listed Firm Annual Report Database and the 
Chinese Listed Firm Financial Variables Analysis Database. 
3.3.1.3 Sample distribution and summary statistics 
Table 3.2 reports the sample distribution of listed firms that are members of Chinese 
business groups. Panel A shows the distribution by year and ownership structure. On average, 
28.46% of SOEs and 8.40% of non-SOEs were affiliated with business groups. There is no 
obvious increase or decrease in numbers of member firms during the sample period.  
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Table 3.2 Sample distribution  
Panel A: Distribution by year and ownership structure 
Year SOEs Non-SOEs 
 No. of 
sample 
No. of  
member  




No. of  
member  
% of  
member 
2004 726 183  25.20 314  30  9.55 
2005 733 185  25.23 344  34  9.88 
2006 722 193  26.73 411  36  8.75 
2007 745 218  29.26 478  45  9.41 
2008 759 224  29.51 518  44  8.49 
2009 671 194  28.91 606  46  7.59 
2010 726 210  28.92 878  65  7.40 
2011 738 219  29.67 1084  91  8.39 
2012 787 233  29.60 1182  97  8.20 
2013 790 233  29.49 1210  96  7.93 
2014 796 240  30.15 1280  114  8.90 
Total 8193 2332  28.46 8305  698  8.40 
 
Panel B: Distribution by industry 
 
This table shows sample distribution by year and ownership structure, as well as by industry.  
Industry No. of sample No. of member % of member 
Agriculture 464 54 11.63793 
Mining 517 145 28.04642 
Manufacturing 15432 2632 17.05547 
Electricity, gas and water 899 280 31.14572 
Construction 540 75 13.88889 
Wholesale and retail 1553 363 23.37411 
Transportation 990 245 24.74747 
Information technology 987 74 7.497467 
Real estate 1288 190 14.75155 
Leasing and business services 265 34 12.83019 
Utilities 217 51 23.5023 
Service 88 5 5.681818 
Conglomerate 719 99 13.76912 
Total 23959 4247 17.72612 
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Generally speaking, the proportion of total firms who were member firms was stable in non-
SOEs and was slowly growing in SOEs. Panel B shows the sample distribution by industry, 
which reveals a phenomenon that member firms concentrated in certain industries. The 
industries most favoured by member firms are natural resource industries (electricity, water, 
gas, as well as mining). After that, it is obvious that the transportation, wholesale and retail, 
and utilities industries are popular too. Under the historical and institutional background of 
the Chinese market, all these industries are more or less controlled by the government. To be 
specific, the natural resource industry is always under control of the government due to its 
crucial status in the economy. Therefore, most firms in this industry are SOEs. Since the 
industry covers basically every region of the nation, natural resource firms normally have 
numbers of subsidiaries. This distribution is consistent with Panel A, in which big firms (or 
business groups) in these industries are mostly SOEs. In addition, broadly observed member 
firms provide circumstantial evidence that business groups are a preferred way to develop 
strong business empires. 
Summary statistics of main variables are shown in Table 3.3, along with the univariate 
test results on the difference in the median of bank loans between firms affiliated and not 
affiliated with business groups. Panel B of Table 3.3 shows that bank loans received by 
member firms are significantly fewer compared to non-member firms, including all kinds of 
bank loans. Nevertheless, the investment level in member firms is not significantly lower 




Table 3.3 Summary statistics and univariate test of key variables  
Panel A: Summary statistics 




StD Min Max 
Total bank 
loan (%) 
16667 15.98 12.97 5.00 29.61 17.70 3.25 37.97 
Long-term 
bank loan (%) 
16667 6.18 3.81 0.00 9.10 7.23 0.00 22.98 
Short-term 
bank loan (%) 
16667 7.25 2.00 0.00 11.10 1.72 0.00 18.34 
Investment 
growth 
16667 0.09 0.15 -0.56 0.75 1.21 -0.71 1.26 
Tobin’s Q 16667 1.91 1.42 0.79 2.41 1.69 0.18 6.93 
ROS (%) 16667 3.07 3.06 0.02 9.13 1.20 -0.38 19.68 
Leverage (%) 16667 0.47 0.47 0.29 0.62 0.24 0.06 1.93 





21.46 11.00 35.86 7.75 3.24 42.72 
Board 16667 9.02 9.00 8.00 9.00 1.86 6.00 18.00 
Independence 
(%) 
16667 35.45 33.33 33.33 33.33 6.45 33.33 39.75 
 
Panel B: Univariate tests comparing member firms and non-member firms 
Variables Member firms Non-member firms t-value 
Total bank loan 0.13 0.18 -3.46*** 
Long-term bank loan 0.06 0.08 -2.95*** 
Short-term bank loan 0.07 0.08 -2.16** 
Investment growth 0.12 0.11 0.26 
 
This table shows summary statistics and univariate test of key variables. Detailed definitions of all 
the variables are reported in Table 3.1. 
 
3.3.2 Regression models 
        To examine the hypotheses proposed in Section 3.2, several models are constructed to 
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conduct empirical tests utilising the business group dataset. For Hypothesis 1 regarding the 
role of ICMs as alternatives to the external financing market, two models are analysed 
together to give a comprehensive result. In regard to external financing, equation (3.1) is 
generated to detect the bank loan levels of member firms. For investment expenditure, 
equation (3.2) is introduced to see if affiliation with business groups has any influence on 
investment levels in member firms, following Chen (2011). 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐵𝐺 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  
                                       +𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +𝛽 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + ɛ (3.1) 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐵𝐺 +𝛽 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑄 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  
                             +𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ                                                 (3.2) 
where BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is a business group member firm; 
Business cycle and Firm’s life cycle are included in model (3.1) as two sets of dummy 
variables (similar to sets of Year and Industry dummy variables) to control for their influence 
on firm’s decision on getting capital.  
        The two equations are analysed together. In equation (3.1) 𝛽  is expected to be 
significantly negative, indicating member firms borrow less from the external financing 
market. In equation (3.2) 𝛽  is expected to be insignificant, indicating member and 
independent firms do not differ in their investment levels. The gap between external capital 
and investment level shows that ICMs are an alternative to the external financing market. 
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There is another possible situation: that 𝛽  is insignificant in equation (3.1) and significantly 
positive in equation (3.2), indicating member firms borrow the same amounts from external 
financing market compared to independent firms, while they actually invest more than the 
latter. Both situations lead to the same conclusion, which verify the existence and 
fundamental function of ICMs. 
        To test Hypothesis 2a, equation (3.3) is generated with investment expenditure as the 
dependent variable and the interaction term between business group and cash flow level as 
the key independent variable. This model is used to test whether affiliation with business 
groups has any impact on the sensitivity of investment expenditure to cash flow level in 
member firms. 







                                     +𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑄  + 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  
                                     +𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + ɛ                                                                       (3.3) 
        𝛽  is expected to be significantly negative, indicating that member firms are faced with 
less financial constraints generally. Furthermore, equation (3.3) is run twice using two 
subsamples. 𝛽  of the small business group subsample is expected to be more significantly 
negative (and larger in magnitude) compared to 𝛽  for the large business group subsample. 
The result could be explained by ICM efficiency theory. 
        To illustrate Hypothesis 2b, equation (3.4) is constructed. The dependent variable is 
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inefficient investment which is calculated by the method proposed by Rajan et al. (2000). 
This model tests whether there is a correlation between efficiency of ICM and the size of 
business groups. 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝐵𝐺 +𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑄 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  
                                                  +𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ                                      (3.4) 
where Inefficient Investment is the sum of value-destroying and cross-subsidising investment, 
and Large is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a business group is one of the biggest (i.e. 
Fuson Group and Tsinghua Group) and that equals 0 otherwise. 
        𝛽  is expected to be significantly positive, indicating large business groups keep 
inefficient ICMs. According to Cline et al. (2014), empire building managers (engaged in 
inefficient investments) utilise their internal capital markets to avoid external monitoring, in 
other words to transfer internal capital from high-Tobin’s Q member firms to low-Tobin’s Q 
member firms, resulting in inefficient ICMs. Furthermore, external investors punish 
inefficient ICM business groups with significantly negative market reactions. Therefore, 
since large business groups are highly likely to be empire building, business expansion 
(including inefficient investment in low-Tobin’s Q member firms) is their priority. They need 
to operate inefficient ICMs to support their new-born or weak member firms. On the contrary, 
small business groups have not yet reached the expansion stage. Instead, they chase optimal 
investment opportunities and maximisation of corporate profitability. Therefore, they prefer 
to maintain an efficient ICM so that they can utilise both internal and external financing 
markets to survive and thrive.  
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        Taken together, the results of equations (3.3) and (3.4) suggest that the anti-financial-
constraints effect of ICMs is stronger in small business groups because they tend to maintain 
efficient ICMs. To be specific, due to their efficient ICMs, small business groups transfer 
internal capital from member firms with low Tobin’s Qs to member firms with high Tobin’s 
Qs. Therefore, on the one hand, investment activity in high-Tobin’s Q (representing high 
investment opportunity) member firms is not limited by financial constraints. On the other 
hand, it does no harm to low-Tobin’s Q member firms because there are not many profitable 
investment opportunities for them after all. 
        Regarding ICM efficiency theory, Rajan et al. (2000) propose Absolute Value by 
Allocation (AVA) and Relative Value by Allocation (RVA) to measure the efficiency of 
resource allocation in corporate internal capital markets. Cline et al. (2014) further develop 
the method to define value-destroying investment (negative of AVA) and cross-subsidising 
investment (negative of RVA). If a business group is engaged in value-destroying or cross-
subsidising investment, it is considered to have an inefficient ICM which suggests internal 
capital is transferred from member firms with higher Tobin’s Qs to member firms with lower 
Tobin’s Qs. In contrast, an efficient ICM suggests internal capital is transferred from member 
firms with lower Tobin’s Qs to member firms with higher Tobin’s Qs. 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = − ∑ 𝑄 − 1 −           (3.5) 
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
= − ∑ 𝑄 − 𝑄 − − ∑ −                  (3.6) 
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where Q is Tobin’s Q representing growth (investment) opportunity, S is firm size, and 
CAPEX is capital expenditure investment. 
        To test Hypothesis 3a, based on the model proposed by Chen et al. (2011), the 
relationship between business groups and investment efficiency is proposed in equation (3.7). 
The interaction term shows if the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment 
opportunities, represented by Tobin’s Qs, is affected by the affiliation with business groups. 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐵𝐺 +𝛽 𝐵𝐺 × 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑄  
                                    +𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ          (3.7) 
        𝛽  is expected to be significantly negative for member SOEs, suggesting that affiliation 
with business group does harm to investment efficiency in member SOEs. Nevertheless, 𝛽  
is expected to be significantly positive for member non-SOEs, indicating affiliation with 
business groups improves investment efficiency in member non-SOEs. The reason can be 
further analysed by using business group subsamples. 
        When testing equation (3.7) using two subsamples, large and small business groups, the 
results for the two types of groups are expected to be different and supportive of the previous 
results. 𝛽  for large member SOEs is expected to be significantly negative, while 𝛽  for small 
member non-SOEs is expected to be significantly positive. The explanation involves a further 
development of H2. According to the relationship between ICM and financial constraints, it 
is known that the anti-financial-constraints effect is stronger in small business groups due to 
their efficient ICMs, which means they transfer internal capital from low-investment-
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opportunity member firms to high-investment-opportunity member firms. This perfectly 
explains why investment efficiency is significantly improved in small business groups. On 
the contrary, in large (empire building) business groups, internal capital is transferred in the 
opposite direction (from high-investment-opportunity member firms to low-investment-
opportunity member firms, inefficient ICM), resulting in low investment efficiency 
(investment activity is less sensitive to investment opportunity). 
        For Hypothesis 4, equation (3.8) is produced to examine the influence of 2008 financial 
crisis on the effect of affiliation with business groups on member firms. This model is run 
twice, once using a member-firm subsample and once using a non-member-firm subsample. 
A comparison is made between the results. 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠+𝛽 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑄  
                                +𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ              (3.8) 
        𝛽  is expected to be significantly positive in the member-firm subsample, indicating 
there is an overall improvement in investment efficiency in business groups after the financial 
crisis. This is because all business firms, even the large ones, are predicted to be engaged in 
efficient ICM after the crisis, to ensure survival and sustainable development of the groups. 
However, 𝛽  for the non-member-firm subsample is expected to be significantly (or 
insignificantly) negative due to the damage to investment activity (and investment 
opportunity) after the crisis. 
3.4 Empirical results and analysis 
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3.4.1 The role of internal capital market (ICM) as an alternative to the external financing 
market 
        As discussed in Section 3.2.1, the existence of ICM is demonstrated by combing two 
perspectives, external financing and investment expenditure. Therefore, a simultaneous 
model that contains two regressions is run to give a comprehensive result on the role and 
function of ICMs. The regression results of equation (3.1) show the relationship between 
business groups and their level of access to bank loans. Specifically, since this model is 
supposed to be considered together with investment expenditure, Long-term bank loans is 
the proper dependent variable rather than total bank loans or short-term bank loans. This is 
due to the characteristics of investment capital. In most cases, long-term bank loans are 
considered to be the main sources of investment expenditure, while short-term bank loans 
often serve as sources of cash flow. Thus, long-term bank loans are chosen as the dependent 
variable in this model to be associated with investment expenditure. According to the 
coefficients of Business group in the first row, which are all significantly negative at the 1% 
level, Table 3.4 shows that business groups require far fewer long-term bank loans than non-
member firms. Since long-term bank loans are closely related with investment capital, the 
investment activity in business groups will be further addressed in Table 3.5. 
        Table 3.5 illustrates the impact of affiliation with business groups on investment 
expenditure. According to the coefficients of Business groups, it shows that business groups 
and non-member firms are indifferent regarding investment expenditure. In other words, 
member firms are investing as much as independent firms. Combining Table 3.4 and 3.5, 
even though business groups receive (or require) much less in long-term bank loans, they do 
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Table 3.4 Business group and long-term bank loans 
VARIABLES Long-term bank loans 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Business group -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (-2.59) (-2.87) (-2.98) 
ROS t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.34) (0.23) (0.43) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.24) (-0.64) (0.46) 
Size 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (14.52) (11.73) (12.64) 
Tangibility 0.094*** 0.084*** 0.052*** 
 (9.25) (7.42) (8.41) 
Board -0.002 -0.002 -0.010** 
 (-0.52) (-0.74) (-2.15) 
Independence -0.010 -0.053*** 0.010 
 (-1.42) (-2.99) (0.24) 
Constant -1.635*** -2.522*** -1.567*** 
 (-8.98) (-3.70) (-7.82) 
Business cycle Yes Yes Yes 
Life cycle Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.379 0.322 
Observations 16,613 7,703 7,298 
This table shows the impact of affiliation with business groups on the access to long-term bank loans. 
The key independent variable Business group is a dummy that indicates whether a firm is affiliated 
with a business group, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; detailed definitions of all the variables 
are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** 




Table 3.5 Business group and investment expenditure 
VARIABLES Investment 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Business group 0.019 0.017 -0.003 
 (0.87) (0.46) (-0.56) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 -0.000 0.240*** 0.000 
 (-0.82) (27.88) (0.39) 
Leverage t-1 0.003 0.725*** -0.000 
 (1.11) (13.30) (-1.50) 
Size -0.036*** 0.024* 0.000 
 (-4.94) (1.66) (0.03) 
Tangibility 0.158*** 0.383*** 0.091*** 
 (2.83) (3.67) (9.10) 
Board -0.004 0.024 -0.008 
 (-0.10) (0.31) (-0.89) 
Independence 0.009 -0.046 0.002 
 (0.21) (-0.59) (0.26) 
Constant 0.746*** -1.201*** 0.052* 
 (4.50) (-3.61) (1.71) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.351 0.468 
Observations 14,722 6,856 6,464 
 
This table shows the impact of membership of a business group on a firm’s investment expenditure. 
The key independent variable Business group is a dummy that indicates whether a firm is affiliated 
with a business group, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for 
SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Not invest less than non-member firms. This phenomenon could be viewed as evidence of 
the existence internal capital markets within business groups, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. In other words, internal capital markets enable member-firms to reallocate 
excess capital within business groups. This result is consistent with the finding of Stein 
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(2002), which states that parent firms reallocate funds to subsidiaries or segments with 
investment proposals with a positive net present value but not enough investment capital. 
Therefore, by utilising ICM, business groups are able to keep normal investment levels while 
borrowing less money from the external financing market. 
3.4.2 ICMs in business groups of different sizes and softened financial constraints 
        Section 3.4.1 discusses the role of ICMs as an alternative to the external financing 
market, which enables member firms to maintain investment levels while borrowing less 
from banks. The next question is: how does the internal capital affect the cash flow in 
member firms? Does it really release member firms from financial constraints? Table 3.6 
shows the actual effect of affiliation with business groups on financial constraints in member 
firms. The coefficients of the interaction term between Business group and Cash flow are all 
significantly negative at the 1% level, suggesting that the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow is significantly weakened in business groups. Therefore, the level of investment 
expenditure is no longer limited to the level of cash flow in member-firms due to the role of 
ICM. Specifically, the coefficient in column 2 is much larger than the other two in columns 
1 and 3, showing that the financial-constraint-weakening effect of ICM is much stronger in 
member SOEs. Due to historical reasons, SOEs are naturally bigger in size and have better 
access to all kinds of resources. Thus, SOE business groups are even stronger in every respect, 
including their access to internal capital. This phenomenon can be further verified by a 
circumstantial evidence which is given by Table 3.7. Table 3.7 shows the regression results 
for equation (3.1) with the dependent variable replaced by short-term bank loans. Since 
financial constraint measures the relationship between investment expenditure and cash flow,  
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Table 3.6 Business group and investment-cashflow sensitivity 
VARIABLES Investment 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Business group 0.001 0.092*** -0.005 
 (0.05) (4.30) (-0.69) 
Business group -0.124*** -2.353*** -0.233*** 
*Cash flow (-2.73) (-23.76) (-29.21) 
Cash flow 0.448*** 0.377*** 0.246*** 
 (83.12) (5.41) (72.57) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.000*** -0.038*** 0.000*** 
 (10.86) (-6.46) (41.87) 
Leverage t-1 0.070*** 0.215*** 0.024*** 
 (18.79) (6.61) (24.28) 
Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.19) (0.85) (1.17) 
Cash 0.107*** 1.569*** 0.362*** 
 (20.86) (76.38) (83.92) 
Constant 0.026 -0.227 0.016 
 (0.08) (-0.86) (0.14) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.692 0.817 0.995 
Observations 13,177 5,684 6,315 
 
This table shows the impact of business group membership on investment-cashflow sensitivity. The 
key independent variable Business group is a dummy that indicates whether a firm is affiliated with 
a business group, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for SOEs 
and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are 





Table 3.7 Business group and short-term bank loans 
VARIABLES Short-term bank loans 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Business group 0.014** -0.013*** 0.094*** 
 (2.17) (-4.41) (4.91) 
ROS t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.52) (-1.62) (-0.50) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.001*** -0.017*** 0.000* 
 (3.74) (-17.08) (1.91) 
Size -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.025*** 
 (-4.63) (-5.17) (-4.45) 
Tangibility 0.114*** 0.071*** 0.182*** 
 (7.11) (8.56) (4.54) 
Board 0.000 0.001 0.009 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.27) 
Independence 0.078 0.017 0.170 
 (1.51) (0.60) (1.44) 
Constant 0.374*** 0.351*** 0.623*** 
 (6.68) (11.42) (4.17) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.232 0.236 
Observations 16,667 7,729 7,316 
 
This table shows the impact of business group membership on short-term bank loans. The key 
independent variable Business group is a dummy that indicates whether a firm is affiliated with a 
business group, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for SOEs 
and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are 





and short-term bank loans are an essential source of cash flow, Table 3.7 helps to dig dipper 
into the financial constraint issue. The coefficients of Business group give diverse results in 
the first row. The coefficient is significantly positive in columns 1 and 3, and is negative in 
column 2, indicating that member SOEs demand less in short-term bank loans while member 
non-SOEs need more loans than non-member firms. This result is consistent with the finding 
in Table 3.6. Member SOEs require less in short-term loans because their affiliates have 
already satisfied their cash flow need and freed them from financial constraints. External 
short-term capital is not really essential in this case. In column 3, the coefficient of Business 
group is significantly positive because affiliation with business groups has to some extent 
softened financial constraints in member non-SOEs, but not as much as in member SOEs. 
Hence, they are still thirsty for short-term bank loans due to their long-lasting inferior 
position in the external financing market. 
        To further investigate the role of ICMs, the whole sample is divided into two subsamples 
according to the size of business groups. Business groups that are bigger than the average 
are classified as Large business groups, and others are classified as Small business groups. 
Table 3.8 shows the different effects of affiliation on financial constraints in large and small 
business groups separately. According to the coefficients of the interaction term, it is clear 
that small business groups are faced with even softer financial constraints compared to large 
business groups, especially in SOEs, consistent with Hypothesis 2a. The result can be 
explained by ICM efficiency theory. Since large business groups are more engaged in 
“empire building”, they are more likely to run inefficient ICMs by reallocating capital from 
member firms with high Tobin’s Qs to member-firms with low Tobin’s Qs, in order to 
support the development of new-born or weaker member firms. On the contrary, small  
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Table 3.8 The impact of business group size on financial constraints 
VARIABLES  Investment  
 All sample firms 
Large            Small 
SOE 
Large            Small 
Non-SOE 
Large            Small 
Business group 0.004 0.003 0.037 0.088*** 0.016 -0.015* 
 (0.09) (0.08) (1.06) (2.76) (0.97) (-1.79) 
Business group -0.270 -0.123** -1.047** -2.417*** -0.254 -0.232*** 
*Cash flow (-0.51) (-2.57) (-2.32) (-22.00) (-1.46) (-28.92) 
Cash flow 0.471*** 0.448*** 0.262*** 0.320*** 0.452*** 0.246*** 
 (83.07) (79.29) (3.43) (4.21) (84.10) (71.87) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.045*** -0.040*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (9.37) (10.37) (-6.69) (-6.06) (60.02) (41.52) 
Leverage t-1 0.095*** 0.070*** 0.231*** 0.217*** 0.095*** 0.024*** 
 (21.57) (17.93) (6.33) (5.96) (53.87) (23.98) 
Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.09) (0.21) (0.80) (0.65) (-3.10) (0.37) 
Cash 0.083*** 0.107*** 1.609*** 1.589*** 0.101*** 0.362*** 
 (15.36) (19.90) (70.34) (70.56) (14.78) (83.45) 
Constant 0.034 0.031 -0.212 -0.260 0.045 0.016 
 (0.09) (0.08) (-0.71) (-0.80) (0.46) (0.14) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.703 0.692 0.813 0.819 0.996 0.995 
Observations 11,881 11,992 4,931 4,777 5,914 6,190 
 
This table shows the impact of the size of a business group on its financial constraints. The key 
independent variable Business group is a dummy that indicates whether a firm is affiliated with a 
business group, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for SOEs 
and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 3.1. T-statistics are 






Table 3.9 Size of business group and efficiency of ICM 
VARIABLES Inefficient investment 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Large 0.019** 0.197*** 0.083** 
Business group (2.47) (3.96) (2.44) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 -0.000 0.240*** 0.000 
 (-0.82) (27.88) (0.39) 
Leverage t-1 0.003 0.725*** -0.000 
 (1.11) (13.30) (-1.50) 
Size -0.036*** 0.024* 0.000 
 (-4.94) (1.66) (0.03) 
Tangibility 0.158*** 0.383*** 0.091*** 
 (2.83) (3.67) (9.10) 
Board -0.004 0.024 -0.008 
 (-0.10) (0.31) (-0.89) 
Independence 0.009 -0.046 0.002 
 (0.21) (-0.59) (0.26) 
Constant 0.746*** -1.201*** 0.052* 
 (4.50) (-3.61) (1.71) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.351 0.468 
Observations 14,722 6,856 6,464 
 
This table shows impact of business group size on the efficiency of its ICM. The key independent 
variable Large business group is a dummy that indicates whether a business group is a large one, 
which equals 1 if the business group is larger than the mean size; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 
for SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 3.1. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 




business groups pay more attention to making profits in order to outperform other firms, 
which facilitates efficient ICMs. Therefore, small business groups always reallocate capital 
to a high-Tobin’s Q member firms, which results in even softer financial constraints. Table 
3.9 shows the relationship between efficiency of ICM and business groups of different sizes. 
According to the significantly positive coefficients of Large, it is clear that large business 
groups are more likely to be involved in ‘value-destroying and cross-subsidising investments’ 
which result in inefficient ICMs. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2b, which is also 
a further demonstration of the conclusion that large business groups tend to operate 
inefficient ICM due to their ‘empire building’ ambitions. 
3.4.3 ICMs in business groups of different sizes and their diverse impacts on investment 
efficiency 
        As discussed in Section 3.2.3, Table 3.10 shows the results of equation (3.5) regarding 
the effect of affiliation with business groups on investment efficiency in member firms. The 
coefficients of the interaction term between Business group and Tobin’s Q show diverse 
results regarding different ownership structure of firms. In column 2, the coefficient is 
significantly negative at the 1% level, indicating weakened investment efficiency in SOE 
business groups. However, in column 3, the coefficient is significantly positive at the 5% 
level, indicating strengthened investment efficiency in non-SOE business groups. This 
phenomenon is consistent with Hypothesis 3a which predicts that member SOEs will have 
even lower investment efficiency due to too much excess capital, while member non-SOEs 
will take good advantage of internal capital so that they can seize the best investment 
opportunities and improve their investment efficiency. In addition, the coefficient of Business  
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Table 3.10 Business group and investment efficiency 
VARIABLES Investment 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Business group -0.006 0.444*** -0.002 
 (-0.22) (9.96) (-0.26) 
Business group 0.014* -0.285*** 0.036** 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (1.84) (-17.66) (2.32) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 -0.000 0.350*** 0.000 
 (-0.71) (33.42) (0.36) 
Leverage t-1 0.002 0.619*** -0.008 
 (0.93) (11.53) (-1.42) 
Size -0.034*** 0.048*** -0.007 
 (-4.69) (3.36) (-0.01) 
Tangibility 0.162*** 0.406*** 0.091*** 
 (2.90) (3.98) (9.08) 
Board 0.109*** 0.024 0.017** 
 (2.70) (0.31) (2.32) 
Independence 0.045 -0.118 0.008 
 (1.11) (-1.55) (1.09) 
Constant 0.713*** -1.821*** 0.053* 
 (4.28) (-5.56) (1.74) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.371 0.467 
Observations 14,722 6,856 6,464 
 
This table shows the impact of business group membership on investment efficiency. The key 
independent variable Business group is a dummy that indicates whether a firm is affiliated with a 
business group, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for SOEs 
and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 3.1. T-statistics are 




Group in column 2 is significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating that SOE-business 
groups invest much more than other SOEs. Combined with the result in Table 3.4 column 2 
that SOE-business group receive much less in long-term bank loans, this is further evidence 
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that ICM works as an internal financing market which enables business groups to invest 
appropriately while borrowing less from the external financing market. 
        Table 3.11 shows the difference between large and small business groups when it comes 
to the effect of the affiliation on investment efficiency in member firms. According to the 
coefficients of the interaction term between Business group and Tobin’s Q, diverse results 
are observed from the model. In column 3, the coefficient is significantly negative at the 1% 
level, suggesting that large member SOEs have much lower investment efficiency compared 
to other firms. In column 6, the coefficient is significantly positive at the 5% level, suggesting 
that small member non-SOEs have higher investment efficiency. Taken together, these 
results are consistent with Hypothesis 3b. Generally speaking, the coefficient in column 2 
suggests that small business groups are much more efficient in investment activities. As 
mentioned in the discussion about Table 3.8, this result is consistent with ICM efficiency 
theory as well. Since small business groups are more likely to run efficient ICMs, they 
reallocate capital to high-Tobin’s Q-member-firms, which explains their high investment 
efficiency. 
3.4.4 The influence of the 2008 financial crisis on the efficiency of ICMs 
        In order to compare the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis on ICM efficiency on 
member firms with its impact on independent firms, the whole sample is divided into two 
subsamples: member-firms and non-member-firms. In Table 3.12, the coefficients of the 
interaction term between Crisis and Tobin’s Q shows different results in member firms and 
independent firms. On the one hand, in columns 1, 3 and 5, the coefficients are significantly  
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Table 3.11 Business group size and investment efficiency 
VARIABLES  Investment  
 All sample firms 
Large            Small 
SOE 
Large            Small 
Non-SOE 
Large            Small 
Business group 0.047 -0.073* 0.410*** 0.168 -0.009 -0.002 
 (1.27) (-1.89) (6.90) (1.06) (-0.55) (-0.28) 
Business group 0.001 0.033*** -0.342*** -0.077 0.006 0.011** 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (0.06) (2.77) (-18.56) (-1.23) (0.77) (2.45) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 -0.000 -0.000 0.362*** 0.368*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.83) (-0.56) (32.35) (31.99) (0.25) (0.33) 
Leverage t-1 0.003 0.001 0.538*** 0.651*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.08) (0.58) (9.13) (11.09) (-1.20) (-1.39) 
Size -0.037*** -0.041*** 0.081*** 0.090*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (-4.48) (-4.79) (4.73) (4.91) (-0.25) (-0.13) 
Tangibility 0.144** 0.172*** 0.439*** 0.515*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 
 (2.37) (2.80) (3.84) (4.35) (8.78) (8.65) 
Board -0.005 -0.003 0.040 0.025 -0.008 -0.008 
 (-0.10) (-0.07) (0.52) (0.31) (-0.89) (-0.89) 
Independence 0.009 0.008 -0.067 -0.046 0.002 0.002 
 (0.20) (0.18) (-0.88) (-0.59) (0.26) (0.26) 
Constant 0.826*** 0.703*** -2.333*** -1.254*** 0.053* 0.056* 
 (4.70) (4.23) (-6.64) (-3.69) (1.70) (1.81) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.329 0.179 0.135 0.467 0.467 
Observations 14,722 14,722 6,856 6,856 6,464 6,464 
 
This table shows business groups of two different sizes and their investment efficiency. The key 
independent variable Business group is a dummy that indicates whether a firm is affiliated with a 
business group, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for SOEs 
and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 3.1. T-statistics are 





Table 3.12 Business group and investment efficiency after the 2008 financial crisis 
VARIABLES  Investment  
 All sample firms 
Member     Non-member 
SOE 
Member     Non-member 
Non-SOE 
Member    Non-member 
Crisis 0.065 0.034 -0.079 0.425*** 0.048*** 0.019** 
 (1.19) (0.62) (-0.83) (3.84) (2.60) (2.19) 
Crisis 0.002*** -0.028** 0.013*** -0.411*** 0.001** -0.000 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (3.30) (-2.25) (3.37) (-14.67) (2.45) (-0.88) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.023*** -0.002*** 0.034*** 0.293*** 0.001 0.000 
 (5.17) (-3.38) (5.87) (23.28) (0.51) (0.88) 
Leverage t-1 0.002 0.038*** 0.839*** 2.280*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.28) (5.99) (11.62) (35.77) (-1.54) (-1.41) 
Size -0.017** -0.042*** -0.059*** 0.003 0.004 0.001 
 (-2.07) (-4.50) (-5.07) (0.15) (1.36) (0.46) 
Tangibility 0.190*** 0.147** 0.082 0.279** 0.101*** 0.093*** 
 (2.98) (2.11) (0.93) (2.30) (4.79) (8.35) 
Board 0.010 0.136*** -0.045 -0.014 0.030** 0.017** 
 (0.22) (2.72) (-0.71) (-0.16) (2.07) (2.14) 
Independence 0.103 0.066 0.190 -0.051 0.146** -0.001 
 (1.02) (0.61) (1.48) (-0.27) (2.58) (-0.08) 
Constant 0.299 0.866*** 0.866*** -1.346*** -0.105 0.034 
 (1.57) (4.08) (3.31) (-3.29) (-1.49) (1.01) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.205 0.379 0.370 0.113 0.434 
Observations 3,796 11,451 1,952 4,832 1509 5,567 
 
This table shows the impact of business group on investment efficiency after the 2008 financial crisis. 
The key independent variable Business group is a dummy that indicates whether a firm is affiliated 
with a business group, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for 
SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 3.1. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 




positive at the 1% and 5% significance levels, indicating that business groups tend to operate 
efficient ICMs after the financial crisis, which is consistent with the extant literature and 
Hypothesis 4. To be more specific, investment efficiency in business groups is consequently 
better when they transfer capital from member-firms with lower Tobin’s Qs to member-firms 
with higher Tobin’s Qs (better investment or growth opportunity), which helps to create 
efficient ICMs. On the other hand, the coefficients in columns 2 and 4 are significantly 
negative at the 1% and 5% significance levels, indicating that the damage of the financial 
crisis to investment efficiency is much greater in independent firms. 
        Overall, business group members were able to utilise their ICMs to mitigate the negative 
impacts of the financial crisis on corporate investment activities. Business groups used ICM 
to transfer internal capital to subsidiaries with better investment opportunities and thereby 
support investment in these firms. Similarly, independent firms that are on their own invested 
less and experience lower investment efficiency during the financial crisis. The results are 
consistent with previous empirical studies.  
3.4.5 Robustness results 
3.4.5.1 Potential endogeneity issue 
    In this section, the potential endogeneity issue of our regression models is addressed. 
We believe that there is no indication of a loop-causality relationship. As regards the impacts 
of the key variable Business group on the dependent variables, any argument that suggests a 
converse influence will not hold. For instance, as argued in Section 3.4.1, it is known that, 
due to affiliation with business groups, ICMs can serve as alternatives to the external 
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financing market because they support member firms through internal capital reallocation. 
Therefore, member firms receive considerably less in long-term bank loans than non-member 
firms. However, one cannot argue that affiliations with business groups are established due 
to a lack of external bank loans or an indifferent level of investment expenditure. This is 
simply not how business groups are actually constructed. In most cases, subsidiaries are born 
as a result of certain need of the parent company. All in all, the affiliation with business 
groups is not likely to be affected by level of access to bank loans or level of investment 
expenditure.  
    Nevertheless, it is impossible to verify that Business group is completely exogenous. In 
order to solve the potential endogeneity of affiliation with business groups, a two-stage least-
square method is adopted. In the 2SLS method, the key point is to identify an instrumental 
variable which is highly correlated with the endogenous variable and not correlated with the 
dependent variable. In this chapter, employee number is adopted as the instrumental variable. 
It is reasonable to assume that affiliation with business groups is highly correlated with 
number of employees in the whole group. A variable NOE (Number of Employees) is 
generated based on the discussion above.  
    Table 3.13 reports the 2SLS regression results for the impact of affiliation with business 
group on their access to bank loans. The correlations among NOE, Long-term bank loan and 
Business group are further documented in columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.14. The correlation 
coefficient between Long-term bank loan and NOE is 0.000 and not significant at all 
according to column 1. Moreover, the high level of correlation between Business group and 
NOE is suggested by the significantly positive coefficient of NOE in the first-stage result in  
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Table 3.13 Heckman two-stage regression results showing the impact of business group 
membership on level of access to bank loans  
VARIABLES  First-stage Second-stage   
 Bank loan Business group Total bank loan  Long-term loan Short-term loan 
Number of 0.000 0.06***    
Employees (0.23) (3.37)    
Princelings   -0.067** -0.186*** -0.062* 
   (-2.38) (-3.08) (-0.44) 
ROS t-1  0.097*** 0.135*** 0.056*** 0.089*** 
  (3.76) (5.83) (8.30) (7.90) 
Tobin’s Q t-1  0.014*** 0.037*** 0.025*** 0.010*** 
  (5.67) (8.28) (5.39) (11.46) 
Size  0.198*** 0.165*** 0.183*** 0.112*** 
  (3.21) (3.86) (9.86) (8.72) 
Tangibility  0.328*** 0.301*** 0.168*** 0.175*** 
  (4.96) (7.29) (3.85) (12.60) 
Board  0.003** 0.008** 0.001* 0.002 
  (2.05) (2.41) (1.23) (0.37) 
Independence  0.128 0.103 0.101 0.97 
  (0.63) (0.90) (0.69) (0.95) 
Constant  -6.581*** -5.237*** -3.498*** -3.219*** 
  (-7.15) (-6.79) (-6.85) (-6.80) 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.378 0.321 0.298 0.275 
Observations  16,976 16,976 16,976 17,034 
Chi-sq 0.017 Sargan 0.000 Weak IV F 25.594 
 
This table shows the Heckman two-stage regression results showing the impact of business group on 
level of access to banks loans. The key independent variable Business group is a dummy that indicates 
whether a firm is affiliated with a business group, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; NOE is a 
variable that represents number of employees; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in 
Table 3.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent 




column 2. Both results suggest that NOE is a suitable instrumental variable for Business 
group. In the second-stage, the coefficients of Business group are still significantly negative, 
demonstrating the robustness of the previous conclusion that affiliation with business groups 
do weaken a firm’s need for long-term bank loans generally. Other variables basically take 
the same signs as they did in the original results. 
3.4.5.2 Other robustness tests 
        In order to test the robustness of the empirical results, alternative measurements of 
dependent variables are adopted to provide more evidence on the robustness of the 
fundamental models. Panel A in Table 3.14 shows the impact of business group affiliation 
on change in access to long-term bank as a replacement for the original access to long-term 
bank loans. The significantly negative coefficients of Business group suggest that the 
conclusion about its role in replacing external financing capital is robust. Meanwhile, the 
negative impact is stronger in member SOEs, and less significant in member non-SOEs, 
which is consistent with the discussion in Section 3.4.1. Panel B shows the influence of 
affiliation with business groups on change in short-term bank loans. More specifically, the 
coefficient of Business group is significantly negative in column 2, suggesting that member 
SOEs receive much less short-term bank loans from the external financing market. Again, 
the results are consistent with the conclusion in Section 3.4.2 that member firms utilise ICM 
as an alternative to external bank loans. Furthermore, Panel C shows the effect of affiliation 
with business groups on change in investment expenditure. Similar to the results from 
Section 3.4.2, there is no difference in growth of investment expenditure between member 
firms and non-member firms, which is consistent with the original conclusion.  
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Table 3.14 Robustness tests with different dependent variables 
Panel A. Business group and change in level of access to long-term bank loans 
VARIABLES ∆Long-term bank loans 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Business group -0.004** -0.005** -0.003* 
 (-2.36) (-2.17) (-1.71) 
ROS t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.79) (0.71) (-0.10) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 
 (-0.21) (-1.84) (-0.00) 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.07) (0.54) (0.69) 
Tangibility -0.013*** -0.022*** -0.009* 
 (-4.33) (-4.84) (-1.74) 
Board 0.000 0.004 0.001 
 (0.10) (0.88) (0.24) 
Independence -0.013 -0.023 0.004 
 (-1.28) (-1.56) (0.24) 
Constant -0.405*** -0.311*** -0.387*** 
 (-28.69) (-13.80) (-17.68) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.399 0.327 
Observations 16,613 7,703 7,298 
 
This table shows the impact of business group on changes in level of access to long-term bank loans. 
The key independent variable Business group is a dummy that indicates whether a firm is affiliated 
with a business group, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for 
SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 3.1. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 




Panel B. Business group membership and change in level of access to short-term bank loans 
VARIABLES ∆Short-term bank loans 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Business group 0.012 -0.000*** 0.054 
 (0.40) (-4.02) (0.55) 
ROS t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** 
 (-1.64) (-1.33) (-3.97) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.000 -0.007*** 0.000 
 (0.35) (-8.48) (0.10) 
Size 0.005 0.001 -0.008 
 (0.46) (1.10) (-0.29) 
Tangibility 0.039 0.011 0.136 
 (0.52) (1.58) (0.67) 
Board -0.063 0.004 -0.254 
 (-0.94) (0.58) (-1.45) 
Independence -0.432* -0.058** -1.183* 
 (-1.75) (-2.48) (-1.90) 
Constant 0.374*** 0.351*** 0.623*** 
 (6.68) (11.42) (4.17) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.332 0.336 
Observations 16,667 7,729 7,316 
 
This table shows the impact of business group membership on changes in level of access to short-
term bank loans. The key independent variable Business group is a dummy that measures the 
affiliation with business groups of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; SOE is a 
dummy which equals 1 for SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are 
reported in Table 3.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** 





Panel C. Business group membership and change in investment expenditure 
VARIABLES ∆Investment 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Business group 0.149 0.079 0.293 
 (0.59) (1.31) (0.35) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 -0.003 -0.063*** -0.003 
 (-0.73) (-3.24) (-0.45) 
Leverage t-1 0.051 1.082*** 0.035 
 (1.00) (11.37) (0.45) 
Size -0.097 -0.159*** -0.251 
 (-1.11) (-6.24) (-1.06) 
Tangibility 0.314 0.177 0.703 
 (0.49) (1.07) (0.41) 
Board -0.256 0.225 -1.806 
 (-0.45) (1.52) (-1.23) 
Independence -2.762 0.698 -9.775* 
 (-1.33) (1.27) (-1.87) 
Constant 3.450 2.038*** 12.352* 
 (1.55) (3.34) (1.93) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.381 0.451 0.568 
Observations 14,722 6,856 6,464 
 
This table shows the impact of business group membership on change in investment expenditure. The 
key independent variable Business group is a dummy that measures the affiliation with business 
groups of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is affiliated; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for 
SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 3.1. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 





        This chapter studies the role of ICMs in the Chinese market. Following the hypotheses 
in Section 3.2, six regression models are developed and run respectively, based on the data 
for Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2015. The functions of ICMs in different dimensions, 
including corporate financing and investing activities, are analysed to generate a report on 
the situation of member firms affiliated with business groups. 
        The findings of the empirical models suggest that fundamentally, ICM plays a role as 
an alternative to the external financing market. Since the Chinese market is still in 
transformation and not yet sufficiently developed, ICMs are certainly a necessary part of 
business groups, especially non-SOE business groups. With the help of ICMs, member firms 
in business groups are able to maintain their investment levels while requiring fewer bank 
loans. Moreover, it is demonstrated in this chapter that ICM softens financial constraints in 
business groups, and the effect is stronger in small business groups because they prefer to 
operate efficient ICMs. Furthermore, there is evidence that affiliation with business groups 
exerts diverse impacts on member firms due to the different sizes of groups. Specifically, 
member SOEs affiliated with large business groups experience low investment efficiency 
because their capital resources are more than sufficient for their needs. On the contrary, 
member non-SOEs affiliated with small business groups make the most use of their efficient 
ICM to achieve higher levels of investment efficiency. Finally, taking the 2008 financial 
crisis as a natural experiment, it is discovered that all business groups change the status of 
their ICM to efficient when the crisis struck in order to ensure the survival and sustainable 
development of member firms. It can be concluded that ICMs are important components of 
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Chinese business groups as a medium of internal capital flows, and serve the purpose of the 




Chapter Four: The Impact of Princeling Connections on the Internal 
Capital Market Efficiency of Business Groups 
 
4.1 Introduction 
        Business groups have always been a hot topic in the field of corporate finance, not only 
due to their unique organisational structures, but also for their exclusive internal capital 
markets (ICMs) which act as an alternative to the external financing market and provide 
business groups with more choices when making decisions compared to standalone firms 
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Samphantharak, 2006). Talking about the external financing 
market, princeling connections should be taken into consideration for their unneglectable 
role in improving external financing capacity in connected firms. Therefore, when it comes 
to princeling-backed business groups, the role of princeling connections and business groups 
explains their superiority in external and internal financing markets respectively. Due to the 
various impacts of princeling connections, princeling-backed business groups may act 
differently to other business groups. This study explores the behaviour of business groups 
when princeling connections are involved. To be specific, this chapter discusses how industry 
structure affects corporate performance of Chinese business groups and the role of princeling 
connections during the process.  
        This chapter mainly focuses on the impacts of princeling connections on some aspects 
of corporate operations in business groups, as well as their interactions with several other 
variables. As mentioned, according to industry structure, business groups are divided into 
two types in this chapter: horizontally structured and vertically structured. In order to 
145 
 
investigate the characteristics of the two different types of groups, we are interested in the 
following questions: (1) Since the profit maximisation motive among business groups impels 
them to expand their businesses in a profitable way, which usually involves establishing new 
subsidiaries in the same industry that they have privileges due to professional experience and 
insider information, what factors would encourage them to enter a strange industry even 
though this sort of investment is often found to be relatively inefficient and even unprofitable? 
What is the role of princeling connection here, for it certainly helps to overcome obstacles 
when entering a new industry? (2) Do the two different types of business groups use their 
ICMs in the same way? To be specific, as there are direct transactions between subsidiaries 
(for vertically structured business groups) or not (for horizontally structured business groups), 
are the method of transferring internal capital different for the two types? (3) If it could be 
concluded that vertically structured business groups expand because of the incentive of profit 
maximisation, while horizontally structured ones expand because of their “empire building” 
or conglomerate expansion aspirations, what are the impacts of different incentives on ICM 
efficiency in the two types of business groups? What is the impact of princeling connections 
on ICM efficiency? (4) If different industry structure types do affect ICM efficiency, do they 
have any further influence on corporate performance, given that they are closely related? Do 
princeling connections have any effect on business groups’ corporate performance with 
different industry structures? 
        In general, being affiliated with a business group means having access to internal capital, 
internal information and other forms of support from parent and brother firms. Therefore, 
business groups are able to expand their businesses much more easily than independent firms 
thanks to their ability to act unitedly, in the same industry or into a new industry. Obviously, 
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expansion in the same industry, with which one business group is familiar, is quite common. 
There are often two reasons that contribute to a new subsidiary being in the same industry. 
The first one is the motivation of profit maximisation, which means business groups are 
either trying to minimise costs or maximise profits by founding an upstream or downstream 
subsidiary in the same industry. The other one is the pure intention of expanding, for instance 
to found a new subsidiary in another region, so that they can increase their market share. 
These business groups that carry out a same-industry strategy are called vertically structured 
business groups in this study. Then of course the other type of business groups is horizontally 
structured. It refers to those groups with businesses across different industries. Horizontally 
structured Chinese business groups are similar to conglomerates in the United States. 
Conglomerates refer to a combination of multiple business entities operating in different 
industries under one corporate group.  In other words, a conglomerate is a multi-industry 
company, which is the same as the horizontally structured business groups in this thesis 
(Matvos et al., 2014). Compared with vertically structured business groups, the motivations 
of horizontally structured business groups to enter new industries that are entirely strange to 
them seem to be less reasonable, unless they have a good reason to do so. Normally, the 
reason would be an investment opportunity which is considered to be promising, a long-term 
strategy or even a social responsibility. It is clear founding a subsidiary in an unfamiliar new 
industry is much tougher than founding subsidiary in the same industry due to previous 
experience and industry insight, especially during the initial periods. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that vertically structured business groups would perform better than 
horizontally structured business groups, for their priorities are profit maximization and 
conglomerate expansion respectively. Given this expectation, it is interesting and appealing 
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to find out what is the reason behind the phenomenon. This chapter intend to explore the 
reason with the assumption that the potential problems of entering a new industry for 
business groups can be solved, to some extent, through princeling connections.  
        Circumstance becomes different for princeling-backed business groups since princeling 
connections are involved. As discussed in Chapter 2, princeling connections can bring many 
privileges to connected firms, including affiliation with the government and better access to 
bank loans in the external financing market. Specifically, when a business group is connected 
to the government through princelings, these privileges are more influential due to the 
character of business groups. With the reinforced strength, princeling-backed business 
groups could be provided with insight into industry policy, insider information, licensing 
privileges, tax exemptions and superior access to both external and internal financing markets, 
along with many other benefits, which make up for its deficiency and strengthens its 
competitive power in a new industry.  
        Based on the research questions, this chapter proposes several hypotheses and carries 
out empirical tests to find out the results. In order to answer the questions about the key 
elements that facilitate business groups to enter a new industry, this chapter focuses on 
information asymmetry. According to common sense, if business groups tend to expand their 
businesses, their best chance is to establish a new subsidiary in their original industry. Due 
to their practical experience and insight into the industry that they are familiar with, 
establishing another subsidiary in the same industry will be easier. It is even better if they 
decide to establish an upstream or downstream subsidiary in the same industry, as this will 
help them to cut costs or increase profits for the whole group. In comparison, establishing a 
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new subsidiary in a totally strange industry would be much more difficult due to lack of 
experience and contacts. Therefore, if business groups decide to enter a new industry, the 
disadvantages must have been offset somehow. Three key elements of entering a new 
industry are considered to be obstacles for first-time investors. The first element is industry 
insight, or insider information. Due to information asymmetry, a foreign investor lacks 
insight on industrial rules and policies, which keeps them from playing a fair game. The 
second element is professional resources, including material resources and network resources. 
Establishing a new firm needs support and cooperation from upstream and downstream firms. 
Foreign investors could end up not getting what they need to kick-start their new businesses. 
The third element is investment capital. To invest in a new industry does require a generous 
amount of capital, especially when the investors are previously outsiders and do not possess 
any fundamental materials or equipment. Fortunately, there is a solution to all the three 
problems for business groups who want to enter a new industry, which is to establish 
connections to the government. Princeling connections can provide business groups with 
insider information on industry policy, access to resources and external capital. Connected 
business groups are likely to experience privileges and protections from the government, as 
well as an enhanced business reputation due to being affiliated with the government. 
Therefore, princeling connections could be considered to be a helping hand to business 
groups who would like to enter a new industry. According to empirical test results, princeling 
connections do facilitate business groups to enter a new industry. 
        Our findings suggest that, on the one hand, member firms that are affiliated with 
vertically structured business groups run ICMs through trade credit, due to the fact that they 
are usually closely connected in business, which makes trade credit the most efficient, least 
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costly and effortless way to transfer internal capital. On the other hand, member firms that 
are affiliated with horizontally structured business groups often run ICM through equity 
transactions, due to the fact that usually they are not really connected in business since they 
focus on different industries, which means trade credit does not work for them. In addition, 
being affiliated with a business group indicates that all firms in the group are controlled by 
the same parent firm, and it is nothing major to transfer parts of their equity to one another.  
        Furthermore, if the methods of transferring internal capital within business groups are 
different due to industry structure, it is reasonable to assume that such differences may have 
an impact on the efficiency of ICMs (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002). Thus, empirical tests 
are designed to explore whether the two types of business groups have different levels of 
ICM efficiency. Our findings show that vertically structured business groups often tend to 
maintain efficient ICMs while it is just the opposite for horizontally structured business 
groups. The motivation of vertically structured business groups to establish a new subsidiary 
in the same industry is to realise profit maximisation, which ensures the efficiency of ICMs. 
However, for horizontally structured business groups, the motivations for establishing a new 
subsidiary in a strange industry are complicated. These motivations can include gaining the 
following benefits: advance knowledge of changes to government policy, strategic purposes, 
or even a sense of social responsibility to support government policy. Hence, investment 
activities in a new industry can hardly be considered to be profit-driven due to the fact that 
they are often not the optimal opportunities for the original business groups. That is why 
horizontally structured business groups are more likely to operate inefficient ICMs. They 
need to pay extra attention to, and provide extra support (such as resources and internal 
capital) for, their new subsidiaries. Additionally, princeling connections help to improve 
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ICM efficiency because they bring promising and profitable investment opportunities. 
        Finally, the ICM efficiency issue leads us to the corporate performance of different 
types of business groups. As corporate performance is closely related to investment 
profitability and efficiency, inefficient ICMs may result in poor corporate performance. 
Utilising return on assets (ROA) as the indicator, an empirical model is designed in order to 
investigate the relationship between industry structure and corporate performance. Our 
findings demonstrate that horizontally structured business groups generally perform worse 
than their vertically structured peer groups. Similarly, to give a comprehensive result on the 
interactions between the effects of key elements, the impact of princeling connections on the 
role of industry structure in corporate performance is further explored. The empirical results 
suggest that princeling connections help to improve corporate performance in horizontally 
structured business groups due to the privileges that comes with them. 
        This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 gives an introduction and literature 
review on the topic of ICM and princeling connections in business groups, as well as an 
overview of the content of this chapter. Section 4.2 shows how the hypotheses proposed in 
this chapter are developed. Section 4.3 discusses the characteristics of the data and the models 
constructed to test the hypotheses. Section 4.4 analyses the collected data and interprets the 
results of the empirical tests. The last section draws a conclusion on the overall insights about 
industry structure and the princeling connections of business groups in the Chinese market. 
4.2 Hypothesis development 
4.2.1 Industry structure and princeling connections 
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        As discussed in the introduction, in regard to industry structure, business groups are 
identified as either vertically or horizontally structured in this chapter. When entering another 
industry, new investors are often at a disadvantage due to information asymmetry, a lack of 
practical experience and other factors. Therefore, factors that eliminate these disadvantages, 
which ultimately facilitate business groups to enter other industries, are worth investigating. 
Other than long-term prospects or strategies or even social responsibility, which are all 
difficult to quantify, it is not surprising that the ability to acquire timely insider information 
about other industries is the key to boundary crossing. A business group will not recklessly 
enter a strange industry unless it is confident of this investment, which would otherwise be 
considered as extremely risky. Such confidence surely comes from information which can 
be counted on. Given the institutional characteristics of the Chinese market, the government 
undoubtedly has a high level of control over the whole economic system. Government policy, 
for instance, has a great influence on each industry and may even change the rules of the 
game. Therefore, being affiliated with a government insider is definitely essential to a firm, 
especially for industry-crossing business groups. Nevertheless, it is illegal for incumbent 
officials to participate in any business activities in China. Moreover, senior officials are 
banned from business affairs under their jurisdictions even after their retirement. Despite the 
strong incentives of business groups to establish connections to the government, and for 
officials to seek rent from their political power, there is no way to arrange a direct trade-off. 
This is where princelings come in. Princelings refer to direct descendants of senior officials 
of the Chinese Communist Party. They work as proxies for their older generation, which is 
actually taking advantage of the loopholes in laws. Thus, to establish princeling connections 
enables a firm to be affiliated with the government. According to previous research in 
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Chapter 2, princeling-backed firms have better access to bank loans and insider information 
which enables them to win government contracts. Similarly, on the one hand, princeling-
backed business groups are likely to be aware of policy changes before their competitors and 
they can seize the initiative to invest in a new industry. On the other hand, compared to non-
princeling-backed business groups they are surely more confident in investing in another 
industry due to all the privileges and protections provided by their government connections. 
        The benefits brought by princeling connections, including insider information, access 
to primary resources, administrative privileges and protections, facilitate business groups to 
enter new industries. Insider information keeps member firms updated about industrial 
policies and regulations, and this helps them to forecast changes in the environment and 
identify fleeting market opportunities, which is particularly valuable in emerging economies, 
where information asymmetry is prevalent and changes in policies and regulations are 
difficult to foresee. Furthermore, princelings’ connections to the government provide access 
to resources, including resources required in the new industry, as well as external financing. 
In particular, since my study on princeling connections has demonstrated their ability to raise 
bank loans, princeling connections do provide connected business groups with more external 
financing. Thirdly, connected business groups are provided with superior access to licenses, 
permits, administrative privileges and favourable conditions that promote market entry. In 
the light of Zhu and Chung (2014), the following hypothesis and model are proposed. 
H1a: Business groups with princeling connections are more likely to enter a new industry. 
        If this hypothesis is correct, then princeling connections facilitate member firms’ entry 
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into new industries. The following part of this hypothesis is about how it works in regard to 
corporate financing, especially financing from internal capital markets. A firm has two 
financing sources. One is the external financing market, where princeling-backed firms have 
an advantage. The other is its internal capital market, where member firms affiliated with a 
business group have an advantage. A firm that depends more on external financing will 
depend less on the internal capital market, and vice versa. 
        Following Zhu and Chung (2014), the debt ratio of a firm is considered to be a proxy 
for its dependence (or reliance) on external financial resources (Pfeffer, 1987; Baker, 1990). 
Therefore, this proxy also reflects the firm’s dependence on its internal capital market. 
Princeling connections are more valuable to highly leveraged (higher debt ratio) member 
firms than to lower-leveraged ones, as the connections serve as an important channel for 
external financial resources. 
H1b: The role of princeling connections to facilitate business groups to enter a new industry 
is more important for business groups with higher debt ratios. 
4.2.2 Industry structure and internal capital transfer 
        Since there are two types of business groups, depending on whether they have 
subsidiaries in the same industry or in different industries, they are divided into two 
subsamples. Vertically structured business groups refer to those whose subsidiaries are all in 
one industry, while horizontally structured business groups have subsidiaries in different 
industries. In this section we investigate how internal capital is transferred differently in 
business groups with different industry structures. According to the extant literature, ICMs 
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in business groups are implemented in several ways, including trade credits and equity 
transfers. Trade credits clearly need actual business transactions to proceed between member 
firms that are affiliated within the same business group, while equity transfers are a more 
realistic option for subsidiaries that do not have direct transactions between them because 
they are in different industries (Love et al., 2007). Hence, it is reasonable to propose that 
trade credits would be more suitable for vertically structured business groups while equity 
transfers would be more suitable for horizontally structured business groups.    
        To be more specific, on the one hand, vertically structured business groups are 
motivated by profit maximisation or business expansion within the original industry. They 
try to maximise profits or minimise costs by establishing upstream or downstream 
subsidiaries in the same industry, and to expand their original businesses by establishing 
subsidiaries that are copies of extant ones (for instance in different regions). Therefore, it is 
highly likely that actual transactions happen continuously between subsidiaries, which 
enables internal capital to be transferred through trade credits (for instance notes and 
accounts payable and receivable) within these business groups. On the other hand, 
horizontally structured business groups enter new industries mainly due to the privileges that 
come with princeling connections. A new subsidiary in the new industry normally has no 
business interactions with extant subsidiaries or even the parent firm. Therefore, internal 
capital is more likely to be transferred by equity transfers in these business groups.  
H2a: Internal capital is transferred by trade credits in vertically structured business groups. 




4.2.3 Industry structure, ICM efficiency and princeling connections 
        To further explore the different motivations for business expansion and their impacts in 
vertically and horizontally structured business groups, this section discusses how industry 
structure affects the efficiency of ICMs in business groups. Again, the motivations of 
horizontally-structured business groups for establishing subsidiaries in new industries are 
more complicated than the motivations of vertically structured groups. Business expansion 
in vertically structured business groups is done to maximise profits. By establishing a new 
upstream or downstream subsidiary, transaction costs for the whole business group would be 
considerably reduced. Also, vertically structured business groups are in control of their 
supply or/and demand systems, which enables them to adjust their production strategies 
freely to serve the goal of profit maximisation. Likewise, if a vertically structured business 
group decides to establish a subsidiary that is similar to extant ones so as to increase their 
market share, investment in the new subsidiary is usually quite efficient due to their practical 
experience and support, so that the profit patterns can be easily copied. Under these 
circumstances, internal capital that is transferred to new subsidiaries is apparently profit-
driven. Therefore, vertically structured business groups are more likely to have efficient 
ICMs, taking both investment in the new subsidiary and later investment into account. 
        However, horizontally structured business groups operate differently because entering 
a strange industry is definitely much harder than business expansion in a familiar industry, 
especially in the initial stages. Motivations for entering a new industry include information 
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asymmetry, long-term strategy and social responsibility. Even when a horizontally structured 
business group decides to establish a subsidiary in a new industry because of a promising 
and profitable opportunity, it can still suffer from investment inefficiency due to lack of 
experience and other unexpected issues, which always require supports from the parent and 
brother firms. If a vertically structured business group enters a new industry for strategy-
related reasons let alone for social responsibility or to support government policy, profit 
maximisation or investment efficiency are clearly no longer priorities. Governments in 
emerging economies often formulate policies to develop specific sectors that are of strategic 
importance to the national economy (Amsden, 2001), and the government might ask 
affiliated firms, normally SOEs, to take the lead in such initiatives. The investment 
opportunities presented in the new subsidiaries can hardly be taken as optimal ones under 
this circumstance. Moreover, there is less likely to be efficient coordination and cooperation 
among affiliated member firms because they are hardly related, either in their management 
or their business transactions. Consequently, horizontally structured business groups may 
result in inefficient ICMs (Almeida et al., 2006). 
H3a: Horizontally structured business groups implement ICMs that are less efficient than 
those of vertically structured business groups. 
        Furthermore, if princelings are involved, things would be different. From the discussion 
in Section 4.2.1, princeling connections facilitate business groups to enter a new industry by 
providing insider information, access to primary resources, administrative privileges and 
protections. Therefore, the entry into new industries by princeling-backed business groups 
turns out to be a promising and profitable investment, which may help to ease the side-effects 
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of exploring a new territory.  
H3b: Princeling connections help to improve ICM efficiency in horizontally structured 
business groups. 
4.2.4 Industry structure and corporate performance 
        As discussed in previous sections, when establishing a new subsidiary, the motivation 
for vertically structured business groups is profit maximisation, while for horizontally 
structured business groups it is “empire building”, which means profit is not their priority. 
Specifically, based on the motivations of two types of business groups for expanding as stated 
in Section 4.2.3, vertically structured business groups tend to operate efficient ICMs while it 
is just the opposite for horizontally structured business groups. In other words, investment 
activities in horizontally structured business groups are considered to be inefficient or 
unprofitable. Therefore, the inefficiency of ICMs in horizontally structured business groups 
may have a negative impact on corporate performance.  
        H4a: Vertically structured business groups perform better than horizontally structured 
business groups. 
        If one takes princeling connections into consideration, one can expect that the 
performance of business groups will be further affected. Since H3b proposes that princeling 
connections help to improve the efficiency of ICMs in horizontally structured business 
groups, it is reasonable to assume that princeling connections will improve corporate 
performance in horizontally structured business groups. 
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         H4b: Princeling connections help to improve corporate performance of horizontally 
structured business groups. 
4.3 Research design 
4.3.1 Sample 
4.3.1.1 Definition of key variables 
        The key variables are Ln(Industry Number) (along with Horizontal BG) and Inefficient 
Investment. Ln(Industry Number) measures the number of industries that a business group 
has entered. Accordingly, Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a business 
group has entered multiple industries and 0 if it stays in one industry. To avoid ambiguity, 
the industries of both parent firms and subsidiaries are taken into account. Inefficient 
Investment is a measure of the level of ICM efficiency in business groups. Following Cline 
et al. (2014), this variable is calculated as the sum of “Value-destroying investment” and 
“Cross-subsidiary investment”. To be specific, positive values of Value-destroying 
Investment indicate that: (1) The firm transfers resources to divisions that have imputed Q 
values of less than one. However, the value losses resulting from the resource allocation to 
these low Q divisions must exceed the value gains resulting from any other transfers to high 
Q (i.e., N1) divisions. This case represents true value-destroying investment. (2) The firm 
transfers resources away from divisions that have imputed Q values greater than one. As 
before, the value loss amounting from this transfer must exceed the value created by transfers 
to high Q divisions. That is, foregoing good projects in a given segment can be overcome if 
the firm largely invests in good projects elsewhere. Consequently, this scenario represents 
the loss of potential value creation (Cline et al., 2014). Positive values of Cross-Subsidising 
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Investment denote overall inefficient resource allocations and indicate that the firm is, on 
average, transferring resources from those divisions with higher than firm average Qs to 
those divisions with lower than firm average Qs (Cline et al., 2014). 
        As regards the datasets of business groups, the information from two related transaction 
databases from RESET and CSMAR are combined, both of which are commonly used and 
very reliable databases on the Chinese market. Based on the Related Transaction database, 
information on affiliation relationship between two firms are collected. To be specific, there 
are different levels of affiliation relationships which includes but not limited to controlling 
shareholders, parent firms, subsidiaries, brother subsidiaries (referring to two subsidiaries of 
the same parent firm) etc.  
        Another key variable, Princelings, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if any of the parent 
firm or subsidiaries of a business group is considered to be princeling-connected and 0 if 
none of them are princeling-connected. Other dependent variables include Trade Credit, 
Equity Transaction and ROA. A set of selected variables are employed as control variables 
for other firm characteristics, including Debt ratio, Size, Sales, Profitability and so on. 
Detailed definitions and calculations of the dependent and control variables are reported in 
Table 4.1. In avoiding the abnormal observations, all the variables are trimmed at the 1% 
level in each tail. 
4.3.1.2 Data collection 
          According to previous literature on business groups, there are several methods adopted 
to identify business groups and to measure internal capital, including controlling holding  
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Table 4.1 Definition and calculation of variables 
 
Name of variables Definition 
Panel A. Dependent variables  
Ln(Industry Number)   Logarithm of number of industries that a business group has entered 
Trade Credit  Difference of notes and accounts payable and receivable 
Equity Transaction Equity transaction between affiliated firms  
Inefficient investment Sum of value-destroying and cross-subsidiary investment 
ROA Return to total assets  
Value-destroying Investment Internal capital transferred to subsidiaries with a less than 1 Tobin’s Q 
Cross-subsidiary Investment Internal capital transferred to subsidiaries with lower Tobin’s Q 
Panel B. Independent variables  
Princelings A dummy variable that equals 1 if the business group is identified to 
be princeling connected and equals 0 otherwise 
Debt Ratio Liability to total assets 
Horizontal BG A dummy variable that equals 1 if the business group enters different 
industries and equals 0 otherwise 
Vertical BG A dummy variable that equals 1 if the business group stays in the same 
industry and equals 0 otherwise 
Panel C. Control variables  
HHI The four-firm concentration ratio 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Sales Natural logarithm of total sales 
Profitability Net income to total assets 
CFO Operating cash flow 
Growth Annual growth of total assets 
Cash Notes and cash equivalent 
Tangibility  Total fixed assets to total assets 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets divided by the replacement cost of assets 
Leverage Total liabilities to total assets 
Board  Number of directors on the board to total assets 
Independence Number of independent directors on the board to total number of 




shares over the other firm, intra-group lending (Buchuk et al., 2014), even combining data 
from three cross-country databases (Gugler et al., 2013). However, these measures do not 
appropriately fit the reality of Chinese business groups. To identify business groups, two 
commonly used and recognised databases for the Chinese market, CSMAR and RESSET, 
are employed to collect the data, both of which contain sub-database that provides 
information on affiliation relationship among listed firms. Furthermore, since the financial 
statements of Chinese business groups are not consolidated, in other words every listed 
subsidiary is an independent firm, we utilize their financial information disclosed in the 
statements to collect data on their internal capital markets.  
        In regard to the basic process of data collection, all the listed firms on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to 2015 are included. To make sure all the firms’ data 
are comparable, Growth Enterprise Market board (GEM) and Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprise board (SEM) are excluded. Moreover, financial sector firms are excluded because 
of their special capital structures and unique accounting standards to avoid abnormal 
observations. Furthermore, we excluded Particular Transfer (PT) as well as Special 
Treatment (ST) firms. The China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) 
is the main source of the majority of the data. Multiple sub-databases of CSMAR provided 
financial indexes and statements, including the Chinese Listed Firm Financial Variables 
Analysis Database and the Chinese Listed Firm Annual Report Database. 
4.3.1.3 Sample distribution and summary statistics 
Table 4.2 reports on the sample distribution of listed firms that are members of Chinese  
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Table 4.2 Sample distribution  
Panel A: Distribution by year, business group industry structure and ownership structure 
 
Panel B: Distribution by year, business group industry structure and princeling connection  
Year Horizontal Vertical 
 Connected Non-connect Connected Non-connected 
2004 142 142 48 72 
2005 162 149 54 76 
2006 171 164 61 83 
2007 197 177 66 85 
2008 195 179 67 84 
2009 212 167 72 74 
2010 216 163 70 76 
2011 222 160 68 75 
2012 230 153 67 75 
2013 228 163 59 75 
2014 228 163 59 75 
 
This table shows sample distribution by year and ownership structure, as well as by princeling 
connection.   
Year Horizontal Vertical 
 SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs 
2004 178 81 91 54 
2005 193 94 100 54 
2006 196 109 107 67 
2007 217 122 115 71 
2008 219 123 113 70 
2009 194 140 115 76 
2010 198 139 114 74 
2011 190 140 117 78 
2012 208 134 115 68 
2013 211 140 111 63 
2014 207 146 110 62 
163 
 
business groups. Panel A shows the distribution by year, industry structure and ownership 
structure. On average, 42.78% SOEs and 25.35% non-SOEs were affiliated with business 
groups. Among all the business groups, the proportion of horizontally structured business 
groups was 64.79% while vertically structured business groups accounted for 35.21% of the 
total. Even though there is no obvious peak or drop in the data, the number of member firms 
grew during the past decade. Generally speaking, the proportion of member firms out of total 
firms was stable in non-SOEs, and was slowly growing in SOEs. In Panel B, the sample is 
distributed by year, industry structure, and princeling connections. Among all the business 
groups, the proportion of princeling-backed business groups was 52.39% while non-
princeling-backed business groups accounted for 47.61% of the total.  
Table 4.3 shows summary statistics of main variables and univariate test results for the 
dependent variables Inefficient Investment, Value-destroying Investment and Cross-
subsidiary Investment between horizontally structured business groups and vertically 
structured business groups. According to Panel B, horizontally structured business groups 
were engaged in significantly more inefficient investment activities than vertically structured 
business groups, including value-destroying and cross-subsidiary investment. Moreover, in 
regard to Cross-subsidiary Investment, princeling-backed business groups are indifferent 
with non-princeling backed business groups. However, in regard to Value-destroying 
Investment and Inefficient Investment, princeling-backed business groups are significantly 
higher than non-princeling-backed business groups. 
4.3.2 Regression models 
164 
 
Table 4.3 Summary statistics and univariate tests of key variables  
Panel A: Summary statistics 







5929 0.84 0.69 0.31 0.00 1.10 0.00 1.56 
Inefficient 
Investment 
5929 0.65 0.01 12.36 -0.75 1.49 -0.98 3.18 
Tobin’s Q 5929 1.02 1.02 1.01 0.45 1.30 0.17 1.47 
Leverage 5929 0.45 0.48 0.80 0.31 0.60 0.05 1.92 
Tangibility 5929 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.07 0.35 -0.00 0.98 
Growth 5929 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.08 -1.00 10.27 
CFO 5929 0.59 0.43 0.40 0.16 0.24 -0.23 0.28 
Board 5929 1.78 2.14 0.78 1.67 2.26 3.00 20.00 
Independence 5929 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.36 0.11 1.00 
Debt ratio 5929 0.54 0.55 0.25 0.42 0.67 0.32 1.49 
ROA 5929 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.05 -0.47 28.08 
Profitability 5929 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.92 
Sale 5929 2.69 3.49 1.64 1.26 1.16 0.00 6.55 
 
Panel B: Univariate tests comparing horizontally and vertically structured business groups 





0.25 0.06 3.79*** 0.16 0.15 1.65 
Value-destroying 
Investment 
0.58 0.12 2.54** 0.47 0.23 1.93* 
Inefficient 
Investment 
0.83 0.19 3.71*** 0.63 0.38 1.86* 
This table shows summary statistics and univariate test of key variables. Detailed definitions of all 
the variables are reported in Table 4.1. 
 
        Models to carry out empirical tests are constructed according to the hypotheses 
proposed in Section 4.2. For H1a, which proposes that princeling connections facilitate 
business groups to enter a new industry, equation (4.1) is generated in the light of Zhu and 
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Chung (2014). Ln(Industry Number) is the dependent variable that represents how many 
industries one business group has entered. Princeling is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a 
firm in the business group is considered to be princeling connected and 0 otherwise. With 
the control variables, this model tests whether princeling connections have any impact on the 
industry structure of business groups. 
Ln(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟) = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠+𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 × 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐶  
                                                  +𝛽 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐶 + 𝛽 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐴𝑔𝑒 
                                                 +𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ (4.1) 
        β1 is expected to be significantly positive, indicating that princeling connections do 
facilitate business groups to enter new industries. In regards to β2, a significantly positive 
coefficient indicates a complementary effect between princeling connections and normal 
political connections, and a significantly negative coefficient indicates a substitute effect 
between the two types of connections. 
        To test H1b regarding the interaction effect of princeling connections and the level of 
reliance on ICM, equation (4.2) is proposed. Debt Ratio, which is liability to total assets, is 
a proxy for the level of reliance on ICM in business groups. Obviously, level of liability tells 
how much capital is raised from the external financing market (for example bank loans), 
while ICMs serve as internal financing markets. If the debt ratio is relatively low in a business 
group, this reveals that the business group does not really rely on the external financing 
market. In other words, it relies more on its ICM for capital. The relationship between 
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princeling connections and debt ratio is dependent on the impact of princeling connections 
on external financing ability. Based on previous research, it is demonstrated that princeling-
backed firms have better access to bank loans. Investing in a new industry surely requires a 
generous amount of capital. If the capital is raised from external sources, it does have 
everything to do with princeling connections. Otherwise, princeling connections would be 
much less important because they would have no influence on ICM. Thus, if a business group 
has a relatively low debt ratio, which means it relies more on its ICM and less on the external 
capital market, the facilitating-industry-crossing effect of princeling connections would 
become weaker. The interaction term between Princelings and Debt Ratio in equation (4.2) 
is used to test this hypothesis. 
𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟) = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 × 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
                                                  +𝛽 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
                                                  +𝛽 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ                                (4.2) 
        β2 is expected to be significantly positive, indicating that the role of princeling 
connections is more important to industry structure in a business group with relatively higher 
debt ratio, or in other word with less dependence on its ICM.  
        Following Love et al. (2007) and Portes et al. (2005), equations (4.3) and (4.4) are 
generated to test H2a and H2b using the internal capital transfer method for vertically and 
horizontally structured business groups. Internal capital is supposed to be transferred by trade 
credits in vertically structured business groups because subsidiaries in these groups are in the 
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same industry and are business-related. Internal capital is supposed to be transferred by 
equity transactions in horizontally structured business groups because there are hardly any 
actual business transactions between subsidiaries in different industries. 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐺 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 
                                                 +𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ (4.3) 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐺 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 
                                                                               +𝛽 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
                                                                               +𝛽 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ   (4.4) 
where Vertical BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the subsidiaries of a business group 
are all in the same industry, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Horizontal BG is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the subsidiaries of a business group are in different industries. 
        Β1 in both equations are expected to be significantly positive, indicating that vertical-
structured business groups usually hold higher level of trade credit to related firms while 
horizontal-structured business groups often have higher level of equity transactions with 
related firms.  
        For H3a, which states that horizontally structured business groups are more likely to 
operate inefficient ICMs, equation (4.5) is constructed as below. The dependent variable 
Inefficient Investment is calculated following the method proposed by Cline et al. (2014). 
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This variable is a sum of “value-destroying investment” (internal capital transferred to 
subsidiaries that have Tobin’s Qs that are lower than 1) and “cross-subsidiary investment” 
(internal capital transferred to low Tobin’s Q subsidiaries from high Tobin’s Q subsidiaries). 
A positive value for Inefficient Investment is considered to be proof of an inefficient ICM. 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐺 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠 𝑄 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
                                                 +𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ                                   (4.5) 
        β1 is expected to be significantly positive, indicating that horizontally structured 
business groups tend to operate inefficient ICMs. 
        For H3b on the impact of princeling connections on industry structure and the ICM 
efficiency of business groups, equation (4.6) is generated.  Since princeling connections 
usually facilitate business groups to seize profitable investment opportunities in other 
industries, thanks to insider information and privileges in many forms, investment efficiency 
in princeling-backed business groups should be improved. 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐺 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐺 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
                                             +𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠 𝑄 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
                                             +𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ɛ                                                       (4.6) 
        β3 is expected to be significantly negative, indicating that princeling connections help 
to reduce inefficient investment. At the meantime, β2 is expected to be significantly positive, 
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indicating that princeling connections increase the efficiency of ICMs in horizontally 
structured business groups. 
        In order to test the last hypotheses, equations (4.7) and (4.8) are generated. For H4a, 
equation (4.7) is used to test whether industry structure has an impact on corporate 
performance (represented by ROA). Since corporate performance is closely related to 
investment profitability, which is indirectly reflected in investment efficiency, the effect of 
industry structure on corporate performance is expected to be consistent with its effect on 
ICM efficiency.  
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐺 + 𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐼 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
                   +𝛽 𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + ɛ                 (4.7) 
        where HHI is the industry concentration ratio which is used to assess the extent to which 
a given market is oligopolistic or competitive. Β1 is expected to be significantly negative, 
indicating that vertically structured business groups perform better than horizontally 
structured business groups.  
        For H4b, equation (4.8) is used to test the interaction between princeling connections 
and the effect of industry structure on corporate performance in business groups. Since 
princeling connections help to improve ICM efficiency due to the benefits they bring, it is 
expected that they will also improve the corporate performance of connected business groups. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐺 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐺 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
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                +𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 
                +𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + ɛ                                                                              (4.8) 
        β3 is expected to be significantly positive, indicating that princeling connections 
improve corporate performance. Β2 is expected to be significantly positive, indicating that 
princeling connections help to weaken the negative relationship between horizontal industry 
structure and corporate performance. 
4.4 Empirical results and analysis 
4.4.1 The role of princeling connections in business groups’ industry structures 
        Following Sections 4.2 and 4.3, this section analyses the results of empirical tests. 
According to Table 4.4, the coefficients of Princelings are significantly positive at the 1% 
and 10% levels, indicating that princeling connections facilitate business groups to enter new 
industries, which is consistent with H1a. Princeling connections provide business firms with 
connections to government, which comes with privileges that put connected business groups 
in an advantageous position compared to other firms when entering a new industry. 
Additionally, the coefficients of Princeling and Normal PC are significantly positive, and 
the interaction term between them are significantly positive at the 10% level, which indicates 
a complementary effect between princeling connections and normal political connections on 
encouraging business groups to enter another industry. Since the Chinese market is still not 
fully developed and market-oriented, there is a high level of government intervention and 
information asymmetry. This institutional background is ideal for princeling connections to 
thrive. With their social and political networks, princelings are able to provide insider 
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Table 4.4 The impact of princeling connections on industry structure 
VARIABLES Ln(Industry Number) 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.126*** 0.108*** 0.025* 
 (7.09) (5.36) (1.84) 
Princelings 0.123* 0.137* 0.163* 
*Normal PC (1.69) (1.72) (1.70) 
Normal PC 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 
 (4.25) (4.87) (4.72) 
Debt Ratio -0.006 -0.343*** -0.015 
 (-0.62) (-6.63) (-0.67) 
Group Age 0.004 0.006 0.018** 
 (0.47) (0.53) (2.08) 
ROA -0.204 -0.257 0.846 
 (-0.73) (-0.63) (1.05) 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (3.67) (3.74) (3.25) 
Sales 0.000 0.000** -0.000 
 (0.63) (1.99) (-0.63) 
Profitability 0.163 0.237 -0.473 
 (0.52) (0.63) (-1.05) 
Constant 0.478*** 0.376*** 0.486*** 
 (4.86) (5.85) (3.47) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.485 0.515 0.496 
Observations 5,929 3,113 2,816 
 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on industry structure. The dependent variable 
Ln(Industry Number) measures the number of industries a business group has entered; the key 
independent variable Princelings is a dummy variable that measures the princeling connections of 
business groups, which equals 1 if the business group is considered to be princeling-connected; 
detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 4.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets 
below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Information that comes from the government, which helps connected business groups to be 
aware of policy changes ahead of schedule, so they can be well prepared and seize the optimal 
investment opportunities when the time comes. Moreover, princeling connections help 
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connected business groups to gain access to primary resources that are controlled by the 
government, which is truly vital when establishing a new business in some industry, for 
example industries of strategic importance. Furthermore, princeling connections bring 
connected business groups administrative privileges and protections from the government 
and help them to win government contracts.  
        Most importantly, a fundamental requirement for establishing a new subsidiary in a 
strange industry is a generous amount of capital, and this is vital in the initial stages of the 
investment. Even with their ICMs, business groups would like to get all the help they can get 
so that the large amount of investment required will not affect their normal corporate 
operations. This is where princeling connections come in. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, 
princeling connections help connected firms to win bank loans. When they are favoured in 
the external financing market, and they are equipped with ICMs as well, princeling-backed 
business groups are never held back by limited investment capital, and this advantage is a 
powerful helping hand when entering a new industry. Along with all the benefits brought by 
princeling connections and having sufficient investment capital, it is much easier and less 
expensive for princeling-backed business groups to enter a new industry. 
        Table 4.5 shows the interaction between debt ratio and the effect of princeling 
connections on the industry structures of business groups. The coefficients of the interaction 
term between Princelings and Debt ratio are significantly negative. Given that the 
coefficients of Debt ratio are negative, this result indicates that, when debt ratio increases, 
the positive effects of princeling connections are more important to business groups, which 
is consistent with H1b. As explained in Section 4.3.2, debt ratio stands for the level of 
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Table 4.5 The influence of debt ratio on the relationship between princeling connections and 
industry structure 
VARIABLES Ln(Industry Number) 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.273*** 0.632*** 0.374*** 
 (4.51) (5.43) (3.21) 
Princelings* -0.078 -0.733*** -0.570*** 
Debt Ratio (-0.80) (-3.69) (-2.83) 
Debt Ratio 0.005 -0.189*** 0.025 
 (0.11) (-2.95) (0.36) 
Group Age 0.002 0.002 0.08** 
 (0.92) (0.57) (2.36) 
ROA -0.401 -0.509 1.497 
 (-0.67) (-0.55) (1.13) 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (9.63) (7.36) (2.75) 
Sales 0.000 0.000** -0.000 
 (0.05) (1.96) (-0.68) 
Profitability 0.406 0.473 -1.601 
 (0.69) (0.57) (-1.27) 
Constant 0.615*** 0.649*** 0.608*** 
 (17.26) (13.22) (9.12) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.485 0.558 0.403 
Observations 5,929 3,113 2,816 
 
This table shows the impact of debt ratio on the relationship between princeling connections and 
industry structure. The dependent variable Ln(Industry Number) measures the number of industries a 
business group has entered; the key independent variable Princelings is a dummy variable that 
measures the princeling connections of business groups, which equals 1 if the business group is 
considered to be princeling-connected; the other key independent variable Debt Ratio measures the 
reliance of a business group on the external capital market; detailed definitions of all the variables 
are reported in Table 4.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** 




reliance on the external financial market and ICMs. With a relatively high debt ratio, business 
groups are more reliant on the external financial market, and therefore the loan-winning 
effect of princeling connections is more important to them. In other words, a relatively high 
debt ratio increases the facilitating role of princeling connections when connected business 
groups are entering a new industry. 
4.4.2 The relationship between industry structure and the transfer of internal capital  
        Internal capital is transferred in several ways within business groups, including trade 
credits and equity transactions. Table 4.6 shows the relationship between trade credits and 
vertically structured business groups. The coefficients of Vertical BG are significantly 
positive, indicating that vertically structured business groups hold higher levels of trade 
credit among group members, which is consistent with H2a. In other words, internal capital 
in vertically structured business groups is transferred by trade credits. Table 4.7 shows the 
relationship between equity transactions and horizontally structured business groups. The 
coefficients of Horizontal BG are significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating that 
horizontally structured business groups hold higher levels of equity transactions among 
group members, which is consistent with H2b. Therefore, internal capital in horizontally 




Table 4.6 The relationship between vertically structured business groups and trade credit 
VARIABLES Trade Credit 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Vertical BG 0.098*** 0.113*** 0.096*** 
 (3.83) (4.67) (3.10) 
CFO -0.036* -0.027* -0.019* 
 (-1.94) (-1.66) (-1.73) 
Growth 0.069 0.087 -0.093 
 (0.97) (0.96) (-0.96) 
Cash -0.014 0.014 -0.018 
 (-1.10) (1.31) (-1.39) 
Size 0.007 0.026 0.009 
 (0.41) (0.79) (0.66) 
Leverage t-1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.92) (-1.58) (-1.39) 
Constant 0.046*** -0.201*** 0.152* 
 (3.50) (-3.01) (1.91) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.291 0.356 0.318 
Observations 1,452 748 704 
 
This table shows the relationship between vertically structured business groups and trade credit. The 
key independent variable Vertical BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the business group is 
vertically structured and 0 otherwise; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 
4.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance 





Table 4.7 The relationship between horizontally structured business groups and equity 
transactions 
VARIABLES Equity Transaction 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Horizontal BG 0.109*** 0.079*** 0.123*** 
 (2.83) (3.09) (3.96) 
Tobin’s Q 0.003 0.016 0.006 
 (0.31) (0.76) (0.96) 
Cash -0.000 -0.00 -0.000 
 (-0.42) (-0.58) (-0.89) 
Liability 0.009* 0.008* -0.009* 
 (1.87) (1.92) (-1.95) 
Growth 0.016* 0.018* 0.009* 
 (1.66) (1.86) (1.93) 
Profitability -0.015 0.012 -0.017 
 (-1.20) (1.51) (-1.59) 
Constant 0.256*** -0.831*** 0.715* 
 (3.10) (-2.81) (1.71) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.329 0.289 0.328 
Observations 4,477 2,310 2,167 
 
This table shows the relationship between horizontally structured business groups and equity 
transactions. The key independent variable Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
business group is horizontally structured and 0 otherwise; detailed definitions of all the variables are 
reported in Table 4.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
        Regarding the two different types of business groups, vertically structured business 
groups have subsidiaries all in one same industry so that they become business partners of 
each other to minimise transaction costs and ultimately to maximise profits, while 
horizontally structured business groups have subsidiaries in different industries which means 
they are hardly actually related in their business activities. It is obvious that the most efficient 
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and inexpensive method to transfer internal capital is through their business transactions, 
which can be easily done through trade credits. On the contrary, trade credits would not work 
for horizontally structured business groups because they do not have actual business 
transactions in common. Therefore, they transfer internal capital through equity transactions. 
Since all the subsidiaries are affiliated with the same business group, or in other words are 
all controlled by the same parent firm, it does not matter if their equities are partially 
transferred to one another.  
4.4.3 The impact of industry structure on ICM efficiency and its interaction with princeling 
connections  
        Table 4.8 shows how industry structure affects the ICM efficiency of business groups. 
The coefficients of Horizontal BG are significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating that, 
generally speaking, horizontally structured business groups are engaged in inefficient ICM, 
which is consistent with H3a. The theory is that business groups normally establish new 
subsidiary firms to enter a new industry. Therefore, to support the newly formed subsidiary, 
internal capital is transferred inefficiently. In other words, horizontally structured business 
groups can be expected to experience lower ICM efficiency compared to their vertically 
structured peers. Horizontally structured business groups transfer internal capital to their 





Table 4.8 Efficiency of ICM in horizontally structured business groups and ownership 
structure 
VARIABLES Inefficient Investment 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Horizontal BG 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.042*** 
 (3.61) (3.37) (3.33) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.061*** 
 (14.23) (8.93) (11.69) 
Leverage t-1 0.003 0.007 0.098*** 
 (1.41) (0.91) (3.89) 
Size -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.64) (0.41) (-0.18) 
Tangibility 0.033*** 0.013 0.104** 
 (2.89) (1.57) (2.56) 
Board 0.006 -0.001 -0.044** 
 (0.97) (-0.16) (-2.22) 
Independence -0.141*** -0.037 -0.122 
 (-4.20) (-1.40) (-1.20) 
Constant 0.746*** -1.201*** 0.052* 
 (4.50) (-3.61) (1.71) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.351 0.468 
Observations 5,929 3,113 2,816 
 
This table shows the impact of industry structure on ICM efficiency. The key independent variable 
Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the business group is horizontally structured and 
0 otherwise; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 4.1. T-statistics are reported 
in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
        Table 4.9 shows the impacts of princeling connections on influence of industry structure 
on ICM efficiency. The coefficients of Princelings are significantly negative, which is 
consistent with my investigation of the impact of princeling connections on investment 
efficiency in Chapter Two. For non-SOEs, princeling connections bring them the loans they 
are longing for, and they thus improve investment efficiency. The coefficients of the  
179 
 
Table 4.9 Efficiency of ICM in horizontally structured business groups, ownership structure 
and princeling connections 
VARIABLES Inefficient Investment 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Horizontal BG 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 (3.61) (3.37) (3.33) 
Horizontal BG* 0.213* 0.129* 0.098*** 
Princelings (1.78) (1.65) (2.67) 
Princelings -0.005 0.008 -0.011** 
 (-0.38) (0.99) (-2.48) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 -0.102** -0.161** -0.071** 
 (-1.98) (-2.36) (-2.09) 
Leverage t-1 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 
 (-0.72) (-1.58) (1.59) 
Size 0.006 -0.026 0.001 
 (0.21) (-0.59) (0.26) 
Tangibility 0.002 0.021 0.004 
 (0.10) (0.31) (0.89) 
Board 0.002 0.055 -0.001 
 (1.41) (1.30) (-0.50) 
Independence -0.006 0.011 0.000 
 (-0.94) (0.76) (0.83) 
Constant 0.236*** -0.761*** 0.851* 
 (3.50) (-2.61) (1.81) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.379 0.391 0.364 
Observations 5,929 3,113 2,816 
 
This table shows the influence of princeling connections on the impact of industry structure on ICM 
efficiency. The key independent variable Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
business group is horizontally structured and 0 otherwise; the other key independent variable 
Princelings is a dummy variable that measures the princeling connections of business groups, which 
equals 1 if the business group is considered to be princeling-connected; detailed definitions of all the 
variables are reported in Table 4.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** 




interaction term between Horizontal BG and Princelings are significantly positive at the 1% 
and 10% levels. For horizontally structured non-SOE business groups, by combining 
coefficients of Princelings and the interaction term, princeling connections improve their 
ICM efficiency, which is consistent with H3b. The reason is that princeling connections bring 
them insider information and privileges that help them to gain promising and optimal 
investment opportunities in a new industry while being free of governmental obligations. In 
other words, princeling connections improve the efficiency of ICMs in horizontally 
structured business groups, especially for non-SOE business groups. 
4.4.4 The impact of industry structure on corporate performance, and its interaction with 
princeling connections  
        Based on the analysis of empirical results in Section 4.4.3, horizontally structured 
business groups tend to operate inefficient ICMs due to their investment in new industries. 
Since corporate performance is closely related to investment profitability, inefficient 
investment may have a negative influence on corporate performance. Table 4.10 shows the 
impact of industry structure on the corporate performance of business groups. The coefficient 
of Horizontal BG is significantly negative in columns 1 and 3 at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively, indicating that horizontally structured business groups generally perform worse 
than vertically structured business groups, especially for non-SOE business groups, which is 
consistent with H4a. This result is also consistent with the results in Table 4.8, which show 
that horizontally structured business groups experience relatively lower ROA due to their 
inefficient ICM for their “empire building” aspirations. 
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Table 4.10 The impact of industry structure on corporate performance 
VARIABLES ROA 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Horizontal BG -0.003** -0.002 -0.009*** 
 (-4.74) (-1.26) (-6.74) 
HHI 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 
 (2.63) (2.98) (3.07) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.37) (-1.14) (-0.74) 
Growth 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 
 (6.36) (6.47) (5.96) 
Tangibility -0.009*** -0.003 -0.010* 
 (-3.37) (-0.37) (-1.95) 
CFO 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (3.42) (3.83) (4.47) 
Leverage -0.016*** -0.040*** -0.036*** 
 (-6.36) (-7.25) (-5.47) 
Board 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.006 
 (3.95) (5.63) (1.03) 
Independence 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.067*** 
 (4.36) (3.57) (4.58) 
Constant 0.001 0.002 0.005 
 (0.46) (1.17) (1.42) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.473 0.428 0.483 
Observations 5,524 3,012 2,512 
 
This table shows the impact of industry structure on corporate performance. The key independent 
variable Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the business group is horizontally 
structured and 0 otherwise; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 4.1. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 
        Table 4.11 shows how princeling connections affect the role of industry structure 
regarding corporate performance. The coefficients of the interaction term between 
Ln(Industry Number) and Princelings are significantly positive, indicating that princeling  
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Table 4.11 The influence of princeling connections on the impact of industry structure on 
corporate performance 
VARIABLES ROA 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Horizontal BG -0.001** -0.002 -0.005*** 
 (-2.16) (-1.05) (-4.72) 
Horizontal BG 0.001** 0.001* 0.002** 
*Princelings (1.99) (1.69) (2.37) 
Princelings 0.028** 0.029** 0.026** 
 (1.98) (2.08) (2.13) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.76) (-1.11) (-0.61) 
Growth 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 
 (3.72) (4.99) (5.83) 
Tangibility -0.005*** -0.002 -0.010* 
 (-2.60) (-0.89) (-1.86) 
CFO 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (6.21) (4.25) (3.50) 
Leverage -0.006*** -0.032*** -0.021*** 
 (-10.88) (-9.61) (-5.02) 
Board 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 
 (3.20) (5.00) (1.23) 
Independence 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.045*** 
 (6.70) (5.47) (6.12) 
Constant 0.001 0.002 0.005 
 (0.29) (0.15) (0.17) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.397 0.399 0.394 
Observations 5,524 3,012 2,512 
 
This table shows the influence of princeling connections on the impact of industry structure on 
corporate performance. The key independent variable Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the business group is horizontally structured and 0 otherwise; the other key independent variable 
Princelings is a dummy variable that measures the princeling connections of business groups, which 
equals 1 if the business group is considered to be princeling-connected; detailed definitions of all the 
variables are reported in Table 4.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** 




connections improve corporate performance in horizontally structured business groups, 
which is consistent with H4b. Princeling connections improve ICM efficiency in horizontally 
structured business groups, which is demonstrated in Section 4.4.3. In other words, princeling 
connections reduce inefficient investment in horizontally structured business groups, which 
leads to an increase in investment profitability. Therefore, the final result is an overall 
improvement of corporate performance in horizontally structured business groups. 
4.4.5 Robustness of results 
4.4.5.1 Potential endogeneity issue 
    The potential endogeneity issue in this chapter lies into princeling connections. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the exogeneity of princeling connections is not for sure. Therefore, 
the Difference in Difference (DiD) method is employed again to solve the potential 
endogeneity issue. Similar to Section 2.4.6.1, the anti-corruption campaign is considered to 
be an appropriate even for natural experiment, since it is entirely exogeneous. Accordingly, 
princeling-backed business groups are treated group and non-princeling-backed business 
groups are control group. The results of DiD method utilizing the random effect model is 
reported in Table 4.12. The coefficients of the interaction term between Princelings and 
Campaign are significantly negative at the 10% level. Combine the coefficient of Princelings 
and the coefficient of the interaction term, the sum of the two coefficients are negative, 
indicating that princeling-backed business groups are less likely to enter a new industry after 
the anti-corruption campaign. The reason may be the decline of accessible bank loans due to 
the campaign, which was demonstrated in Section 2.4.6.1.  
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Table 4.12 Difference in difference regression results on princeling connections and business 
groups 
VARIABLES Ln(Industry Number) 
 All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.259*** 0.273*** 0.178* 
 (5.93) (4.39) (1.769) 
Princelings -0.283* -0.297* -0.176 
* Campaign (-1.69) (-1.72) (-1.10) 
Campaign -0.039 -0.042 -0.038 
 (-0.25) (-0.87) (-0.72) 
Debt Ratio -0.004 -0.242*** -0.008 
 (-0.10) (-3.88) (-0.11) 
Group Age 0.003 0.003 0.011** 
 (0.92) (0.57) (2.36) 
ROA -0.405 -0.465 1.947 
 (-0.68) (-0.50) (1.48) 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (9.66) (7.38) (2.87) 
Sales 0.000 0.000** -0.000 
 (0.08) (2.05) (-0.70) 
Profitability 0.416 0.432 -1.833 
 (0.71) (0.52) (-1.46) 
Constant 0.620*** 0.685*** 0.631*** 
 (17.72) (14.19) (9.52) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.512 0.494 
Observations 5,929 3,113 2,816 
This table shows the difference in difference random effect model regression results of the 
impacts of princelings connections on industry structure of SOE and non-SOE business 
groups respectively. Column 1 reports the results in all sample firms, while columns 2 and 3 
report the results in SOEs and non-SOEs. The dependent variable is Ln(Industry number). 
The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is 
princelings connected; Campaign is a dummy that equals 1 when it refers to years later than 
2012; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are 
reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 




4.4.5.2 Other robustness tests 
        This section provides robustness test results that employ alternative measures of key 
variables, including Ln(Industry Number), Princelings and Inefficient Investment. To start 
with, in Table 4.4 Ln(Industry Number) is measured as the number of industries that a 
business group has entered. To replace that measure, Ln(Industry Number) in Table 4.13 is 
now a weighted (by total assets) index of industry structure. Similarly, Princelings in Table 
4.4 is a dummy variable indicating whether any subsidiary of the business group is 
considered to be princeling-connected. To provide an alternative measure, Princelings in 
Table 4.13 is now a proportional index indicating how many firms are princeling-connected 
out of the overall firms within the business group. According to the results of Table 4.13, the 
conclusion that princeling connections facilitate business groups to enter new industries is 
robust. 
        As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, Inefficient Investment is a sum of “value-destroying 
investment” and “cross-subsidiary investment”, following the method proposed by Cline et 
al. (2014). Therefore, these two variables are employed as alternative dependent variables to 
Inefficient Investment. Panel A of Table 4.14 reports the impact of industry structure on the 
level of Value-destroying Investment, while Panel B of Table 4.14 reports the impact of 
industry structure on the level of Cross-subsidiary Investment. According to the results of 
Table 4.14, the conclusion that horizontally structured business groups are more likely to 
operate inefficient ICM is robust. 
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Table 4.13 Robustness test on industry structure and princeling connections 
VARIABLES Ln(Industry Number) 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.596*** 0.507*** 0.441*** 
 (36.52) (22.84) (14.24) 
Debt Ratio 0.042 -0.508*** -0.126 
 (0.44) (-3.56) (-0.79) 
Group Age 0.903** 0.837 -0.494 
 (2.56) (1.29) (-0.53) 
ROA 4.786*** 1.814 4.360 
 (2.87) (0.84) (1.43) 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (11.73) (6.75) (3.08) 
Sales 0.000 0.000*** -0.000* 
 (1.15) (3.12) (-1.69) 
Profitability -5.070*** -2.900 -3.931 
 (-2.98) (-1.39) (-1.27) 
Constant 1.852*** 2.001*** 2.004*** 
 (22.07) (18.31) (13.11) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.268 0.237 0.268 
Observations 5,929 3,113 2,816 
 
This table shows the robustness results of the impact of princeling connections on industry structure. 
The dependent variable Ln(Industry Number) measure the number of industries a business group has 
entered; the key independent variable Princelings is a dummy variable that measures the princeling 
connections of business groups, which equals 1 if the business group is considered to be princeling-
connected; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 4.1. T-statistics are reported 




Table 4.14 Additional results on efficiency of ICM in horizontally structured business groups 
and ownership structure 
Panel A. Value-destroying investment in horizontally structured business groups  
VARIABLES Value-destroying Investment 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Horizontal BG 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.036*** 
 (3.62) (3.34) (3.78) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.052*** 
 (15.96) (11.12) (13.20) 
Leverage t-1 0.002 0.007 0.084*** 
 (1.47) (1.19) (4.38) 
Size -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.42) (0.59) (-0.04) 
Tangibility 0.026*** 0.011 0.081*** 
 (2.85) (1.60) (2.63) 
Board 0.006 -0.000 -0.037** 
 (1.25) (-0.05) (-2.50) 
Independence -0.125*** -0.041* -0.097 
 (-4.76) (-1.96) (-1.27) 
Constant -0.013** -0.014** -0.040* 
 (-1.97) (-2.19) (-1.68) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.351 0.468 
Observations 5,929 3,113 2,816 
 
This table shows the results for robustness tests of the relationship between industry structure and 
value-destroying investment. The key independent variable Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the business group is horizontally structured and 0 otherwise; detailed definitions of all 
the variables are reported in Table 4.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, 





Panel B. Cross-subsidiary investment in horizontally structured business groups  
VARIABLES Cross-subsidiary Investment 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Horizontal BG 0.003*** 0.002** 0.006 
 (2.76) (2.22) (1.64) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.003*** -0.000 0.009*** 
 (6.17) (-0.35) (5.91) 
Leverage t-1 0.001 -0.000 0.015** 
 (0.92) (-0.19) (2.00) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.08) (-0.22) (-0.50) 
Tangibility 0.008** 0.002 0.023* 
 (2.35) (0.93) (1.96) 
Board -0.000 -0.001 -0.006 
 (-0.03) (-0.42) (-1.14) 
Independence -0.016* 0.005 -0.025 
 (-1.68) (0.63) (-0.85) 
Constant -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 
 (-1.16) (-0.32) (-1.02) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.351 0.468 
Observations 5,929 3,113 2,816 
 
This table shows the results for the robustness tests of the relationship between industry structure and 
cross-subsidiary investment. The key independent variable Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the business group is horizontally structured and 0 otherwise; detailed definitions of all 
the variables are reported in Table 4.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, 
** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 
4.4.6 Additional results 
4.4.6.1 The impacts of princeling connections and industry structure on bank loans in 
business groups 
        Panel A of Table 4.15 reports the impact of princeling connections on level of access to  
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Table 4.15 The impact of princeling connection and industry structure on bank loans in 
business groups 
Panel A. The impact of princeling connections on bank loans in business groups 
VARIABLES Total bank loan 
SOE             Non-SOE 
Long-term bank loan 
SOE             Non-SOE 
Short-term bank loan 
SOE             Non-SOE 
Princelings 0.365*** 0.475*** 0.220** 0.526*** 0.409*** 0.447*** 
 (5.92) (5.70) (2.43) (4.05) (6.41) (5.59) 
ROSt-1 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.001 
 (-1.00) (0.43) (-0.56) (0.65) (-1.35) (0.25) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.751*** 0.656*** 0.921*** 0.846*** 0.657*** 0.566*** 
 (23.75) (18.86) (17.90) (12.34) (20.08) (16.89) 
Size 0.174*** 0.184*** 0.148*** 0.230*** 0.178*** 0.171*** 
 (21.55) (13.80) (12.34) (10.77) (21.27) (13.19) 
Tangibility 1.589*** 1.080*** 2.873*** 1.944*** 1.244*** 1.247*** 
 (9.34) (3.70) (11.42) (4.21) (7.05) (4.38) 
Board -0.068*** 0.029 -0.058 -0.041 -0.059** -0.012 
 (-2.59) (0.72) (-1.51) (-0.63) (-2.17) (-0.31) 
Independence 0.383*** 0.282*** 0.442*** 0.345** 0.296*** 0.332*** 
 (5.46) (2.64) (4.35) (2.05) (4.07) (3.22) 
Constant 14.929*** 16.709*** 13.949*** 13.700*** 14.760*** 16.469*** 
 (61.82) (41.09) (35.05) (21.76) (59.03) (42.16) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.576 0.594 0.446 0.452 0.530 0.547 
Observations 3,590 2,293 3,590 2,293 3,590 2,293 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on the level of access to total bank loans in 
columns 1 and 2, on the level of access to long-term loans in columns 3 and 4, and on the level of 
access to short-term loans in columns 5 and 6. Princelings is a dummy that measures the princeling 
connection of business group, which equals 1 if the business group is princeling-backed; detailed 
definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below 




Panel B. The impact of industry structure on bank loans in business groups 
VARIABLES Total bank loan 
SOE             Non-SOE 
Long-term bank loan 
SOE             Non-SOE 
Short-term bank loan 
SOE             Non-SOE 
Horizontal BG 0.344*** 0.405*** 0.381*** 0.777*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 
 (5.83) (4.20) (4.32) (4.95) (4.86) (3.23) 
ROSt-1 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.000 
 (-1.14) (0.06) (-0.57) (0.29) (-1.53) (-0.08) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.748*** 0.653*** 0.915*** 0.811*** 0.657*** 0.569*** 
 (23.61) (18.54) (17.82) (11.72) (19.98) (16.74) 
Size 0.175*** 0.190*** 0.148*** 0.239*** 0.178*** 0.176*** 
 (21.68) (14.10) (12.44) (11.21) (21.28) (13.41) 
Tangibility 1.569*** 1.300*** 2.886*** 2.198*** 1.219*** 1.467*** 
 (9.22) (4.47) (11.50) (4.82) (6.88) (5.16) 
Board -0.039 0.029 -0.025 -0.050 -0.033 -0.011 
 (-1.45) (0.71) (-0.65) (-0.78) (-1.19) (-0.28) 
Independence 0.326*** 0.283*** 0.379*** 0.337** 0.248*** 0.332*** 
 (4.60) (2.63) (3.69) (2.01) (3.36) (3.20) 
Constant 14.537*** 16.147*** 13.477*** 12.805*** 14.426*** 16.009*** 
 (57.66) (38.75) (32.65) (20.03) (55.08) (39.92) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.576 0.589 0.449 0.456 0.527 0.539 
Observations 3,590 2,293 3,590 2,293 3,590 2,293 
This table shows the impact of industry structure on the level of access to total bank loans in columns 
1 and 2, on the level of access to long-term loans in columns 3 and 4, and on the level of access to 
short-term loans in columns 5 and 6. Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the business 
group is horizontally structured and 0 otherwise; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported 
in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent 




Panel C. The interacting impacts of princeling connections and industry structure on bank 
loans in business groups 
VARIABLES Total bank loan 
SOE             Non-SOE 
Long-term bank loan 
SOE             Non-SOE 
Short-term bank loan 
SOE             Non-SOE 
Princelings 0.281** 0.113 0.387* 0.073 0.320** 0.099 
 (2.16) (0.63) (1.96) (0.25) (2.37) (0.57) 
Princelings* 0.069 0.427** -0.253 0.505 0.082 0.417** 
Horizontal BG (0.47) (2.15) (-1.14) (1.61) (0.54) (2.18) 
Horizontal BG 0.307*** 0.282*** 0.395*** 0.625*** 0.257*** 0.181* 
 (5.00) (2.72) (4.28) (3.67) (4.01) (1.81) 
ROSt-1 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.000 
 (-0.90) (0.06) (-0.50) (0.27) (-1.26) (-0.09) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.739*** 0.637*** 0.908*** 0.792*** 0.647*** 0.553*** 
 (23.40) (18.19) (17.65) (11.46) (19.75) (16.38) 
Size 0.175*** 0.189*** 0.148*** 0.239*** 0.179*** 0.176*** 
 (21.85) (14.23) (12.46) (11.27) (21.48) (13.53) 
Tangibility 1.599*** 1.090*** 2.907*** 1.968*** 1.254*** 1.256*** 
 (9.44) (3.76) (11.59) (4.30) (7.12) (4.43) 
Board -0.043 0.013 -0.028 -0.070 -0.038 -0.026 
 (-1.60) (0.32) (-0.72) (-1.09) (-1.36) (-0.66) 
Independence 0.327*** 0.296*** 0.381*** 0.358** 0.248*** 0.345*** 
 (4.63) (2.79) (3.71) (2.15) (3.39) (3.36) 
Constant 14.552*** 16.453*** 13.454*** 13.148*** 14.444*** 16.307*** 
 (57.92) (39.62) (32.57) (20.49) (55.42) (40.78) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.580 0.600 0.450 0.463 0.533 0.551 
Observations 3,590 2,293 3,590 2,293 3,590 2,293 
This table shows the interacting impacts of princeling connections and industry structure on the level 
of access to total bank loans in columns 1 and 2, on the level of access to long-term loans in columns 
3 and 4, and on the level of access to short-term loans in columns 5 and 6. Princelings is a dummy 
that measures the princeling connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-
backed; Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the business group is horizontally 
structured and 0 otherwise; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 





Total, long-term and short-term bank loans. The coefficients of Princelings in the first row 
are all significantly positive at the 1% and 5% levels, indicating that princeling connections 
generally improve the access to bank loans in business groups. Furthermore, this impact is 
stronger in non-SOE business groups since the coefficients in columns 2, 4 and 6 are larger 
in magnitude. Panel B of Table 4.15 reports the impact of industry structure on access to all 
kinds of bank loans. Similarly, horizontally structured business groups possess better ability 
to obtain bank loans, and this effect is much stronger in non-SOE business groups seeking 
long-term bank loans. Panel C shows the interacting impacts of princeling connections and 
industry structure on access to bank loans in business groups. According to the coefficients 
of the interaction term between Princelings and Horizontal BG, the two elements seem to 
work in synergy in non-SOE business groups, which gives rise to a significant improvement 
in access to bank loans.  
4.4.6.2 The impacts of princeling connections and industry structure on investment decision 
in business group 
        Table 4.16 shows the impacts of princeling connections and industry structure on 
investment decisions in business groups. In Panel A, the significantly positive coefficients 
of Princelings suggest that princeling-backed business groups tend to invest more than 
business groups without princeling connections. Moreover, this effect is much stronger in 
non-SOE business groups. Over-investing of princeling-backed non-SOE business groups 
does harm to their investment efficiency. Panel B gives similar results regarding the impacts 
of industry structure on business group investment efficiency, demonstrating that for 
horizontally structured business groups, both SOE and non-SOE groups tend to invest more,  
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Table 4.16 The impact of princeling connections and industry structure on investment 
decisions in business groups 
Panel A. The impact of princeling connections on investment decisions in business groups 
VARIABLES Investment expenditure 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.547*** 0.341*** 0.908*** 
 (5.86) (2.77) (4.71) 
Princelings -0.055 0.020 -0.327** 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (-0.74) (0.22) (-2.31) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.322*** 0.434*** 0.531*** 
 (10.68) (10.51) (11.18) 
Leverage t-1 -0.060* -1.501*** -1.790*** 
 (-1.93) (-8.02) (-7.77) 
Size 0.067*** 0.111*** 0.087*** 
 (8.06) (9.96) (4.63) 
Tangibility 3.769*** 3.197*** 4.483*** 
 (20.17) (15.29) (11.86) 
Board 0.011 -0.024 0.075 
 (0.39) (-0.77) (1.42) 
Independence 0.371*** 0.527*** 0.131 
 (4.84) (6.19) (0.95) 
Constant 14.922*** 13.494*** 16.144*** 
 (61.42) (46.46) (31.22) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.415 0.475 0.392 
Observations 5,883 3,590 2,293 
This table shows the impact of princeling connections on investment efficiency in all listed firms, as 
well as SOEs and non-SOEs separately. The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy that 
measures the princeling connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market assets value divided by the replacement cost of assets, representing 
investment opportunities; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics 
are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% 




Panel B. The impact of industry structure on investment decisions in business groups 
VARIABLES Investment expenditure 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Horizontal BG 0.072 0.369*** 0.490*** 
 (0.80) (3.38) (2.88) 
Horizontal BG 0.079 -0.098 -0.255*** 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (1.47) (-1.44) (-3.00) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.382*** 0.379*** 0.433*** 
 (8.86) (7.02) (6.61) 
Leverage t-1 -0.055* -1.475*** -1.836*** 
 (-1.74) (-7.84) (-7.92) 
Size 0.065*** 0.112*** 0.092*** 
 (7.77) (10.03) (4.89) 
Tangibility 3.779*** 3.178*** 4.781*** 
 (20.08) (15.18) (12.64) 
Board 0.027 0.001 0.092* 
 (0.92) (0.03) (1.72) 
Independence 0.346*** 0.481*** 0.100 
 (4.46) (5.56) (0.72) 
Constant 14.837*** 13.088*** 15.556*** 
 (56.60) (41.51) (28.95) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.409 0.473 0.382 
Observations 5,883 3,590 2,293 
This table shows the impact of industry structure on investment efficiency in all listed firms, as well 
as in SOEs and non-SOEs separately. Horizontal BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the business 
group is horizontally structured and 0 otherwise; Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market assets value 
divided by the replacement cost of assets, representing investment opportunities; detailed definitions 
of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the 




Panel C. The impact of industry structure on investment decisions in princeling-backed and 
non-princeling-backed business groups 
VARIABLES  Investment expenditure  
All sample firms 
Princeling    Non- 
                    princeling 
SOE 
Princeling    Non- 
                    princeling 
Non-SOE 
Princeling    Non- 
                    princeling 
Horizontal BG 1.043*** 0.205** 0.817*** 0.250** 1.843*** 0.092 
 (4.30) (2.14) (2.92) (2.11) (3.72) (0.52) 
Horizontal BG -0.119** -0.168 -0.393** -0.078 -0.607*** -0.222* 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (-2.14) (-0.98) (-2.14) (-1.07) (-2.61)  (-1.94) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.446*** 0.463*** 0.241 0.390*** 0.991*** 0.355*** 
 (3.18) (10.24) (1.47) (6.80) (4.25) (5.38) 
Leverage t-1 0.008 -1.639*** -2.984*** -1.314*** -5.122*** -1.455*** 
 (0.29) (-10.22) (-4.20) (-6.67) (-4.26) (-6.35) 
Size 0.022 0.122*** 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.283*** 0.089*** 
 (0.92) (12.34) (3.05) (9.51) (4.24) (4.63) 
Tangibility 5.431*** 3.382*** 4.127*** 3.088*** 5.993*** 4.024*** 
 (9.67) (17.18) (6.87) (13.79) (5.58) (10.20) 
Board 0.266*** -0.028 -0.002 0.002 0.586*** -0.094* 
 (3.25) (-0.92) (-0.03) (0.06) (3.65) (-1.67) 
Independence -0.015 0.396*** 0.723*** 0.436*** -1.531*** 0.405*** 
 (-0.07) (4.85) (3.78) (4.58) (-3.54) (2.86) 
Constant 14.470*** 15.021*** 14.519*** 13.079*** 13.738*** 16.719*** 
 (12.14) (55.86) (15.30) (39.13) (16.47) (30.69) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.579 0.404 0.674 0.456 0.685 0.322 
Observations 776 5,107 399 3,191 266 2,027 
This table shows the impact of industry structure on investment decisions in princeling-backed and 
non-princeling-backed business groups, as well as in SOE and non-SOE business groups. Horizontal 
BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the business group is horizontally structured and 0 otherwise; 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market assets value divided by the replacement cost of assets, representing 
investment opportunities; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-statistics 
are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% 





while horizontally structured non-SOE business groups experience a decrease in investment 
efficiency. Panel C further divides subsamples of business groups (regarding ownership 
structure) into princeling-backed and non-princeling-backed business groups. By comparing 
the coefficients of the interacting term between princeling-backed and non-princeling-
backed business groups, one can see that the impact of horizontal industry structure in 
reducing investment efficiency is stronger in business groups with princeling connections. 
The explanation for this could be that both princeling connections and horizontal industry 
structure help to raise investment expenditure, which leads to over-investment that results in 
lower investment efficiency.  
4.5 Conclusions 
        This chapter studies industry structure, its relationship with princeling connections and 
its impact on ICM efficiency in business groups in the Chinese market. Following the 
hypotheses proposed in Section 4.2, eight regression models are developed and run, based 
on data for Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2014. The roles of industry structure in different 
dimensions are thoroughly analysed to generate a comprehensive report. 
        The empirical results suggest that princeling connections facilitate business groups to 
enter a new industry due to the privileges that comes with them, including insider information 
on industry policies, access to licenses and essential resources, extra capital from the external 
financing market, protection from the government, and enhancements to business reputation. 
Moreover, the two types of business groups carry out their ICMs in different ways. To be 
specific, vertically structured business groups transfer internal capital through trade credits 
because subsidiaries are in the same industry and usually closely connected in their 
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businesses, while horizontally structured business groups transfer internal capital through 
equity transactions because trade credits do not work for them since they are in different 
industries and not directly connected in their businesses. Furthermore, vertically structured 
business groups often operate efficient ICMs because their motivation for establishing a new 
subsidiary in the same industry is to maximise profits. In comparison, horizontally structured 
business groups are more likely to have inefficient ICMs because their motivation to establish 
a new subsidiary in a new industry is not profit-driven. In addition, princeling connections 
help to improve ICM efficiency in horizontally structured business groups. Finally, 
inefficient ICM leads to poor corporate performance in horizontally structured business 
groups. Similarly, princeling connections help to improve corporate performance in 





Chapter Five: Conclusions 
 
        In this thesis, we investigated two factors that help firms to build a favourable 
developing environment, namely princeling connections and affiliation with business group. 
The impacts of these two factors on various aspects of corporate operation, including 
financing, investment decisions, development strategy and profitability, are explored through 
empirical tests. Results suggest that the two factors both have unique characters and 
sometimes work in synergy to improve competitive power of firms.  
5.1 The impacts of princeling connections on corporate operations 
        This study proposes princeling connections as a complement to political connections. 
Whereas normal political connections refer to executives with government work experience, 
princeling connections are direct channels through which firms and bureaucrats are tightly 
connected. The empirical results show that princeling connections affect corporate operations 
in many ways. The presence of a princeling connection is a sign that a firm has support and 
protection from the government, and to some extent, this reduces the importance of the role 
of corporate profitability in bank lending decisions. Princeling-backed firms acquire better 
access to long-term bank loans which ultimately turn into investment expenditure. 
Predictably, SOEs do not value the loan-winning attributes of princeling connection as much 
as non-SOEs for they are already superior in the external financing market due to their state-
owned nature. Hence, princeling-backed non-SOEs experience an increase in investment 
expenditure that princeling-backed SOEs do not share. Consequently, excess loans allow 
princeling-backed non-SOEs to invest in sub-optimal opportunities, resulting in a decrease 
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in investment efficiency.  
        In addition, to provide a comprehensive view of the relationship between princeling 
connections and normal political connections, since they do co-exist in firms, contrasting 
tests are carried out with interesting results. On the one hand, in regard to their loan-winning 
ability, there seems to be a synergy between the two types of connections. Princeling 
connections are able to increase access to bank loans even in firms where normal political 
connections are having the same impact. On the other hand, the impacts of princeling 
connections on investment activities are overshadowed by the impacts of political 
connections. Furthermore, unlike normal political connections, the concept of princeling 
connection applies to both principal and agent princelings, and it therefore contributes to 
agency theory. Empirical results indicate that agent princelings (princeling executives) give 
rise to higher levels of debts, which is consistent with the theory that agents tend to serve the 
best interests of the firm more than principals, while principal princelings (princeling 
shareholders) prefer to avoid extra debts due to their concerns about risk. 
5.2 The role of ICMs in business groups 
        Like ICMs in other countries, the fundamental function of ICMs in Chinese business 
groups is to provide an alternative to the external financing market, allowing member firms 
to invest beyond their borrowing levels. Given the unique institutional characteristics of the 
Chinese market, this function is even more essential than it is in other economies. 
Unsurprisingly, internal capital helps to ease financial constraints on subsidiaries, especially 
for member firms affiliated with smaller business groups. The is because of the different 
development stages that business groups go through. Large business groups are obviously 
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engaged in business expansion, while small business groups have not yet reached this stage. 
The “empire building” aspirations of large business groups require them to look after their 
newly established subsidiaries that in their formative stages are likely to be vulnerable and 
unprofitable, which means the business group needs to provide internal capital for the future 
development of new firms. When internal capital stream going to these subsidiaries exceeds 
the stream in the opposite direction, an inefficient ICM is observed. To conclude, large 
business groups often operate an inefficient ICM to support their development strategies, 
whereas small business groups usually run an efficient ICM because profit maximisation 
remains their priority.  
        In the meantime, the results suggest that SOE business groups, large ones in particular, 
are more likely to be involved in investment inefficiency. Understandably, as mainstays of 
the nation’s economy, large SOE business groups are more likely to invest in projects that 
are less profitable but important to the nation, out of a sense of social responsibility or to 
support to government policy, for instance during economic transition and restructuring. 
Non-SOE business groups, on the other hand, do not share the motivation for sub-optimal 
investment. Therefore, owing to the transfer of internal capital via ICMs to subsidiaries who 
need it most, non-SOE business groups experience an improvement in investment efficiency.  
        Nevertheless, when it comes to an unexpected financial crisis, such as the 2008 financial 
crisis, the role of ICMs becomes simple and explicit: They are used to address the damage 
caused by the crisis. Specifically, ICM helps to maintain good investment efficiency in 
business groups, in spite of their differences in size and ownership structures, in comparison 
to stand-alone firms. Apparently, large business groups have to put their “empire building” 
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aspirations on hold as their sustainable development is under threat.   
5.3 Princeling-backed business groups 
        To summarise, princeling connections help individual firms to raise capital from the 
external financing market, while ICMs serve as internal financing markets for member firms 
affiliated with business groups. Thus, there should be no difficulty for princeling-backed 
business groups to finance any investment. In addition, princeling-backed business groups 
benefit from other privileges enjoyed by princeling-backed firms. By utilising social and 
political networks, princeling connections provide business groups with access to insider 
information (including industry policy), scarce resources, easier access to licenses, and 
favoured status when seeking government contracts. Since exploring a new territory is much 
more challenging than developing in a familiar field, advantages in both financing and 
investment help princeling-backed business groups to explore investment opportunities in a 
new industry, so that they have significant advantages over their unconnected peers. This 
explains why princeling-backed business groups tend to be industry-diversified.  
        Moreover, unlike vertically structured (industry-concentrated) business groups who 
normally have business transactions taking place between subsidiaries (for instance upstream 
and downstream subsidiaries), horizontally structured (industry-diversified) business groups 
encounter more obstacles in transferring internal capital between subsidiaries in different 
industries. In particular, establishing a new business in a strange industry is a capital-
intensive investment, accompanied by the foreseeable fact that the new subsidiary is not 
likely to make satisfying profits in the early stages of its development, so that capital 
allocated to it comes from the group’s ICM instead of the external financing market to avoid 
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outside monitoring. As a result, the diversification of business groups into new industries is 
highly correlated with inefficient ICM and relatively poor performance (compared to 
vertically structured business groups). However, as regards investing in a new industry, 
princeling-backed business groups are better off than their unconnected peers. From a 
financing perspective, princeling connections make it possible for business groups to finance 
additionally from the external market so as to ease the burden on their ICMs. From an 
investment perspective, princeling-backed business groups have a significant advantage in 
their ability to gain profitable investment opportunities and win government contracts, which 
increases their investment efficiency and corporate profitability. Conclusively, princeling 
connections improve ICM efficiency and corporate performance in horizontally structured 
business groups.  
5.4 Implications of this thesis 
        This study examines the role of princeling connections in corporate operations in the 
unique Chinese market. More importantly, it examines the real impacts of the government’s 
anti-corruption campaign in terms of economic aspect, and its findings could serve future 
policy making by the Chinese government. The establishment of princeling connections is 
associated with bribery by firms and corruption on the part of bureaucrats. Personal benefits 
and privileges gained by princelings, bureaucrats and princeling-backed firms come at the 
cost of unconnected firms as an inevitable result of rent-seeking behaviour. The misuse of 
political resources encourages corruption and results in the misallocation of social wealth. 
This indicates that princeling connections should be put under strict supervision. Fortunately, 
we are on our way to putting an end to the trade-off between political power and personal 
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benefits. In addition to the anti-corruption campaign, this issue should be addressed at its 
root that is revealed in the incentive of connected firms, especially non-SOEs. If the 
discrimination against private enterprises could be eliminated and firms could be evaluated 
fairly regardless of their ownership structures, the external financing market would serve its 
original purpose much better. Similarly, information transparency should be improved to 
avoid the information asymmetry associated with princeling connections.  
         For business groups, the implications of this study are more practical. Empirical 
evidence indicates that business groups that are larger are inclined to pursue business 
expansion, which does harm to their ICM efficiency and investment efficiency. Their 
tendency to exploit new territories in new industries can even diminish their profitability. For 
the sake of sustainable development, business groups should be cautious and avoid being 
overconfident about their financial capacities, and they should formulate realistic and 
practical long-term strategies. 
 
5.5 Limitations of this thesis and future research focus  
We admit, due to the limitation of data, that we do not have a complete princelings data 
set due to the limitation of accessible information and data. Nevertheless, we believe that the 
sample of princeling-backed firms collected from two sources in this study is representative 
for the princeling-backed firm population. Most importantly, despite possible missing 
observations, our empirical results are statistically significant, which suggests that our 
findings should remain for the population of princeling-backed firms. 
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Another limitation of this thesis is the choice of the instrumental variable in Section 
3.4.5.1 in Chapter Three. In this section, number of employees is utilized as the instrumental 
variable for business groups to eliminate endogeneity issue and to examine the robustness of 
empirical results. The reason to choose number of employees to be the instrumental variable 
is that it is significantly correlated with business groups but not correlated to access to bank 
loans. This instrumental variable meets the conditions of an appropriate IV. However, if this 
instrumental variable is relatively weak, the results would be unreliable.  
        The future focus of the research is to investigate the role of finance companies in 
Chinese business groups. Finance companies are in charge of the management of internal 
capital markets and reallocation of internal capital. In the Chinese market, finance companies 
are often independent subsidiaries of business groups. To some extent, finance companies 
are more like the substantialization of internal capital markets, which is worth further 
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